Growth Patterns

November 29, 2012 § Leave a comment

Growing beings and growing things, whether material

or immaterial, accumulate mass or increase their spreading. Plants grow, black holes grow, a software program grows, economies grow, cities grow, patterns grow, a pile of sand grows, a text grows, the mind grows and even things like self-confidence and love are said to grow. On the other hand, we do not expect that things like cars or buildings “grow.”

Despite the above mentioned initial “definition” might sound fairly trivial, the examples demonstrate that growth itself, or more precisely, the respective language game, is by far not a trivial thing. Nevertheless, when people start to talk about growth or if they invoke the concept of growth implicitly, they mostly imagine a smooth and almost geometrical process, a dilation, a more or less smooth stretching. Urbanists and architects are no exception to this undifferentiated and prosy perspective. Additionally, growth is usually not con- sidered seriously beyond its mere wording, probably due to the hasty prejudgment about the value of biological principles. Yet, if one can’t talk appropriately about growth—which includes differentiation—one also can’t talk about change. As a result of a widely (and wildly) applied simplistic image of growth, there is a huge conceptual gap in many, if not almost all works about urban conditions, in urban planning, and about architecture.1  But why talking about change, for in architecture and urbanism is anyway all about planning…

The imprinting by geometry often entails another prejudice: that of globality. Principles, rules, structures are thought to be necessarily applied to the whole, whatever this “wholeness” is about. This is particularly problematic, if these rules refer more or less directly to mere empirical issues. Such it frequently goes unnoticed that maintaining a particular form or keeping position in a desired region of the parameter space of a forming process requires quite intense interconnected local processes, both for building as well as destroying structures.

It was one of the failures in the idea of Japanese Metabolism not to recognize the necessity for deep integration of this locality. Albeit they followed the intention to (re-)introduce the concept of “life cycle” into architecture and urbanism, they kept aligned to cybernetics. Such, Metabolism failed mainly for two reasons. Firstly, they attempted to combine incommensurable mind sets. It is impossible to amalgamate modernism and the idea of bottom-up processes like self-organization or associativity, and the Metabolists always followed the modernist route. Secondly, the movement has been lacking a proper structural setup: the binding problem remained unresolved. They didn’t develop a structural theory of differentiation that would have been suitable to derive appropriate mechanisms.

This Essay

Here in this piece we just would like to show some possibilities to enlarge the conceptual space and the vocabulary that we could use to describe (the) “growing” (of) things. We will take a special reference to architecture and urbanism, albeit the basics would apply to other fields as well, e.g. to the growth and the differentiation of organizations (as “management”) or social forms, but also of more or even “completely” immaterial entities. In some way, this power is even mandatory, if we are going to address the Urban6, for the Urban definitely exceeds the realm of the empirical.
We won’t do much of philosophical reflection and embedding, albeit it should be clear that these descriptions don’t make sense without proper structural, i.e. theoretical references as we have argued in the previous piece. “As such” they would be just kind of a pictorial commentary, mistaking metaphor as allegory. There are two different kinds of important structural references. One is pointing to the mechanisms2, the abstract machinery with its instantiation on the micro-level or with respect to the generative processes. The other points to the theoretico-structural embedment, which we have been discussing in the previous essay. Here, it is mainly the concept of generic differentiation that provides us the required embedding and the power to overcome the binding problem in theoretical work.

The remainder of this essay comprises the following sections (active links):

1. Space

Growth concerns space, both physical and abstract space. Growth concerns even the quality of space. The fact of growth is incompatible with the conception of space as a container. This becomes obvious in case of the fractals, which got their name due to their “broken” dimensionality. A fractal could be 2.846-dimensional. Or 1.2034101 dimensional. The space established by the “inside” of a fractal is very different from the 3-dimensional space. Astonishingly, the dimensionality even need not be constant at all while traveling through a fractal.

Abstract spaces, on the other hand, can be established by any set of criteria, just by interpreting criteria as dimensions. Such, one gets a space for representing and describing items, their relations and their transformations. In mathematics, a space is essentially defined as the possibility to perform a mapping from one set to another, or in other terms, by the abstract (group-theoretic) symmetry properties of the underlying operations on the relations between any entities.

Strangely enough, in mathematics spaces are almost exclusively conceived as consisting from independent dimensions. Remember that “independence” is the at the core of the modernist metaphysical belief set! Yet, they need neither be Euclidean nor Cartesian as the generalization of the former. The independence of descriptive dimensions can be dropped, as we have argued in an earlier essay. The resulting space is not a dimensional space, but rather an aspectional space, which can be conceived as a generalization of dimensional space.

In order to understand growth we should keep in contact with a concept of space that is as general as possible. It would be really stupid for instance, to situate growth restrictively in a flat 2-dimensional Euclidean space. At least since Descartes’ seminal work “Regulae” (AT X 421-424) it should be clear that any aspect may be taken as a contribution to the cognitive space [8].

The Regulae in its method had even allowed wide latitude to the cognitive use of fictions for imagining artificial dimensions along which things could be grasped in the process of problem solving. Natures in the Meditations, however, are no longer aspects or axes along which things can be compared, evaluated, and arrayed, but natures in the sense that Rule 5 had dismissed: natures as the essences of existing things.

At the same time Descartes also makes clear that these aspects should not be taken as essences of existing things. In other words, Descartes has been ahead of 20ieth century realism and existentialism! Aspects do not represent things in their modes of existence, they represent our mode of talking about the relations we establish to those things. Yet, these relations are more like those threads as String Theory describes them: without fixed endings on either side. All we can say about the outer world is that there is something. Of course, that is far to little to put it as a primacy for human affairs.

The consequence of such a dimensional limitation would be a blind spot (if not a population of them), a gap in the potential to perceive, to recognize, to conceive of and to understand. Unfortunately, the gaps themselves, the blind spots are not visible for those who suffer from them. Nevertheless, any further conceptualization would remain in the state of educated nonsense.

Growth is established as a transformation of (abstract) space. Vice versa, we can conceive of it also as the expression of the transformation of space. The core of this transformation is the modulation of the signal intensity length through the generation of compartments, rendering abstract space into a historical, individual space. Vice versa, each transformation of space under whatsoever perspective can be interpreted as some kind of growth.

The question is not any more to be or not to be, as ontologists tried to proof since the first claim of substance and the primacy of logics and identity. What is more, already Shakespeare demonstrated the pen-ultimate consequences of that question. Hamlet, in his mixture of being realist existentialist (by that very question) and his like of myths and (use) of hidden wizards, guided by the famous misplaced question, went straight into his personal disaster, not without causing a global one. Shakespeare’s masterfully wrapped lesson is that the question about Being leads straight to disaster. (One might add that this holds also for ontology and existentialism: it is consequence of ethical corruption.)

Substance has to be thought of being always and already a posteriori to change, to growth. Setting change as a primacy means to base thought philosophically on difference. While this is almost a completely unexplored area, despite Deleuze’s proposal of the plane of immanence, it is also clear that starting with identity instead causes lots of serious troubles. For instance, we would be forced to acknowledge that the claim of the possibility that a particular interpretation indeed could be universalized. The outcome? A chimaera of Hamlet (the figure in the tragedy!) and Stalin.

Instead, the question is one of growth and the modulation of space: Who could reach whom? It is only through this question that we can integrate the transcendence of difference, its primacy, and to secure the manifold of the human in an uncircumventable manner. Life in all of its forms, with all its immanence,  always precedes logic.3 Not only for biological assemblages, but also for human beings and all its produces, including “cities” and other forms of settlements.

Just to be clear: the question of reaching someone else is not dependent on anything given. The given is a myth, as philosophers from Wittgenstein to Quine until Putnam and McDowell have been proofing. Instead, the question about the possibility to reach someone else, to establish a relation between any two (at least) items is one of activity, design, and invention, targeting the transformation of space. This holds even in particle physics.

2. Modes of Talking

Traditionally spoken, the result of growth is formed matter. More exactly, however, it is transformed space. We may distinguish a particular form, morphos, or with regard to psychology also a “Gestalt,” and form as an abstractum. The result of growth is form. Thus, form actually does not only concern matter, it always concerns the potential relationality.

For instance, growing entities never interact “directly”. They, that is, also: we, always interact through their spaces and the mediality that is possible within them.4 Otherwise it would be completely impossible for a human individual to interact with a city. Before any semiotic interpretive relation it is the individual space that enables incommensurable entities to relate.

If we consider the growth of a plant, for instance, we find a particular morphology. There are different kinds of tissues and also a rather typical habitus, i.e. a general appearance. The underlying processes are of biological nature, spanning from physics and bio-chemistry to information and the “biological integration” of those.

Talking about the growth of a building or the growth of a city we have to spot the appropriate level of abstraction. There is no 1:1 transferability. In a cell we do neither find craftsmen nor top-down-implementations of plans. In contrast, rising a building apparently does not know anything about probabilistic mechanisms. Just by calling something intentionally “metabolism” (Kurokawa) or “fractal” (Jencks), invoking thereby associations of organisms and their power to maintain themselves in physically highly unlikely conditions, we certainly do not approach or even acquire any understanding.

The key for any growth model is the identification of mechanisms (cf. [4]). Biology  is the science that draws most on the concept of mechanism (so far), while physics does so for the least. The level of mechanism is already an abstraction, of course. It needs to be completed, however, by the concept of population, i.e. a dedicated probabilistic perspective, in order to prevent falling back to the realm of trivial machines. In a cross-disciplinary setting we have to generalize the mechanisms into principles, such that these provide a shared differential entity.5

Well, we already said that a building is rarely raised by a probabilistic process. Yet, this is only true if we restrict our considerations to the likewise abstract description of the activities of the craftsmen. Else, the building process starts long before any physical matter is touched.

Secondly, from the perspective of abstraction we never should forget—and many people indeed forget about this—that the space of expressibility and the space of transformation also contains the nil-operator. From the realm of numbers we call it the zero. Note that without the zero many things could not be expressed at all. Similarly, the negative is required for completing the catalog of operations. Both, the nil-operator and the inverse element are basic constituents of any mathematical group structure, which is the most general way to think about the conditions for operations in space.

The same is true for our endeavor here. It would be impossible to construct the possibility for graded expressions, i.e. the possibility for a more or less smooth scale, without the nil and the negative. Ultimately, it is the zero and the nil-operation together with the inverse that allows to talk reflexively at all, to create abstraction, in short to think through.

3. Modes of Growth

Let us start with some instances of growth from “nature”. We may distinguish crystals, plants, animals and swarms. In order to compare even those trivial and quite obviously very different “natural” instances with respect to growth, we need a common denominator. Without that we could not accomplish any kind of reasonable comparison.

Well, initially we said that growth could be considered as accumulation of mass or as an increase of spread. After taking one step back we could say that something gets attached. Since crystals, plants and animals are equipped with different capabilities, and hence mechanisms, to attach further matter, we choose the way of organizing the attachment as the required common denominator.

Given that, we can now change the perspective onto our instances. The performance of comparing implies an abstraction, hence we will not talk about crystals etc. as phenomena, as this would inherit the blindness of phenomenology against its conditions. Instead, we conceive of them as models of growth, inspired by observations that can be classified along the mode of attachment.

Morphogenesis, the creation of new instances of formed matter, or even the creation of new forms, is tightly linked to complexity. Turing titled his famous article the “Chemical Basis of Morphogenesis“. This, however, is not exactly what he invented, for we have to distinguish between patterns and forms, or likewise, between order and organization. Turing described the formal conditions for emergence of order from a noisy flow of entropy. Organization, in contrast, also needs the creation of remnants, partial decay, and it is organization that brings in historicity. Nevertheless, the mechanisms of complexity of which the Turing-patterns and -mechanisms are part of, are indispensable ingredients for the “higher” forms of growth, at least, that is, for anything besides crystals (but probably even for for them in same limited sense). Note that morphogenesis, in neither of its aspects, should not be conceived as something “cybernetical”!

3.1. Crystals

Figure 1a: Crystals are geometric entities out of time.

Crystals are geometrical entities. In the 19th century, the study of crystals and the attempt to classify them inspired mathematicians in their development of the concept of symmetry and group theory. Crystals are also entities that are “structurally flat”. There are no levels of integration, their macroscopic appearance is a true image of their constitution on the microscopic level. A crystal looks exactly the same on the level of atoms up to the scale of centimeters. Finally, crystals are outside of time. For their growth is only dependent on the one or two layers of atoms (“elementary cells”) that had been attached before at the respective site.

There are two important conditions in order to grow a 3-dimensional crystal. The site of precipitation and attachment need to be (1) immersed in a non-depletable solution where (2) particles can move through diffusion in three dimensions. If these conditions are not met, mineral depositions look very different. As far as it concerns the global embedding conditions, the rules have changed. More abstractly, the symmetry of the solution is broken, and so the result of the process is a fractal.

Figure 1b. Growth in the realm of minerals under spatial constraints, particularly the reduction of dimensionality. The image does NOT show petrified plants! It is precipitated mineral from a solution seeped into a nearly 2-dimensional gap between  two layers of (lime) rock. The similarity of shapes points to a similarity of mechanisms.

Both examples are about mineralic growth. We can understand now that the variety of resulting shapes is highly dependent on the dimensional conditions embedding the growth process.

Figure 1c. Crystalline buildings. Note that it is precisely and only this type of building that actualizes a “perfect harmony” between the metaphysics of the architect and the design of social conditions. The believe in independence and the primacy of identity  has been quite effectively delivered into the habit of the everyday housing conditions.

Figure 1d. Crystalline urban layout, instantiated as “parametrism”. The “curvy” shape should not be misinterpreted as “organic”. In this case it is just a little dose of artificial “erosion” imposed as a parametric add-on to the crystalline base. We again meet the theme of the geological. Nothing could be more telling than the claim of a “new global style”: Schumacher is an arch-modernist, a living fossil, mistaking design as religion, who benefits from advanced software technology. Who is Schumacher that he could decree a style globally?

The growth of crystals is a very particular transformation of space. It is the annihilation of any active part of it. The relationality of crystals is completely exhausted by resistance and the spread of said annihilation.

Regarding the Urban6, parametrism must be considered as being deeply malignant. As the label says, it takes place within a predefined space. Yet, who the hell Schumacher (and Hadid, the mathematician) thinks s/he is that s/he is allowed, or even being considered as being able, to define the space of the Urban? For the Urban is a growing “thing,” it creates its own space. Consequently all the rest of the world admits not to “understand” the Urban, yet Hadid and her barking Schumacher even claim to be able to define that space, and thus also claim that this space shall be defined. Not surprisingly, Schumacher is addicted to the mayor of all bureaucrats of theory, Niklas Luhman (see our discussion here), as he proudly announces in his book “The Autopoiesis of Architecture” that is full of pseudo- and anti-theory.

The example of the crystal clearly shows that we have to consider the solution and the deposit together as a conditioned system. The forces that rule their formation are a compound setup. The (electro-chemical) properties of the elementary cell on the microscopic level, precisely where it is in contact with the solution, together with the global, macroscopic conditions of the immersing solution determine the instantiation of the basic mechanism. Regardless the global conditions, basic mechanism for the growth of crystals is the attachment of matter is from the outside.

In crystals, we do not find a separated structural process layer that would be used for regulation of the growth. The deep properties of matter determine their growth. Else, only the outer surface is involved.

3.2. Plants

With plants, we find a class of organisms that grow—just as crystals—almost exclusively at their “surface”. With only a few exceptions, matter is almost exclusively attached at the “outside” of their shape. Yet, matter is also attached from their inside, at precisely defined locations, the meristemes. Else, there is a dedicated mechanism to regulate growth, based on a the diffusion of certain chemical compounds, the phyto-hormones, e.g. auxin. This regulation emancipates the plant in its growth from the properties of the matter it is built from.

Figure 2a. Growth in Plants. The growth cone is called apical meristeme. There are just a handful of largely undifferentiated cells that keep dividing almost infinitely. The shape of the plant is largely determined by a reaction-diffusion-system in the meristem, based on phyto-hormones that determine the cells. Higher plants can build secondary meristemes at particular locations, leading to a characteristic branching pattern.

 

Figure 2b. A pinnately compound leaf of a fern, showing its historical genesis as attachment at the outside (the tip of the meristeme)  from the inside. If you apply this principle to roots, you get a rhizome.

Figure 2c. The basic principle of plant growth can be mapped into L-Grammars, n order to create simulations of plant-like shapes. This makes clear that fractal do not belong to geometry! Note that any form creation that is based on formal grammars is subject to the representational fallacy.

Instead of using L-grammars as a formal reference we could also mention self-affine mapping. Actually, self-affine mapping is the formal operation that leads to perfect self-similarity and scale invariance. Self-affine mapping projects a minor version of the original, often primitive graph onto itself. But let us inspect two examples.

Figure 2d.1. Scheme showing the self-affine mapping that would create a graph that looks like a leaf of a fern (image from wiki).

self-affine Fractal fern scheme
Figure 2d.2. Self-affine fractal (a hexagasket) and its  neighboring graph, which encodes its creation [9].
self-affine fractals hexagasket t

Back to real plants! Nowadays, most plants are able to build branches. Formally, they perform a self-affine mapping. Bio-chemically, the cells in their meristeme(s) are able to respond differentially to the concentration of one (or two) plant hormones, in this case auxine. Note, that for establishing a two component system you won’t necessarily need two hormones! The counteracting “force” might be realized by some process just inside the cells of the meristeme as well.

From this relation between the observable fractal form, e.g. the leaf of the fern, or the shape of the surrounding of a city layout, and the formal representation we can draw a rather important conclusion. The empirical analysis of a shape should never stop with the statement that the respective shape shows scale-invariance, self-similarity or the like. Literally nothing is gained by that! It is just a promising starting point. What one has to do subsequently is to identify the mechanisms leading to the homomorphy between the formal representation and the particular observation. If you like, the chemical traces of pedestrians, the tendency to imitate, or whatever else. Even more important, in each particular case these actual mechanisms could be different, though leading to the same visual shape!!!

In earlier paleobiotic ages, most plants haven’t been able to build branches. Think about tree ferns, or the following living fossile.

Figure 2d. A primitive plant that can’t build secondary meristemes (Welwitschia). Unlike in higher plants, where the meristeme is transported by the growth process to the outer regions of the plant (its virtual borders), here it remains fixed; hence, the leaf is growing only in the center.

Figure 2e. The floor plan of Guggenheim Bilbao strongly reminds to the morphology of Welwitschia. Note that this “reminding” represents a naive transfer on the representational level. Quite in contrast, we have to say that the similarity in shape points to a similarity regarding the generating mechanisms. Jencks, for instance, describes the emanations as petals, but without further explanation, just as metaphor. Gehry himself explained the building by referring to the mythology of the “world-snake”, hence the importance of the singularity of the “origin”. Yet, the mythology does not allow to say anything about the growth pattern.

Figure 2f. Another primitive plant that can’t build secondary apical meristems. common horsetail (Equisetum arvense). Yet, in this case the apical meristeme is transported.

Figure 2g. Patrick Schumacher, Hadid Office, for the master plan of the Istanbul project. Primitive concepts lead to primitive forms and primitive habits.

Many, if not all of the characteristics of growth patterns in plants are due to the fact that they are sessile life forms. Most buildings are also “sessile”. In some way, however, we consider them more as geological formations than as plants. It seems to be “natural” that buildings start to look like those in fig.2g above.

Yet, in such a reasoning there are even two fallacies. First, regarding design there is neither some kind of “naturalness”, nor any kind of necessity. Second, buildings are not necessarily sessile. All depends on the level of the argument. If we talk just about matter, then, yes, we can agree that most buildings do not move, like crystals or plants. Buildings could not be appropriately described, however, just on the physical level of their matter. It is therefore very important to understand that we have to argue on the level of structural principles. Later we will provide an impressive example of an “animal” or “animate” building.7 

As we said, plants are sessile, all through, not only regarding their habitus. In plants, there are no moving cells in the inside. Thus, plants have difficulties to regenerate without dropping large parts. They can’t replace matter “somewhere in between”, as animals can do. The cells in the leafs, for instance, mature as cells do in animals, albeit for different reasons. In plants, it is mainly the accumulation of calcium. Such, even in tropical climates trees drop off their leaves at least once a year, some species all of them at once.

The conclusion for architecture as well as for urbanism is clear. It is just not sufficient to claim “metabolism” (see below) as a model. It is also appropriate to take “metabolism” as a model, not even if we would avoid the representational fallacy to which the “Metabolists” fell prey. Instead, the design of the structure of growth should orient itself in the way animals are organized, at the level of macroscopic structures like organs, if we disregard swarms for the moment, as most of them are not able to maintain persistent form.

This, however, brings immediately the problematics of territorialization to the fore. What we would need for our cities is thus a generalization towards the body without organs (Deleuze), which orients towards capabilities, particularly the capability to choose the mode of growth. Yet, the condition for this choosing is the knowledge about the possibilities. So, let us proceed to the next class of growth modes.

3.3. Swarms

In plants, the growth mechanisms are implemented in a rather deterministic manner. The randomness in their shape is restricted to the induction of branches. In swarms, we find a more relaxed regulation, as there is only little persistent organization. There is just transient order. In some way, many swarms are probabilistic crystals, that is, rather primitive entities. Figures 3a thru 3d provide some examples for swarms.

From the investigation of swarms in birds and fishes it is known that any of the “individual” just looks to the movement vector of its neighbors. There is no deep structure, precisely because there is no persistent organization.

Figure 3a. A flock of birds. Birds take the movement of several neighbors into account, sometimes without much consideration of their distance.

Figure 3b. A swarm of fish, a “school”. It has been demonstrated that some fish not only consider the position or the direction of their neighbors, but also the form of the average vector. A strong straight vector seems to be more “convincing” for the neighbors as a basis for their “decision” than one of unstable direction and scalar.

Figure 3c. The Kaaba in Mekka. Each year several persons die due to panic waves. Swarm physics helped to improve the situation.

Figure 3d. Self-ordering in a pedestrians population at Shibuya, Tokyo. In order to not crash into each other, humans employ two strategies. Either just to follow the person ahead, or to consider the second derivative of the vector, if the first is not applicable. Yet, it requires a certain “culture”, an unspoken agreement to do so (see this for what happens otherwise)

A particularly interesting example for highly developed swarms that are able to establish persistent organization is provided by Dictyostelium (Fig 4a), in common language called a slime-mold. In biological taxonomy, they form a group called Mycetozoa, which indicates their strangeness: Partly, they behave like fungi, partly like primitive animals. Yet, they are neither prototypical fungi nor prototypical animals. in both cases the macroscopic appearance is a consequence of (largely) chemically organized collaborative behavior of a swarm of amoeboids. Under good environmental conditions slime-molds split up into single cells, each feeding on their own (mostly on bacteria). Under stressing conditions, they build astonishing macroscopic structures, which are only partially reversible as parts of the population might be “sacrificed” to meet the purpose of non-local distribution.

Figure 4a. Dictyostelium, “fluid” mode; the microscopic individuals are moving freely, creating a pattern that optimizes logistics. Individuals can smoothly switch roles from moving to feeding. It should be clear that the “arrangement” you see is not a leaf, nor a single organism! It is a population of coordinating individuals. Yet, the millions of organisms in this population can switch “phase”… (continue with 4b…)

Figure 4b. Dictyostelium, in “organized” mode, i.e. the “same” population of individuals now behaving “as if” it would be an organism, even with different organs. Here, individuals organize a macroscopic form, as if they were a single organism. There is irreversible division of labor. Such, the example of Dictyostelium shows that the border between swarms and plants or animals can be blurry.

The concept of swarms has also been applied to crowds of humans, e.g. in urban environments [11]. Here, we can observe an amazing re-orientation. Finally, after 10 years or so of research on swarms and crowds, naïve modernist prejudices are going to be corrected. Independence and reductionist physicism have been dropped, instead, researchers get increasingly aware of relations and behavior [14].

Trouble is, the simulations treat people as independent particles—ignoring our love of sticking in groups and blabbing with friends. Small groups of pedestrians change everything, says Mehdi Moussaid, the study’s leader and a behavioral scientist at the University of Toulouse in France. “We have to rebuild our knowledge about crowds.”

Swarms solve a particular class of challenges: logistics. Whether in plants or slime-molds, it is the transport of something as an adaptive response that provides their framing “purpose”. This something could be the members of the swarm itself, as in fish, or something that is transported by the swarm, as it is the case in ants. Yet, the difference is not that large.

Figure 5: Simulation of foraging raid patterns in army ants Eciton. (from [12]) The hive (they haven’t a nest) is at the bottom, while the food source is towards thr top.  The only difference between A and B is the number of food sources.

When compared to crystals, even simple swarms show important differences. Firstly, in contrast to crystals, swarms are immaterial. What we can observe at the global scale, macroscopically, is an image of rules that are independent of matter. Yet, in simple, “prototypical” swarms the implementation of those rules is still global, just like in crystals. Everywhere in the primitive swarm the same basic rules are active. We have seen that in Dictyostelium, much like in social insects, rules begin to be active in a more localized manner.

The separation of immaterial components from matter is very important. It is the birth of information. We may conceive information itself as a morphological element, as a condition for the probabilistic instantiation. Not by chance we assign the label “fluid” to large flocks of birds, say starlings in autumn. On the molecular level, water itself is organized as a swarm.

As a further possibility, the realm of immaterial rules provides allows also for a differentiation of rules. For in crystals the rule is almost synonymic to the properties of the matter, there is no such differentiation for them. They are what they are, eternally. In contrast to that, in swarms we always find a setup that comprises attractive and repellent forces, which is the reason for their capability to build patterns. This capability is often called self-organization, albeit calling it self-ordering would be more exact.

There is last interesting point with swarms. In order to boot a swarm as swarm, that is, to effectuate the rules, a certain, minimal density is required. From this perspective, we can recognize also a link between swarms and mediality. The appropriate concept to describe swarms is thus the wave of density (or of probability).

Not only in urban research the concept of swarms is often used in agent-based models. Unfortunately, however, only the most naive approaches are taken, conceiving of agents as entities almost without any internal structure, i.e. also without memory. Paradoxically, researchers often invoke the myth of “intelligent swarms”, overlooking that intelligence is nothing that is associated to swarms. In order to find appropriate solutions to a given challenge, we simply need an informational n-body system, where we find emergent patterns and evolutionary principles as well. This system can be realized even in a completely immaterial manner, as a pattern of electrical discharges. Such a process we came to call a “brain”… Actually, swarms without an evolutionary embedding can be extremely malignant and detrimental, since in swarms the purpose is not predefined. Fiction authors (M.Crichton, F.Schätzing) recognized this long ago. Engineers seem to still have difficulties with that.

Such, we can also see that swarms actualize the most seriously penetrating form of growth.

3.4. Animals

So far, we have met three models of growth. In plants and swarms we find different variations of the basic crystalline mode of growth. In animals, the regulation of growth acquired even more degrees of freedom.

The major determinant of the differences between the forms of plants and animals is movement. This not only applies to the organism as a whole. We find it also on the cellular level. Plants do not have blood or an immune system, where cells of a particular type are moving around. Once they settled, they are fixed.

The result of this mobility is a greatly diversified space of possibilities for instantiating compartmentalization. Across the compartments, which we find also in the temporal domain, we may even see different modes of growth. The liver of the vertebrates, for instance, grows more like a plant. It is somehow not surprising that the liver is the organ with the best ability for regeneration. We also find interacting populations of swarms in animals, even in the most primitive ones like sponges.

The important aspects of form in animals are in their interior. While for crystals there is no interiority, plants differ in their external organization, their habitus, with swarms somewhere in between. Animals, however, are different due to their internal organization on the level of macroscopic compartments, which includes their behavioral potential. (later: remark about metabolism, as taking the wrong metaphorical anchor) Note that the cells of animals look quite similar, they are highly standardized, even between flies and humans.

Along with the importance of the dynamics and form of interior compartments, the development of animals in their embryological phase8 is strictly choreographed. Time is not an outer parameter any more. Much more than plants, swarms or even crystals, of course, animals are beings in and of time. They have history, as individual and as population, which is independent of matter. In animals, history is a matter of form and rules, of interior, self-generated conditions.

During the development of animal embryos we find some characteristic operations of form creating, based on the principle of mobility, additionally to the principles that we can describe for swarms, plants and crystals. These are

  • – folding, involution and blastulation;
  • – melting, and finally
  • – inflation and gastrulation;

The mathematics for describing these operations is not geometry any more. We need topology and category theory in order to grasp it, that is the formalization of transformation.

Folding brings compartments together that have been produced separately. It breaks the limitations of signal horizons by initiating a further level of integration. Hence, the role of folding can be understood as a way as a means to overcome or to instantiate dimensional constraints and/or modularity. While inflation is the mee accumulation of mass and amorphous enlargement of a given compartment by attachment from the interior, melting may be conceived as a negative attachment. Abstractly taken, it introduces the concept of negativity, which in turn allows for smooth gradation. Finally, involution, gastrulation and blastulation introduce floating compartments, hence swarm-like capabilities in the interior organization. It blurs the boundaries between structure and movement, introducing probabilism and reversibility into the development and the life form of the being.

Figure 6a. Development in Embryos. Left-hand, a very early phase is shown, emphasizing the melting and inflating, which leads to “segments”, called metamers. (red arrows show sites of apoptosis, blue arrows indicate inflation, i.e. ordinary increase of volume)

Figure 6b. Early development phase of a hand. The space between fingers is melted away in order to shape the fingers.

Figure 6c. Rem Koolhaas [16]. Inverting the treatment of the box, thereby finding (“inventing”?) the embryonic principle of melting tissue in order to generate form. Note that Koolhaas himself never referred to “embryonic principles” (so far). This example demonstrates clearly where we have to look for the principles of morphogenesis in architecture!

In the image 6a above we can not only see the processes of melting and attaching, we also can observe another recipe of nature: repetition. In case of the Bauplan of animal organisms the result is metamery.9 While in lower animals such as worms (Annelidae), metamers are easily observed, in higher animals, such as insects or vertebrates, metamers are often only (clearly) visible in the embryonal phase. Yet, in animals metamers are always created through a combination of movement or melting and compartmentalization in the interior of the body. They are not “added” in the sense of attaching—adding—them to the actual border, as it is the case in plants or crystals. In mathematical terms, the operation in animals’ embryonic phase is multiplication, not addition.

Figure 6d. A vertebrate embryo, showing the metameric organization of the spine (left), which then gets replicated by the somites (right). In animals, metamers are a consequence of melting processes, while in plants it is due to attachment. (image found here)

The principles of melting (apoptosis), folding, inflating and repetition can be used to create artificial forms, of course. The approach is called subdivision. Note that the forms shown below have nothing to do with geometry anymore. The frameworks needed to talk about them are, at least, topology and category theory. Additionally, they require an advanced non-Cartesian conception of space, as we have been outlining one above.

Figure 7. Forms created by subdivision (courtesy Michael Hansmeyer). It is based on a family of procedures, called subdivision, that are directed towards the differentiation of the interior of a body. It can’t be described by geometry any more. Such, it is a non-geometrical, procedural form, which expresses time, not matter and its properties. The series of subdivisions are “breaking” the straightness of edges and can be seen also as a series of nested, yet uncompleted folds (See Deleuze’s work on the Fold and Leibniz). Here, in Hansmeyer’s work, each column is a compound of three “tagmata”, that is, sections that have been grown “physically” independently from each other, related just by a similar dynamics in the set of parameters.

subdivision columns

Creating such figurated forms is not fully automatic, though. There is some contingency, represented by the designer’s choices while establishing a particular history of subdivisions.

Animals employ a wide variety of modes in their growing. They can do so due to the highly developed capability of compartmentalization. They gain almost complete independence from matter10 , regarding their development, their form, and particularly regarding their immaterial setup, which we can observe as learning and the use of rules. Learning, on the other hand, is intimately related to perception, in other words, configurable measurement, and data. Perception, as a principle, is in turn mandatory for the evolution of brains and the capability to handle information. Thus, staffing a building with sensors is not a small step. It could take the form of a jump into another universe, particularly if the sensors are conceived as being separate from the being of the house, for instance in order to facilitate or modify mental or social affairs of their inhabitants.

3.5. Urban Morphing

On the level of urban arrangements, we also can observe different forms of differentiation on the level of morphology.

Figure 8. Urban Sprawl, London (from [1]). The layout looks like a slime-mold. We may conclude that cities grow like slime-molds, by attachment from the inside and directed towards the inside and the outside. Early phases of urban sprawl, particularly in developing countries, grow by attachment form the outside, hence they look more like a dimensionally constrained crystal (see fig.1b).

The concept of the fractal and the related one of self-similarity entered, of course, also the domain of urbanism, particularly an area of interest which is called Urban Morphology. This has been born as a sub-discipline of geography. It is characterized by a salient reductionism of the Urban to the physical appearance of a city and its physical layout, which of course is not quite appropriate.

Given the mechanisms of attachment, whether it is due to interior processes or attachment from the outside (through people migrating to the city), it is not really surprising to find similar fractal shapes as in case of (dimensionally) constrained crystalline growth, or in the case of slime-molds with their branching amoeba highways. In order to understand the city, the question is not whether there is a fractal or not, whether there is a dimensionality of 1.718 or one of 1.86.

The question is about the mechanisms that show up as a particular material habitus, and about the actual instantiation of these mechanisms. Or even shorter: the material habitus must be translated into a growth model. In turn, this would provide the means to shape the conditions of the cities own unfolding and evolution. We already know that dedicated planning and dedicated enforcement of plans will not work in most cities. It is of utmost importance here, not to fall back into representationalist patterns, as for instance Michael Batty sometimes falls prey to [1]. Avoiding representationalist fallacies is possible only if we embed the model about abstract growth into a properly bound compound which comprises theory (methodology and philosophy) and politics as well, much like we proposed in the previous essay.

Figure 9a. In former times, or as a matter of geographical facts, attachment is excluded. Any growth is directed towards the inside and shows up as a differentiation. Here, in this figure we see a planned city, which thus looks much like a crystal.

Figure 9b. A normally grown medieval city. While the outer “shell” looks pretty standardized, though not “crystalline”, the interior shows rich differentiation. In order to describe the interior of such cities we have to use the concept of type.

Figure 10a. Manhattan is the paradigmatic example for congestion due to a severe (in this case: geographical) limitation of the possibility to grow horizontally. In parallel, the overwhelming interior differentiation created a strong connectivity and abundant heterotopias. This could be interpreted as the prototype of the internet, built in steel and glass (see Koolhaas’ “Delirious New York” [15]).

Figure 10b. In the case of former Kowloon (now torn down), it wasn’t geological, but political constraints. It was a political enclave/exclave, where actually no legislative regulations could be set active. In some way it is the chaotic brother of Manhattan. This shows Kowloon in 1973…

Figure 10c. And here the same area in 1994.

Figure 10d. Somewhere in the inside. Kowloon developed more and more into an autonomous city that provided any service to its approx. 40’000 inhabitants. On the roof of the buildings they installed the play grounds for the children.

The medieval city, Manhattan and Kowloon share a particular growth pattern. While the outer shape remains largely constant, their interior develops any kind of compartments, any imaginable kind of flow and a rich vertical structure, both physical and logical. This growth pattern is the same as we can observe in animals. Furthermore, those cities, much like animals, start to build an informational autonomy, they start to behave, to build an informational persistence, to initiate an intense mediality.

3.6. Summary of Growth Modes

The following table provides a brief overview about the main structural differences of growth models, as they can be derived from their natural instantiations.

Table 1: Structural differences of the four basic classes of modes of growth. Note that the class labels are indeed just that: labels of models. Any actual instantiation, particularly in case of real animals, may comprise a variety of compounds made from differently weighted classes.

Aspect \ Class crystal plant swarm animal
Mode of Attachment passive positive active positive active positive and negative active positive and negative
Direction from outside from inside from inside  towards outside or inside from & towards the inside
Morphogenetic Force as a fact by matter explicitly produced inhibiting fields implicit and explicit multi-component fields 11 explicitly produced multi-component fields
Status of Form implicitly templated by existing form beginning independence from matter independence from matter independence from matter
Formal Tools geometric scaling, representative reproduction, constrained randomness Fibonacci patterns, fractal habitus, logistics fractal habitus, logistics metamerism, organs, transformation, strictly a-physical
Causa Finalis(main component) actualization of identity space filling logistics mobile logistics short-term adaptivity

4. Effects of Growth

Growth increases mass, spread or both. Saying that doesn’t add anything, it is an almost syntactical replacement of words. In Aristotelian words, we would get stuck with the causa materialis and the causa formalis. The causa finalis of growth, in other words its purpose and general effect, besides the mere increase of mass, is differentiation12, and we have to focus the conditions for that differentiation in terms of information. For the change of something is accessible only upon interpretation by an observing entity. (Note that this again requires relationality as a primacy)

The very possibility of difference and consequently of differentiation is bound to the separation of signals.13 Hence we can say that growth is all about the creation of a whole bouquet of signal intensity lengths, instantiated on a scale that stretches from as morpho-physical compartments through morpho-functional compartments to morpho-symbolic specializations.14

Inversely we may say that abstract growth is a necessary component for differentiation. Formally, we can cover differentiation as an abstract complexity  of positive and negative growth. Without abstract growth—or differentiation—there is no creation or even shaping of space into an individual space with its own dynamical dimensionality, which in turn would preclude the possibility for interaction. Growth regulates the dimensionality of the space of expressibility.

5. Growth, an(d) Urban Matter

5.1. Koolhaas, History, Heritage and Preservation

From his early days as urbanist and architect, Koolhaas has been fascinated by walls and boxes [16], even with boxes inside boxes. While he conceived the concept of separation first in a more representational manner, he developed it also into a mode of operation later. We now can decode it as a play with informational separation, as an interest in compartments, hence with processes of growth and differentiation. This renders his personal fascinosum clearly visible: the theory and the implementation of differentiation, particularly with respect to human forms of life. It is probably his one and only subject.

All of Koolhaas’ projects fit into this interest. New York, Manhattan, Boxes, Lagos, CCTV, story-telling, Singapore, ramps, Lille, empirism, Casa da Musica, bigness, Metabolism. His exploration(s) of bigness can be interpreted as an exploration of the potential of signal intensity length. How much have we to inflate a structure in order to provoke differentiation through the shifting the signal horizon into the inside of the structure? Remember, that the effective limit of signal intensity length manifests as breaking of symmetry, which in turn gives rise to compartmentalization, opposing forces, paving the way for complexity, emergence, that is nothing else than a dynamic generation of patterns. BIG BAG. BIG BANG. Galaxies, stardust, planets, everything in the mind of those crawling across and inside bigness architecture.  Of course, it appears to be more elegant to modulate the signal intensity length through other means than just by bigness, but we should not forget about it. Another way for provoking differentiation is through introducing elements of complexity, such as contradictory elements and volatility. Already in 1994, Koolhaas wrote [17]15

But in fact, only Bigness instigates the regime of complexity that mobilizes the full intelligence of architecture and its related fields. […] The absence of a theory of Bigness–what is the maximum architecture can do?–is architecture’s most debilitating weakness. […] By randomizing circulation, short-circuiting distance, […] stretching dimensions, the elevator, electricity, air-conditioning,[…] and finally, the new infrastructures […] induced another species of architecture. […] Bigness perplexes; Bigness transforms the city from a summation of certainties into an accumulation of mysteries. […] Bigness is no longer part of any urban tissue. It exists; at most, it coexists. Its subtext is fuck context.

The whole first part of this quote is about nothing else than modulating signal intensity length. Consequently, the conclusion in the second part refers directly to complexity that creates novelty. An artifice that is double-creative, that is creative and in each of its instances personalized creative, how should it be perceived other than as a mystery? No wonder, modernists get overcharged…

The only way to get out of (built) context is through dynamically creating novelty., by creating an exhaustively new context outside of built matter, but strongly building on it. Novelty is established just and only by the tandem of complexity and selection (aka interpretation). But, be aware, complexity here is fully defined and not to be mistaken with the crap delivered by cybernetics, systems theory or deconstructivism.

The absence of a theory of Bigness—what is the maximum architecture can do? —is architecture’s most debilitating weakness. Without a theory of Bigness, architects are in the position of Frankenstein’s creators […] Bigness destroys, but it is also a new beginning. It can reassemble what it breaks. […] Because there is no theory of Bigness, we don’t know what to do with it, we don’t know where to put it, we don’t know when to use it, we don’t know how to plan it. Big mistakes are our only connection to Bigness. […] Bigness destroys, but it is also a new beginning. It can reassemble what it breaks. […] programmatic elements react with each other to create new events- Bigness returns to a model of programmatic alchemy.

All this reads like a direct rendering of our conceptualization of complexity. It is, of course, nonsense to think that

[…] ‘old’ architectural principles (composition, scale, proportion, detail) no longer apply when a building acquires Bigness. [18]

Koolhaas sub-contracted Jean Nouvel for caring of large parts of Euro-Lille. Why should he do so, if proportions wouldn’t be important? Bigness and proportions are simply on different levels! Bigness instantiates the conditions for dynamic generation of patterns, and those patters, albeit volatile and completely on the side of the interpreter/observer/user/inhabitant/passer-by, deserve careful thinking about proportions.

Bigness is impersonal: the architect is no longer condemned to stardom.

Here, again, the pass-porting key is the built-in creativity, based on elementarized, positively defined complexity. We thus would like to propose to consider our theory of complexity—at least—as a theory of Bigness. Yet, the role of complexity can be understood only as part of generic differentiation. Koolhaas’ suggestion for Bigness does not only apply for architecture. We already mentioned Euro-Lille. Bigness, and so complexity—positively elementarized—is the key to deal with Urban affairs. What could be BIGGER than the Urban? Koolhaas concludes

Bigness no longer needs the city, it is the city.’ […]

Bigness = urbanism vs. architecture.

Of course, by “architecture” Koolhaas refers to the secretions by the swarm architects’ addiction to points, lines, forms and apriori functions, all these blinkers of modernism. Yet, I think, urbanism and a re-newed architecture (one htat embraces complexity) may be well possible. Yet, probably only if we, architects and their “clients”, contemporary urbanists and their “victims,” start to understand both as parts of a vertical, differential (Deleuzean) Urban Game. Any comprehensive apprehension of {architecture, urbanism} will overcome the antipodic character of the relations between them. Hope is that it also will be a cure for junkspace.

There are many examples from modernism, where architects spent the utmost efforts to prevent the “natural” effect of bigness, though not always successful. Examples include Corbusier as well as Mies van der Rohe.

Koolhaas/OMA not only uses assemblage, bricolage and collage as working techniques, whether as “analytic” tool (Delirious New York) or in projects, they also implement it in actual projects. Think of Euro-Lille, for instance. Implementing the conditions of or for complexity creates a never-ending flux of emergent patterns. Such an architecture not only keeps being interesting, it is also socially sustainable.

Such, it is not really a surprise that Koolhaas started to work on the issue and the role of preservation during the recent decade, culminating in the contribution of OMA/AMO to the Biennale 2010 in Venice.

In an interview given there to Hans Ulrich Obrist [20] (and in a lecture at the American University of Beirut), Koolhaas mentioned some interesting figures about the quantitative consequences of preservation. In 2010, 3-4% of the area of the earths land surface has been declared as heritage site. This amounts to a territory larger than the size of India. The prospects of that have been that soon up to 12% are protected against change. His objection was that this development can lead to kind of a stasis. According to Koolhaas, we need a new vocabulary, a theory that allows to talk about how to get rid of old buildings and to negotiate of which buildings we could get rid of. He says that we can’t talk about preservation without also talking about how to get rid of old stuff.

There is another interesting issue about preservation. The temporal distance marked by the age of the building to be preserved and the attempt to preserve the building constantly decreased across history. In 1800 preservation focused on buildings risen 2000 years before, in 1900 the time distance shrunk to 300 years, and in 2000 it was as little as 30 years. Koolhaas concludes that we obviously are entering a phase of prospective preservation.

There are two interpretations for this tendency. The first one would be, as a pessimistic one, that it will lead to a perfect lock up. As an architect, you couldn’t do anything anymore without being engaged in severely intensified legislation issues and a huge increase in bureaucrazy. The alternative to this pessimistic perspective is, well, let’s call it symbolic (abstract) organicism, based on the concept of (abstract) growth and differentiation as we devised it here. The idea of change as a basis of continuity could be built so deeply into any architectural activity, that the result would not only comprise preservation, it would transcend it. Obviously, the traditional conception of preservation would vanish as well.

This points to an important topic: Developing a theory about a cultural field, such as it is given by the relation between architecture and preservation, can’t be limited to just the “subject”. It inevitably has to include a reflection about the conceptual layer as well. In the case of preservation and heritage, we simply find that the language game is still of an existential character, additionally poisoned by values. Preservation should probably not target the material aspects. Thus, the question whether to get rid of old buildings is inappropriate. Transformation should not be regarded as a question of performing a tabula rasa.

Any well-developed theory of change in architectural or Urban affairs brings a quite important issue to the foreground. The city has to decide what it wants to be. The alternatives are preformed by the modes of growth. It could conceive of itself as an abstract crystal, as a plant, a slime-mold made from amoeboids, or as an abstract animal. Each choice offers particular opportunities and risks. Each of these alternatives will determine the characteristics and the quality of the potential forms of life, which of course have to be supported by the city. Selecting an alternative also selects the appropriate manner of planning, of development. It is not possible to perform the life form of an animal and to plan according to the characteristics of a crystal. The choice will also determine whether the city can enter a regenerative trajectory, whether it will decay to dust, or whether it will be able to maintain its shape, or whether it will behave predatory. All these consequences are, of course, tremendously political. Nevertheless, we should not forget that the political has to be secured against the binding problem as much as conceptual work.

In the cited interview, Koolhaas also gives a hint about that when he refers to the Panopticum project, a commission to renovate a 19th century prison. He mentions that they discovered a rather unexpected property of the building: “a lot of symbolic extra-dimensions”. These symbolic capital allows for “much more and beautiful flexibility” to handle the renovation. Actually, one “can do it in 50 different ways” without exhausting the potential, something, which according to Koolhaas is “not possible for modern architecture”.

Well, again, not really a surprise. Neither function, nor functionalized form, nor functionalized fiction (Hollein) can bear symbolic value except precisely that of the function. Symbolic value can’t be implanted as little as meaning can be defined apriori, something that has not been understood, for instance, by Heinrich Klotz14. Due to the deprivation of the symbolic domain it is hard to re-interpret modernist buildings. Yet, what would be the consequence for preservation? Tearing down all the modernist stuff? Probably not the worst idea, unless the future architects are able to think in terms of growth and differentiation.

Beyond the political aspects the practical question remains, how to decide on which building, or district, or structure to preserve? Koolhaas already recognized that the politicians started to influence or even rule the respective decision-making processes, taking responsibility away from the “professional” city-curators. Since there can’t be a rational answer, his answer is random selection.

Figure 11: Random Selection for Preservation Areas, Bejing. Koolhaas suggested to select preservation areas randomly, since it can’t be decided “which” Bejing should be preserved (there are quite a few very different ones).

Yet, I tend to rate this as a fallback into his former modernist attitudes. I guess, the actual and local way for the design of the decision-making process is a political issue, which in turn is dependent on the type of differentiation that is in charge, either as a matter of fact, or as a subject of political design. For instance, the citizens of the whole city, or just of the respective areas could be asked about their values, as it is a possibility (or a duty) in Switzerland. Actually, there is even a nice and recent example for it. The subject matter is a bus-stop shelter designed by Santiago Calatrava in 1996, making it to one of his first public works.

Figure 12: Santiago Calatrava 1996, bus stop shelter in St.Gallen (CH), at a central place of the city; there are almost no cars, but every 1-2 minutes a bus, thus a lot of people are passing even several times per day. Front view…

…and rear view

In 2011, the city parliament decided to restructure the place and to remove the Calatrava shelter. It was considered by the ‘politicians’ to be too “alien” for the small city, which a few steps away also hosts a medieval district that is a Unesco World Heritage. Yet, many citizen rated the shelter as something that provides a positive differential, a landmark, which could not be found in other cities nearby, not even in whole Northern Switzerland. Thus, a referendum has been enforced by the citizens, and the final result from May 2012 was a clear rejection of the government’s plans. The effect of this recent history is pretty clear: The shelter accumulates even more symbolic capital than before.

Back to the issue of preservation. If it is not the pure matter, what else should be addressed? Again, Koolhaas himself already points to the right direction. The following fig.13 shows a scene from somewhere in Bejing. The materials of the dwelling are bricks, plastic, cardboard. Neither the site nor the matter nor the architecture seems to convey anything worthwhile to be preserved.

Figure 13: When it comes to preservation, the primacy is about the domain of the social, not that of matter.

Yet, what must be preserved mandatorily is the social condition, the rooting of the people in their environment. Koolhaas, however, says that he is not able to provide any answer to solve this challenge. Nevertheless it s pretty clear, that “sustainability” start right here, not in the question of energy consumption (despite the fact that this is an important aspect too).

5.2. Shrinking. Thinning. Growing.

Cities have been performances of congestion. As we have argued repeatedly, densification, or congestion if you like, is mandatory for the emergence of typical Urban mediality. Many kinds of infrastructures are only affordable, let alone be attractive, if there are enough clients for it. Well, the example of China—or Singapore—and its particular practices of implementing plans demonstrate that the question of density can take place also in a plan, in the future, that is, in the domain of time. Else, congestion and densification may actualize more and more in the realm of information, based on the new medially active technologies. Perhaps, our contemporary society does not need the same corporeal density as it was the case in earlier times. There is a certain tendency that the corporeal city and the web amalgamate into something new that could be called the “wurban“. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, some kind of density is needed to ignite the conditions for the Urban.

Such, it seems that the Urban is threatened by the phenomenon of thinning. Thinning is different from shrinking, which appears foremost in some regions of the U.S. (e.g. Detroit) or Europe (Leipzig, Ukrainia) as a consequence of monotonic, or monotopic economic structure. Yet, shrinking can lead to thinning. Thinning describes the fact that there is built matter, which however is inhabited only for a fraction of time. Visually dense, but socially “voided”.

Thinning, according to Koolhaas, considers the form of new cities like Dubai. Yet, as he points out, there is also a tendency in some regions, such as Switzerland, or the Netherlands, that approach the “thinned city” from the other direction. The whole country seems to transform itself into something like an urban garden, neither of rural nor of urban quality. People like Herzog & deMeuron lament about this form, conceiving it as urban sprawl, the loss of distinct structure, i.e. the loss of clearly recognizable rural areas on the one hand, and the surge of “sub-functional” city-fragments on the other. Yet, probably we should turn perspective, away from reactive, negative dialectics, into a positive attitude of design, as it may appear a bit infantile to think that a palmful of sociologists and urbanists could act against a gross cultural tendency.

In his lecture at the American University in Beirut in 2010 [19], Koolhaas asked “What does it [thinning] mean for the ‘Urban Condition’?”

Well, probably nothing interesting, except that it prevents the appearance of the Urban16 or lets it vanish, would it have been present. Probably cities like Dubai are just not yet “urban”, not to speak of the Urban. From the distant, Dubai still looks like a photomontage, a Potemkin village, an absurdity. The layout of the arrangement of the high-rises remembers to the small street villages, just 2 rows of cottages on both sides of  a street, arbitrarily placed somewhere in the nowhere of a grassland plain. The settlement being ruled just by a very basic tendency for social cohesion and a common interest for exploiting the hinterland as a resource. But there is almost no network effect, no commonly organized storage, no deep structure.

Figure 14a: A collage shown by Koolhaas in his Beirut lecture, emphasizing the “absurdity” (his words) of the “international” style. Elsewhere, he called it an element of Junkspace.

The following fig 14b demonstrates the artificiality of Dubai, classifying more as a lined village made from huge buildings than actually as a “city”.

Figure 14b. Photograph “along” Dubai’s  main street taken in late autumn 2012 by Shiva Menon (source). After years of traffic jamming the nomadic Dubai culture finally accepted that something like infrastructure is necessary in a more sessile arrangement. They started to build a metro, which is functional with the first line since Sep 2010.

dubai fog 4 shiva menon

Figure 14c below shows the new “Simplicity ™”. This work of Koolhaas and OMA oscillates between sarcasm, humor pretending to be naive, irony and caricature. Despite a physical reason is given for the ability of the building to turn its orientation such as to minimize insulation, the effect is a quite different one. It is much more a metaphor for the vanity of village people, or maybe the pseudo-religious power of clerks.

Figure 14c-1. A proposal by Koolhaas/OMA for Dubai (not built, and as such, pure fiction). The building, called “Simplicity”, has been thought to be 200m wide, 300m tall and measuring only 21m in depth. It is placed onto a plate that rotates in order to minimize insulation.

Figure 14b-2. The same thing a bit later the same day

Yet, besides the row of high-rises we find the dwellings of the migration workers in a considerable density, forming a multi-national population. However, the layout here remembers more to Los Angeles than to any kind of “city”. Maybe, it simply forms kind of the “rural” hinterland of the high-rise village.

Figure 15. Dubai, “off-town”. Here, the migration workers are housing. In the background the skyscrapers lining the infamous main street.

For they, for instance, also started to invest into a metro, despite the (still) linear, disseminated layout of the city, which means that connectivity, hence network effects are now recognized as a crucial structural element for the success of the city. And this then is not so different anymore from the classical Western conception. Anyway, even the first cities of mankind, risen not in the West, provided certain unique possibilities, which as a bouquet could be considered as urban.

There is still another dimension of thinning, related to the informatization of presence via medially active technologies. Thinning could be considered as an actualization of the very idea of the potentiality of co-presence, much as it is exploited in the so-called “social media”. Of course, the material urban neighborhood, its corporeality, is dependent on physical presence. Certainly, we can expect either strong synchronization effects or negative tipping points, demarcating a threshold towards sub-urbanization. On the other hand, this could give rise to new forms of apartment sharing, supported by urban designers and town officials…

On the other hand, we already mentioned natural structures that show a certain dispersal, such as the blood cells, the immune system in vertebrates, or the slime-molds. These structures are highly developed swarms. Yet, all these swarms are highly dependent on the outer conditions. As such, swarms are hardly persistent. Dubai, the swarm city. Technology, however, particularly in the form of the www and so-called social media could stabilize the swarm-shape.17

From a more formal perspective we may conceive of shrinking and thinning simply as negative growth. By this growth turns, of course, definitely into an abstract concept, leaving the representational and even the metaphorical far behind. Yet, the explication of a formal theory exceeds the indicated size of this text by far. We certainly will do it later, though.

5.3. In Search for Symbols

What turns a building into an entity that may grow into an active source for symbolization processes? At least, we can initially know that symbols can’t be implanted in a direct manner. Of course, one always can draw on exoticism, importing the cliché that already is attached to the entity from abroad. Yet, this is not what we are interested in here.The question is not so dissimilar to the issue of symbolization at large, as it is known from the realm of language. How could a word, a sign, a symbol gain reference, and how could a building get it? We could even take a further step by asking: How could a building acquire generic mediality such that it could be inhabited not only physically, but also in the medial realm? [23] We can’t answer the issues around these questions here, as there is a vast landscape of sources and implications, enough for filling at least a book. Yet, conceiving buildings as agents in story-telling could be a straightforward and not too complicated entry into this landscape.

Probably, story-telling with buildings works like a good joke. If they are too direct, nobody would laugh. Probably, story-telling has a lot to do with behavior and the implied complexities, I mean, the behavior of the building. We interpret pets, not plants. With plants, we interpret just their usage. We laugh about cats, dogs, apes, and elephants, but not about roses and orchids, and even less about crystals. Once you have seen one crystal, you have seen all of them. Being inside a crystal can be frightening, just think about Snow White. While in some way this holds even for plants, that’s certainly not true for animals. Junkspace is made from (medial) crystals. Junkspace is so detrimental due to the fundamental modernist misunderstanding that claims the possibility of implementing meaning and symbols, if these are regarded as relevant at all.

Closely related to the issue of symbols is the issue of identity.

Philosophically, it is definitely highly problematic to refer to identity as a principle. It leads to deep ethical dilemmata. If we are going to drop it, we have to ask immediately about a replacement, since many people indeed feel that they need to “identify” with their neighborhood.

Well, first we could say that identification and “to identify” are probably quite different from the idea of identity. Every citizen in a city could be thought to identify with her or his city, yet, at the same time there need not be such a thing as “identity”. Identity is the abstract idea, imposed by mayors and sociologists, and preferably it should be rejected just for that, while the process of feeling empathy with one’s neighborhood is a private process that respects plurality. It is not too difficult to imagine that there are indeed people that feel so familiar with “their” city, the memories about experiences, the sound, the smell, the way people walk, that they feel so empathic with all of this such that they source a significant part of their personality from it. How to call this inextricable relationship other than “to identify with”?

The example of the Calatrava-bus stop shelter in St.Gallen demonstrates one possible source of identification: Success in collective design decisions. Or more general: successfully finished negotiations about collective design issues, a common history about such successful processes. Even if the collective negotiation happens as a somewhat anonymous process. Yet, the relative preference of participation versus decreed activities depends on the particular distribution of political and ethical values in the population of citizens. Certainly, participatory processes are much more stable than top-down-decrees, not only in the long run, as even the Singaporean government has recognized recently. But anyway, cities have their particular personality, because they behave18 in a particular manner, and any attempt to get clear or to decide about preservation must respect this personality. Of course, it also applies that the decision-making process should be conscious enough to be able to reflect about the metaphysical belief set, the modes of growth and the long-term characteristics of the city.

5.4. The Question of Implementation

This essay tries to provide an explication of the concept of growth in the larger context of a theory of differentiation in architecture and urbanism. There, we positioned growth as one of four principles or schemata that are constitutive for generic differentiation.

In this final section we would like to address the question of implementation, since only little has been said so far about how to deal with the concept of growth. We already described how and why earlier attempts like that of the Metabolists dashed against the binding problem of theoretical work.

If houses do not move physically, how then to make them behaving, say, similar to the way an animal does? How to implement a house that shares structural traits with animals? How to think of a city as a system of plants and animals without falling prey to utter naivity?

We already mentioned that there is no technocratic, or formal, or functionalist solution to the question of growth. At first, the city has to decide what it wants to be, which kind of mix of growth modes should be implemented in which neighborhoods.

Let us first take some visual impressions…

Figure 16a,b,c. The Barcelona Pavilion by Mies van der Rohe (1929 [1986]).

This pavilion is a very special box. It is non-box, or better, it establishes a volatile collection of virtual boxes. In this building, Mies reached the mastery of boxing. Unfortunately, there are not so much more examples. In some way, the Dutch Embassy by Koolhaas is the closest relative to it, if we consider more recent architecture.

Just at the time the Barcelona pavilion has been built, another important architect followed similar concepts. In his Villa Savoye, built 1928-31, LeCorbusier employed and demonstrated several new elements in his so-called “new architecture,” among others the box and the ramp. Probably the most important principle, however, was to completely separate construction and tectonics from form and design. Such, he achieved a similar “mobility” as Mies in his Pavilion.

Figure 17a: La Villa Savoye, mixing interior and exterior on the top-roof “garden”. The other zone of overlapping spaces is beneath the house (see next figure 17b).

corbusier Villa Savoye int-ext

Figure 17b: A 3d model of Villa Savoye, showing the ramps that serve as “entrance” (from the outside) and “extrance” (towards the top-roof garden). The principle of the ramp creates a new location for the creation and experience of duration in the sense of Henri Bergson’s durée. Both the ramp and the overlapping of spaces creates a “zona extima,” which is central to the “behavioral turn”.

Corbusier Villa Savoye 06 small model

Comparing La Villa Savoye with the Barcelona pavilion regarding the mobility of space, it is quite obvious, that LeCorbusier handled the confluence and mutual penetration of interior and exterior in a more schematic and geometric manner.19

The quality of the Barcelona building derives from the fact that its symbolic value is not directly implemented, it just emerges upon interaction with the visitor, or the inhabitant. It actualizes the principle of “emerging symbolicity by induced negotiation” of compartments. The compartments become mobile. Such, it is one of the roots of the ramp that appeared in many works of Koolhaas. Yet, its working requires a strong precondition: a shared catalog of values, beliefs and basic psychological determinants, in short, a shared form of life.

On the other hand, these values and beliefs are not directly symbolized, shifting them into their volatile phase, too. Walking through the building, or simply being inside of it, instantiates differentiation processes in the realm of the immaterial. All the differentiation takes place in the interior of the building, hence it brings forth animal-like growth, transcending the crystal and the swarm.

Thus the power of the pavilion. It is able to transform and to transcend the values of the inhabitant/visitor. The zen of silent story-telling.

This example demonstrates clearly that morphogenesis in architecture not only starts in the immateriality of thought, it also has to target the immaterial.

It is clear that such a volatile dynamics, such a active, if not living building is hard to comprehend. In 2008, the Japanese office SANAA has been invited for contributing the annual installation in the pavilion. They explained their work with the following words [24].

“We decided to make transparent curtains using acrylic material, since we didn’t want the installation to interfere in any way with the existing space of the Barcelona Pavilion,” says Kazuyo Sejima of SANAA.

Figure 18. The installation of Japanese office SANAA in the Barcelona Pavilion. You have to take a careful look in order to see the non-interaction.

Well, it certainly rates as something between bravery and stupidity to try “not to interfere in any way with the existing space“. And doing so by highly transparent curtains is quite to the opposite of the buildings characteristics, as it removes precisely the potentiality, the volatility, virtual mobility. Nothing is left, beside the air, perhaps. SANAA committed the typical representational fault, as they tried to use a representational symbol. Of course, the walls that are not walls at all have a long tradition in Japan. Yet, the provided justification would still be simply wrong.

Instead of trying to implement a symbol, the architect or the urbanist has to care about the conditions for the possibility of symbol processes and sign processes. These processes may be political or not, they always will refer to the (potential) commonality of shared experiences.

Above we mentioned that the growth of a building has its beginning in the immateriality of thought. Even for the primitive form of mineralic growth we found that we can understand the variety of resulting shapes only through the conditions embedding the growth process. The same holds, of course, for the growth of buildings. For crystals the outer conditions belong to them as well, so the way of generating the form of a building belongs to the building.

Where to look for the outer conditions for creating the form? I suppose we have to search for them in the way the form gets concrete, starting from a vague idea, which includes its social and particularly its metaphysical conditions. Do you believe in independence, identity, relationality, difference?

It would be interesting to map the difference between large famous offices, say OMA and HdM.

According to their own words, HdM seems to treat the question of material very differently from OMA, where the question of material comes in at later stage [25]. HdM seems to work much more “crystallinic”, form is determined by the matter, the material and the respective culture around it. There are many examples for this, from the wine-yard in California, the “Schaulager” in Basel (CH), the railway control center (Basel), up to the “Bird’s Nest” in Bejing (which by the way is an attempt for providing symbols that went wrong). HdM seem to try to rely to the innate symbolicity of the material, of corporeality itself. In case of the Schaulager, the excavated material have been used to raise the building, the stones from the underground have been erected into a building, which insides looks like a Kafkaesque crystal. They even treat the symbols of a culture as material, somehow counterclockwise to their own “matérialisme brut”. Think about their praise of simplicity, the declared intention to avoid any reference beside the “basic form of the house” (Rudin House). In this perspective, their acclaimed “sensitivity” to local cultures is little more than the exploitation of a coal mine, which also requires sensitivity to local conditions.

Figure 18: Rudin House by Herzog & deMeuron

HdM practice a representationalist anti-symbolism, leaning strongly to architecture as a crystal science, a rather weird attitude to architecture. Probably it is this weirdness that quite unintentionally produces the interest in their architecture through a secondary dynamics in the symbolic. Is it, after all, Hegel’s tricky reason @ work? At least this would explain the strange mismatch of their modernist talking and the interest in their buildings.

6. Conclusions

In this essay we have closed a gap with respect to the theoretical structure of generic differentiation. Generic Differentiation may be displayed by the following diagram (but don’t miss the complete argument).

Figure 19: Generic Differentiation is the key element for solving the binding problem of theory works. This structure is to be conceived not as a closed formula, but rather as a module of a fractal that is created through mutual self-affine mappings of all of the three parts into the respective others.

basic module of the fractal relation between concept/conceptual, generic differentiation/difference and operation/operational comprising logistics and politics that describes the active subject

In earlier essays, we proposed abstract models for probabilistic networks, for associativity and for complexity. These models represent a perspective from the outside onto the differentiating entity. All of these have been set up in a reflective manner by composing certain elements, which in turn can be conceived as framing a particular space of expressibility. Yet, we also proposed the trinity of development, evolution and learning (chp.10 here) for the perspective from the inside of the differentiation process(es), describing different qualities of differentiation.

Well, the concept of growth20 is now joining the group of compound elements for approaching the subject of differentiation from the outside. In some way, using a traditional and actually an inappropriate wording, we could say that this perspective is more analytical than synthetical, more scientific than historiographical. This does not mean, of course, that the complementary perspective is less scientific, or that talking about growth or complexity is less aware of the temporal domain. It is just a matter of weights. As we have pointed out in the previous essay, the meta-theoretical conception (as a structural description of the dynamics of theoretical work) is more like a fractal field than a series of activities.

Anyway, the question is what can we do with the newly re-formulated concept of growth?

First of all, it completes the concept of generic differentiation, as we already mentioned just before. Probably the most salient influence is the enlarged and improved vocabulary to talk about change as far as it concerns the “size” of the form of a something, even if these something is something immaterial. For many reasons, we definitely should resist the tendency to limit the concept of growth to issues of morphology.

Only through this vocabulary we can start to compare the entities in the space of change. Different things from different domains or even different forms of life can be compared to each other, yet not as those things, but rather as media of change. Comparing things that change means to investigate the actualization of different modes of change as this passes through the something. This move is by no means eclecticist. It is even mandatory in order to keep aligned to the primacy of interpretation, the Linguistic Turn, and the general choreostemic constitution.

By means of the new and generalized vocabulary we may overcome the infamous empiricist particularism. Bristle counting, as it is called in biology, particularly entomology. Yes, there are around 450’000 different species of beetles… but… Well, overcoming particularism means that we can spell out new questions: about regulative factors, e.g. for continuity, melting and apoptosis. Guided by the meta-theoretical structure in fig.19 above we may ask: How would a politics of apoptosis look like? What about recycling of space? How could infrastructure foster associativity, learning and creativity of the city, rather than creativity in the city? What is epi/genetics of the growth and differentiation processes in a particular city?

Such questions may appear as elitary, abstract, of only little use. Yet, the contrary is true, as precisely such questions directly concern the productivity of a city, the speed of circulation of capital, whether symbolic or monetary (which anyway is almost the same). Understanding the conditions of growth may lead to cities that are indeed self-sustaining, because the power of life would be a feature deeply built into them. A little, perhaps even homeopathic dose of dedetroitismix, a kind of drug to cure the disease that infected the city of Detroit as well as the planners of Detroit or also all the urbanists that are pseudo-reasoning about Detroit in particular and sustainability in general. Just as Paracelsus mentioned that there is not just one kind of stomach, instead there are hundreds of kinds of stomach, we may recognize how to deal with the thousands of different kinds of cities that all spread across thousands of plateaus, if we understand of how to speak and think about growth.

Notes

1. This might appear a bit arrogant, perhaps, at first sight. Yet, at this point I must insist on it, even as I take into account the most advanced attempts, such as those of Michael Batty [1], Luca D’Acci or Karl Kropf [2]. The proclaimed “science of cities” is in a bad state. Either it is still infected by positivist or modernist myths, or the applied methodological foundations are utterly naive. Batty for instance embraces full-heartedly complexity. But how could one use complexity other as a mere label, if he is going to write such weird mess [3], mixing wildly concepts and subjects?

“Complexity: what does it mean? How do we define it? This is an impossible task because complex systems are systems that defy definition. Our science that attempts to understand such systems is incomplete in the sense that a complex system behaves in ways that are unpredictable. Unpredictability does not mean that these systems are disordered or chaotic but that defy complete definition.

Of course, it is not an impossible task to conceptualize complexity in a sound manner. This is even a mandatory precondition to use it as a concept. It is a bit ridiculous to claim the impossibility and then writing a book about its usage. And this conceptualization, whatsoever it would look like, has absolutely nothing to do with the fact that complex systems may behave unpredictable. Actually, in some way they are better predictable than complete random processes. It remains unclear which kind of unpredictability Batty is referring to? He didn’t disclose anything about this question, which is a quite important one if one is going to apply “complexity science”. And what about the concept of risk, and modeling, then, which actually can’t be separated at all?

His whole book [1] is nothing else than an accumulation of half-baked formalistic particulars. When he talks about networks, he considers only logistic networks. Bringing in fractals, he misses to mention the underlying mechanisms of growth and the formal aspects (self-affine mapping). In his discussion of the possible role of evolutionary theory [4], following Geddes, Batty resorts again to physicalism and defends it. Despite he emphasizes the importance of the concept of “mechanism”, despite he correctly distinguishes development from evolution, despite he demands an “evolutionary thinking”, he fails to get to the point: A proper attitude to theory under conditions of evolution and complexity, a probabilistic formulation, an awareness for self-referentiality, insight to the incommensurability of emergent traits, the dualism of code and corporeality, the space of evo-devo-cogno. In [4], one can find another nonsensical statement about complexity on p.567:

“The essential criterion for a complex system is a collection of elements that act independently of one another but nevertheless manage to act in concert, often through constraints on their actions and through competition and co-evolution. The physical trace of such complexity, which is seen in aggregate patterns that appear ordered, is the hallmark of self-organisation.” (my emphasis).

The whole issue with complex systems is that there is no independence… they do not manage to act in concert… wildly mixing with concepts like evolution or competition… physics definitely can nothing say about the patterns, and the hallmark of self-organizing systems is not surely not just the physical trace: it is the informational re-configuration.

Not by pure chance therefore he is talking about “tricks” ([5], following Hamdi [7]): “The trick for urban planning is to identify key points where small change can lead spontaneously to massive change for the better.” Without a proper vocabulary of differentiation, that is, without a proper concept of differentiation, one inevitably has to invoke wizards…

But the most serious failures are the following: regarding the cultural domain, there is no awareness about the symbolic/semiotic domain, the disrespect of information, and regarding methodology, throughout his writings, Batty mistakes theory for models and vice versa, following the positivist trail. There is not the slightest evidence in his writing that there is even a small trace of reflection. This however is seriously indicated, because cities are about culture.

This insensitivity is shared by talented people like Luca D’Acci, who is still musing about “ideal cities”. His procedural achievements as a craftsman of empirism are impressive, but without reflection it is just threatening, claiming the status of the demiurg.

Despite all these failures, Batty’s approach and direction is of course by far more advanced than the musings of Conzen, Caniggia or Kropf, which are intellectually simply disastrous.There are numerous examples for a highly uncritical use of structural concepts, for mixing of levels of arguments, crude reductionism, a complete neglect of mechanisms and processes etc. For instance, Kropf in [6]

A morphological critique is necessarily a cultural critique. […] Why, for example, despite volumes of urban design guidance promoting permeability, is it so rare to find new development that fully integrates main routes between settlements or roads directly linking main routes (radials and counter-radials)?” (p.17)

The generic structure of urban form is a hierarchy of levels related part to whole. […] More effective and, in the long run, more successful urbanism and urban design will only come from a better understanding of urban form as a material with a range of handling characteristics.” (p.18)

It is really weird to regard form as matter, isn’t it? The materialist final revenge… So, through the work of Batty there is indeed some reasonable hope for improvement. Batty & Marshall are certainly heading to the right direction when they demand (p.572 [4]):

“The crucial step – still to be made convincingly – is to apply the scientifically inspired understanding of urban morphology and evolution to actual workable design tools and planning approaches on the ground.

But it is equally certain that an adoption of evolutionary theory that seriously considers an “elan vital” will not be able to serve as a proper foundation. What is needed instead is a methodologically sound abstraction of evolutionary theory as we have proposed it some time ago, based on a probabilistic formalization and vocabulary. (…end of the longest footnote I have ever produced…)

2. The concept mechanism should not be mistaken as kind of a “machine”. In stark contrast to machines, mechanisms are inherently probabilistic. While machines are synonymic to their plan, mechanisms imply an additional level of abstraction, the population and its dynamics. .

3. Whenever it is tried to proof or implement the opposite, the primacy of logic, characteristic gaps are created, more often than not of a highly pathological character.

4. see also the essay about “Behavior”, where we described the concept of “Behavioral Coating”.

5. Deleuzean understanding of differential [10], for details see “Miracle of Comparison”.

6. As in the preceding essays, we use the capital “U” if we refer to the urban as a particular quality and as a concept, in order to distinguish it from the ordinary adjective that refers to common sense understanding.

7. Only in embryos or in automated industrial production we find “development”.

8. The definition (from Wiki) is: “In animals, metamery is defined as a mesodermal event resulting in serial repetition of unit subdivisions of ectoderm and mesoderm products.”

9. see our essay about Reaction-Diffusion-Systems.

10. To emancipate from constant and pervasive external “environmental” pressures is the main theme of evolution. This is the deep reason that generalists are favored to the costs of specialists (at least on evolutionary time scales).

11. Aristotle’s idea of the four causes is itself a scheme to talk about change. .

12. This principle is not only important for Urban affairs, but also for a rather different class of arrangements, machines that are able to move in epistemic space.

13. Here we meet the potential of symbols to behave according to a quasi-materiality.

14. Heinrich Klotz‘ credo in [21] is „not only function, but also fiction“, without however taking the mandatory step away from the attitude to predefine symbolic value. Such, Klotz himself remains a fully-fledged modernist. see also Wolfgang Welsch in [22], p.22 .

15. There is of course also Robert Venturi with his  “Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture”, or Bernard Tschumi with his disjunction principle summarized in “Architecture and Disjunction.” (1996). Yet, both went as far as necessary, for “complexity” can be elementarized and generalized even further as he have been proposing it (here), which is, I think a necessary move to combine architecture and urbanism regarding space and time. 

16. see footnote 5.

17. ??? .

18. Remember, that the behavior of cities is also determined by the legal setup, the traditions, etc.

19.The ramp is an important element in contemporary architecture, yet, often used as a logistic solution and mostly just for the disabled or the moving staircase. In Koolhaas’ works, it takes completely different role as an element of story-telling. This aspect of temporality we will investigate in more detail in another essay. Significantly, LeCorbusier used the ramp as a solution for a purely spatial problem.

20. Of course, NOT as a phenomenon!

References

  • [1] Michael Batty, Cities and Complexity: Understanding Cities with Cellular Automata, Agent-Based Models, and Fractals. MIT Press, Boston 2007.
  • [2] Karl Kropf (2009). Aspects of urban form. Urban Morphology 13 (2), p.105-120.
  • [3] Michael Batty’s website.
  • [4] Michael Batty and Stephen Marshall (2009). The evolution of cities: Geddes, Abercrombie and the new physicalism. TPR, 80 (6) 2009 doi:10.3828/tpr.2009.12
  • [5] Michael Batty (2012). Urban Regeneration as Self-Organization. Architectural Design, 215, p.54-59.
  • [6] Karl Kropf (2005). The Handling Characteristics of Urban Form. Urban Design 93, p.17-18.
  • [7] Nabeel Hamdi, Small Change: About the Art of Practice and the Limits of Planning, Earthscan, London 2004.
  • [8] Dennis L. Sepper, Descartes’s Imagination Proportion, Images, and the Activity of Thinking. University of California Press, Berkeley 1996. available online.
  • [9] C. Bandt and M. Mesing (2009). Self-affine fractals of finite type. Banach Center Publications 84, 131-148. available online.
  • [9] Gilles Deleuze, Difference & Repetition. [1967].
  • [10] Moussaïd M, Perozo N, Garnier S, Helbing D, Theraulaz G (2010). The Walking Behaviour of Pedestrian Social Groups and Its Impact on Crowd Dynamics. PLoS ONE 5(4): e10047. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010047.
  • [11] Claire Detrain, Jean-Louis Deneubourg (2006). Self-organized structures in a superorganism: do ants “behave” like molecules? Physics of Life Reviews, 3(3)p.162–187.
  • [12] Dave Mosher, Secret of Annoying Crowds Revealed, Science now, 7 April 2010. available online.
  • [13] Charles Jencks, The Architecture of the Jumping Universe. Wiley 2001.
  • [14] Rem Koolhaas. Delirious New York.
  • [15] Markus Heidingsfelder, Rem Koolhaas – A Kind of Architect. DVD 2007.
  • [16] Rem Koolhaas, Bigness – or the problem of Large. in: Rem Koolhaas, Bruce Mau & OMA, S,M,L,XL. p.495-516. available here (mirrored)
  • [17] Wiki entry (english edition) about Rem Koolhaas, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rem_Koolhaas, last accessed Dec 4th, 2012.
  • [18] Rem Koolhaas (2010?). “On OMA’s Work”. Lecture as part of “The Areen Architecture Series” at the Department of Architecture and Design, American University of Beirut. available online. (the date of the lecture is not clearly identifiable on the Areen AUB website).
  • [19] Hans Ulrich Obrist, Interview with Rem Koolhaas at the Biennale 2010, Venice. Produced by the Institute of the 21st Century with support from ForYourArt, The Kayne Foundation. available online on youtube, last accessed Nov 27th, 2012.
  • [20] Heinrich Klotz, The history of postmodern architecture, 1986.
  • [21] Wolfgang Welsch, Unsere postmoderne Moderne. 6.Auflage, Oldenbourg Akademie Verlag, Berlin 2002 [1986].
  • [22] Vera Bühlmann, inahbiting media. Thesis, University of Basel 2009. (in german, available online)
  • [23] Report in de zeen (2008). available online.
  • [24] Jacques Herzog, Rem Koolhaas, Urs Steiner (2000). Unsere Herzen sind von Nadeln durchbohrt. Ein Gespräch zwischen den Architekten Rem Koolhaas und Jacques Herzog über ihre Zusammenarbeit. Aufgezeichnet von Urs Steiner.in: Marco Meier (Ed.). Tate Modern von Herzog & de Meuron. in: Du. Die Zeitschrift der Kultur. Vol. No. 706, Zurich, TA-Media AG, 05.2000. pp. 62-63. available online.

۞

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Urban Strings

November 17, 2012 § Leave a comment

The urban life on this globe forms a vastly diverse and

heterogeneous universe. How could one ever expect to understand it in its entirety ? And isn’t some sort of understanding required to deal with all the challenges offered by the complexity of urban environments that we are faced with? Such, or similar, is the despair of the urbanist. Some say, urbanism is dead, has disappeared, at least as far as urbanism is said to be concerned about kind of a theory about the city or urban life. Whatever happened to urbanism [1], Herzog & deMeuron are convinced [2] that “There are no theories of cities; there are only cities.” No manifestos any more, please!

Should we dismiss the despair of our putative urbanist? Or should we take the expressed concerns serious? Is it reasonable at all to strive for an understanding? And what could “understanding“ mean in light of the complexity of large urban arrangements? The Newton of urban affairs is quite unlikely to appear, the globally unified formula about urban affairs is certainly a delusion. For what purpose should we aim for insights, as most planning initiatives don’t hit their targets anyway? Why not just dropping the distanced attitude that seems to be implied by theory and planning and just act, on the local or even micro-level, to deal with the challenges? At least urbanists of any shade have already many toolboxes for any kind of problem, haven’t they? Well, the outcome of the “just acting,” the collection of works contributed by swarm architects, results, according to Koolhaas, in nothing else than Junkspace.

The matter is not of least relevance, as there have been more than 50% of all humans living in urban environments by 2011, with a projected 75% by 2050, and even today the conditions for inhabitants of cities as well as for cities themselves are often threatening, to say the least. In many urban aggregations in the South, slums are more something common than an exception.

Behind the scenes, and on a quite general level, any discourse about the city and its theory is about the dynamics of urban culture, or simply the concept of change and its political actualization. Upfront it does not matter whether we talk about succeeding whole-sale plans as in the case of Singapore, or similarly perhaps Masdar, failing planning like in case of Mumbai whether we talk about the effects of the mobilization of people, with positive net total as in the case of Shanghai, or a negative net total as in the case of Leipzig (at least up to 2010), whether we talk about self-organized changes or any mixture of those. Given the enormous diversity of the “cultural actual” we have to find a structure for any argument about urban change that is both general enough to include all of those aspects and, most important, that could be bound to the operational level. Otherwise we simply would neither be able to compare them at all, or to “learn” from it. Note that it is not appropriate to “define” change, as this would obscure any theoretical notion. And the generality of this structure should not be burdened by a neglect of the realm of individual personality. The “operational” comprises the political, of course, and thus also issues of ethics and morality.

This Essay

This essay is proposed to be a further step into the direction of Urban Reason. Urban Reason could be circumscribed as human reason that is unfolding, emerging etc. under the condition of the Urban1. In this piece we will try to elucidate the link between some foundational, that is, more conceptual issues and the possibility for active practice.

As one of the pillars of that endeavor we follow the grand or omni-cultural hypotheses of urbanism: Nowadays, human culture is largely identical with urban culture, and through the influence of the cities even in seemingly non-urbanized areas.

The grand cultural hypothesis is b no means a new one. As early as 1966, Aldo Rossi formulated one of its first more complete versions in his “The architecture of the City” (p.51):

In other words, on the most general level, it must be understood that the city represents the progress of human reason, is a human creation par excellence; and this statement has meaning only when the fundamental point is emphasized that the city and every urban artifact are by nature collective.

Yet, Rossi remains largely on the rationalist track (as we will discuss in a later essay about time and architecture). Even as he departs from “classical modernism” in stressing the importance of history, time and (collective) memory with regard to the understanding of the city, the city still remains an artifact, something produced. As a “skeleton,” any existing architecture informs any subsequent architecture, which is beyond mere cause and effect, but for Rossi this influence also remains neutral regarding the possibility of conceptual schemes of thinking. Additionally, the urban remains constructed, there is no autonomy in it.

Despite Rossi’s concepts certainly provide a valuable starting point, it does not push the issue far enough. Even as he realizes that human reason is involved in the subject of the city, as a rationalist he fails to recognize the self-referentiality in such an arrangement.

The grand cultural hypothesis thus not only provokes the serious issue of how to speak about2 the Urban (see footnote 1). With respect to the realms of thoughts and taughts, the Urban takes a role that is quite similar to that of language: everything we (as humans) can think already takes place within language. We can’t step out of it. Likewise we may say that really everything we think and do relates to the Urban, at least nowadays. Thus, the omni-cultural hypotheses also relieves the thinking about the Urban from the monopolistic claims of science(s), relocating the issue of theory from control and pushing it towards design and play. The secondary claim thus is simply that a theory of the Urban is impossible without a strong and serious appropriation of philosophy.3

Such, our grand cultural hypothesis is markedly different from the early and almost classic opening of Henri Lefebvre in his “The Urban Revolution” :

I’ll begin with the following hypothesis: Society has been completely urbanized. This hypothesis implies a definition: An urban society is a society that results from a process of complete urbanization. This urbanization is virtual today, but will become real in the future. (p.1)

Lefebvre still treats the Urban (capital “U”) as something external, from the perspective of a science study, in this case “urbanism” being the target. After all, Lefebvre holds a strong materialist (-marxist) position throughout his work, rejecting even the idea that epistemology could play a role in dealing with the Urban. So, indeed, markedly different from ours.

Another “eternal” issue to be addressed in the context of the Urban is the question about the role of theory. Just throwing around some neologisms, importing exotic concepts from largely unrelated domains, expressing a demand for ethics or morality or doing historical studies does not constitute a theory. Not quite astonishingly, neither modernism in general nor positivism/scientism in particular have been able to develop an appropriate concept of theory. We will also see, for instance, that it is highly unreasonable to conceive “theory” somehow as the antipode of practice or practical concerns.

The refined and appropriately positioned concept of theory directly raises another, almost always overlooked topic. In the “negotiations” about the reasonability of some common ground there is neither a final justification for anything, nor is it reasonable to refer to “values”. Both abolish any possibility for open evolution and lead directly into narrow ideology and dictatorship. Instead, when talking about and engaging e.g. in urban design affairs, we firstly have to make visible our metaphysical stances. Without such exposition any single move or opinion is either rendered into blind—ultimately technocratic—activism or arbitrariness. Secondly, the metaphysics has to rely on a strictly processual approach, which is cleaned from any thinking that refers to origins, centers or axioms.

Both, theory and metaphysics limit effectively what can be expressed, hence what could be recognized, measured and done, both directly limit the achievable ethics, and both constrain the space of possible methods and means that could be applied in any practical case. There are some striking examples for that, as we will see later.

Another important pillar thus is the exploration and adjustment of the conceptual vocabulary. We propose to drop realism and existentialism as the structural basis of urbanism and to switch to a foundation that speaks “informational,” that embraces probabilism in a reflected manner, of course without sliding into the technocratic abyss and also without dropping aspects of empathy. This requires a proper methodological setup that consists of rather clearly identified methodological domains. We will propose a layered structure for that.

The effects of this re-orientation of Urban Theory and its two-sided, bi-lateral binding to both abstract philosophy and practical policy are not limited to the considerations of the Urban. It will also exert a significant force onto philosophy. What (for us) is particularly at stake philosophically is a reconciliation of transcendence with material aspects of the world. Which transposes in less spherical wording to the transitions between concepts and operations, which in turn regards the issue of methods and planning.

The remainder of this essay comprises the following sections (active links):

1. Rendering “Theory”

There are indeed a lot challenges, as even a short visit of the site The Global Urbanist may proof. The variety and scale of the problems is enormous—staggering would be probably a more appropriate description from the perspective of the putatively rational urbanist. The editors of the Global Urbanist site distinguish 7 major regions for this globe, they identify 6 top-level domains and for each of them 10 sub-domains. Any of these 60 areas could be assigned a couple of scientific domains. Taking into account the definition of science as a domain with a particular vocabulary, urbanism is probably well comparable to the attempt of building the tower of Babel.

All of this is indeed, I already mentioned it, impressive. Yet, what is completely missing on that site is a section for theory. Some kind of bottom-line, a frame is missing. The whole site provides reports on conferences about case studies and other so-called hands-on approaches, close to the factual conditions. At least for the Global Urbanist, which certainly provides a representative sample, HdM’s forecasting proposal from 2008 turned true as a matter of fact, it seems.

If we take the modernist conceptualization of theory into consideration, HdM have been completely right in expressing their doubts about the reasonability of theory in urbanism. From within modernism, the concept of theory has achieved a very clear definition, displayed extensively in Stegmüller’s series [3], which continues the legacy of Popper, Carnap, and Sneed, accompanied and extended by the work by Salmon Wesley and van Fraassen. Well, at least the late van Fraassen stumbled into some doubts about the analyticity of theories. For our concerns here it is important to see that the concept of theory is a matter of the philosophy of science, not of the sciences themselves.

Well, domain-specific theories not only introduce dedicated terms and rules that allow the derivation of models. The first important claim of the modernist notion of theory is that this derivation of models from a theory can be formalized. The second important claim about theories is that they have to be falsifiable, which implies and presupposes that any two theories could be separated in a clear-cut manner. The result of the these claims is devastating. Theories couldn’t be distinguished from models anymore, since any model also introduces theoretical terms. Since falsifiability and uniqueness are also required, both the difference to models as well as the value of the concept “theory” vanishes. Thus, analytic theories indeed don’t exist. They are not even possible. In some sense, modernism is an attitude free from any theory, just as HdM claimed. And HdM would be also right in rejecting another idea about theory that can be met often in architecture, namely, that theory ought to deal with that which is permanent and always valid, notably the rules of art and law of statics. In their exclamation that we cited in the beginning HdM did not deplore, of course, the missing of theories with regard to urbanism… they praised it.

Yet, the failure of modernism and positivism to provide an appropriate concept of theory does not mean at all that we have to drop theoreticity completely and once and for all. We just have to revoke the modernist conceptualization of “theory”. This gap we are now going to fill.

As we have argued in a previous essay about theory in general, theories are orthoregulative milieus for the invention of models. It is the models that we use for anticipation. This notion of theory relates modeling with the Form of Life in which said modeling takes place. As a consequence, it is clear that the subject of theories are models and the process of creating models. The subject of theory is not empirical issues, quite contrary to the modernist (positivist) attempt. Inversely, we can see that any anticipation, even any model that has some utility, whether it is a formalizable one or a de-facto model, implies a theory, since nothing could be done outside of any condition. There is no rule-based activity without at least one theory. The true conceptual antipode of theory is therefore not practice, but rather performance. This conception solves a number of riddles about theories. For instance, different theories may well overlap, even producing a common sub-set of models that are hardly separable when directly compared as such. It also opens a much more appropriate perspective onto the fuzzy evolutionary network of theories than Kuhn [4] has been able to conceive it. Revolutions, whether scientific or not, are a matter of underdevelopment, symptoms of the possibility of disconnected singularities, hence not any more appropriate for our current techno-scientific, globalized societies today. (Though there is no guarantee for the ability to prevent underdevelopment.)

What does this concept of theory mean for the practice of urbanism, for the practice of building within a city, whether it expands the city or differentiate it? Why is it justified to commiserate the missing of theory on the Global Urbanist website?

As a first hint we may take Frank Lloyd Wright’s frequently cited credo about the relation of principles and form:

“Do not try to teach design. Teach principles.”

Certainly, Wright did not provide an architectural theory that could have been understood easily. Despite he himself provided 9 principles, these principles can’t count as a reflected theory, albeit Wright’s approach is clearly heading towards the concept of theory as we understand it. Think for instance about his insisting on the aspect of instantiation as actualization, even as he didn’t use such wording. The required philosophy (Deleuze) was to be written down only years later. Doubtless Wright’s approach was an early one, and one that has to be developed much further. But his message is quite clear: Theory precedes form, or in philosophical terms, potentiality precedes actuality, and concepts precede representation. Well, what applies to architecture fits also to the affairs around urbanism.

Yet, principles are a weak foundation. They remain axiomatic, messing representations and values, hence remaining completely within naïve realism or phenomenology. This holds for other “principled” theoretical approaches as well, e.g. that of Christopher Alexander, LeCorbusier, or those of Bernhard Tschumi, notwithstanding their respective appeal. On the other hand, praising some philosophical stance, let us say, the deconstructivism as unfolded by Derrida, and trying to coin it more or less directly into architecture is just as deficient. Jumping on some ism-bandwagon doesn’t qualify as theory, neither in architecture, nor in urbanism or any other domain.

Let me highlight the issue with a small anecdote. Recently, Sam Mendes, the celebrated director of the latest James Bond 007 movie, reflected about the use of action elements in an interview regarding the making-of of the movie. After a few weeks of taking more and more action shots, perfecting them eventually, he said, you will arrive at a point where you have ask yourself: What is it that you actually want to do and show?

Obviously, Mendes relates a particular action to the dynamics of the whole story, and that “wholeness” is quite extensive in the case of the 007 series, after 22 other James Bond movies. Previously, and as an extension to the Austin/Searle speech-act-theory [5], we called this aspect the delocutionary aspect of an utterance. It concerns the story-telling—through which is also actualizes—and the play whose subject is the playing itself. Taking this delocutionary aspect into consideration, formally and content-wise, implies precisely the conceptualization of theory as an orthoregulative milieu. In contrast to that, the Austin/Searle theory remains completely compatible with a modernist, i.e. positivistic and reductionist approach, since its top-most level relates just to a strategy, that is to a predefined or at least a predefinable purpose, but fails to relate to the openness of social intercourse. Delocutionary aspects, in contrast, resist any kind of apriori assignment, since they precisely declare to play with the potential of assignment, thereby abolishing any actual apriori assignment.

Well, the same scheme applies—and I think quite well so—to the presentation of topics on the Global Urbanist site. A lot of activities, undisputably interesting, but no framing. More clearly: mostly like a herd of chickens running wildly across the limited ground within a well-defined cage. That does not mean that the reports could not be inspiring. Yet, they could be inspiring only before the background of a suitable theory. Otherwise, case reports can count just as kind of soulful portrays which hardly can provide any kind of “lesson learnt” whatsoever.

Let us take a brief view onto an example of activism devoid of theory (in our sense). Kerwin Datu, editor-in-chief of The Global Urbanist, reported about the World Urban Forum in Naples in the beginning of September 2012. He distils four key elements of spatial planning of expanding cities (emphasis by Datu).

The first is the inevitable expansion proposition: that urbanization is a process that cannot be stopped, only shaped, by effective spatial planning.

The second is the sustainable densities proposition: that in place of the commonplace mantra that cities need to densify, Angel argues that it needs only to be optimised. Cities should be dense enough to sustain a public transport system, but not so dense that they generate health risks for their inhabitants.

Third is the decent housing proposition. ‘Adequate housing is possible only when land is in ample supply,’ a situation that many local authorities must do a lot more to create. In many cities there is an effective coalition that restricts land supply to generate superprofits for landowners, with severe impacts on the affordability of housing for all.

And fourth is the public works proposition: ‘as a city expands, space for public works must be secured in advance of development,’ […].

For once, it appears that the basic principles of planning for urbanization have been identified, and packaged in a form simple enough for laypeople (which most politicians are when it comes to spatial planning) can understand. Of course, in a conference as large and fragmented as the World Urban Forum, it remains to be seen whether any urban leaders are willing to listen.

As Datu emphasizes, a lot of ministers and mayors have been attending, thus politically important people who indeed could make the difference. Yet, the results are just depressing, aren’t they? If these four points indeed would be taken as the “basic principles of planning for urbanization”, well, then no wonder the conditions in many cities are simply bad. These results of the World Urban Forum are obviously almost nil, precisely because there are no design commitments regarding the social quality. It represents the effect of misplaced, physicalist reductionism. Doing spatial planning just from the perspective of almost physical elements is nothing but deficient. A further reason for the irrelevance of these “results” is that there is not the slightest reference to even a simple theory of differentiation, well, to any theory. Obviously, politically important people are confused and disoriented. What a dark age…

Given that we again would like to drop a remark about the parentage of theory in a field concerning the topic of the Urban. Approaching the problems from a meta-perspective, from some distance so-to-speak, by applying some particular domain science, for instance sociology, statistics, geography, fluid physics, engineering of control, etc. is not sufficient for calling the approach a “theory”. Imposing the implied theoretical stances of any particular science onto the field of the Urban and so importing those stances reverses the roles. This way, one does not achieve anything that is related to the Urban. One just creates a kind of sub-species of the respective science, that is sociology about urban populations, geography about spatial pattern dynamics, etc. Clearly, that does not solve the problem of how to address the Urban itself. Sticking to this hope may well be called scientism. And that is clearly misplaced with regard to the Urban.

Quite interestingly, a few recent articles published on the Global Urbanist site argue in favor of bottom-up approaches4, emphasizing that large-scale projects inevitably fail in most cases, and stretching the point of planning-with instead of a planning-for attitude. This bottom-up attitude is running contrary to—the fallacious—modernist scientism. We will return to this issue later. Yet, the respective articles are case-studies that hardly could be generalized, hence their value is quite limited. This is even true for AMO’s and Koolhaas’ investigation of Lagos, Nigeria [6]. What we would need is—again—a proper theory of differentiation. Koolhaas and his AMO/OMA obviously recognized that. As we argued recently, they approached that problematic field practically through their buildings, and more theoretical through their delocutionary essays (Generic City, Junkspace, the first an alleged movie script, the second kind of text for staged play). This engagement continued with their recently published work about the Japanese Metabolists and their concepts [7], provided as a collection of interviews and reviews [8].

2. Clearance for Take-Off

From all of that it should be clear that we would like to suggest to reject the attitude that denies the relevance of theory for dealing with the Urban, whether it is suggested explicitly—as in the case of Herzog&deMeuron—or implicitly—as the Global Urbanists prefer.

The whole endeavor of theorizing about the Urban must respect the role of theory: theory is NOT concerned about those empirical facts or material arrangements that we can observe in any particular city. As soon as we are engaged in observing we have been moving into the realm of modeling.5

Our conceptualization of “theory” renders the task of creating—or at least that of approaching—a theory more easy. We can set the empirical manifold of the Urban apart, at least for the time being. Later we will see that the treatment of the vast and almost infinite body of empirical facts concerning the Urban can be structured neatly before the background of the theoretical move. Anyway, leaving the particularity of the Urban behind allows us to focus on methodological as well as delocutionary issues.

One of these issues concerns the pervasiveness of the Urban. As we have been deriving this in a previous article, nowadays the Urban is synonymic with human culture at large. There is no single aspect on this globe anymore that would not be significantly affected by human culture and that is, human urban culture. “ More than ever, the city is all we have.” [1] Anything that we could say about the Urban is already enclosed by the Urban, it always takes place with respect to and even within the Urban.

The situation is thus much like it is the case for language. Any investigation not only presupposes language, it takes place within it, especially however any investigation of language itself. This insight, first recognized by Wittgenstein, paved the way for a (small?) revolution in philosophy, eventually called the Linguistic Turn in the 1970ies.

Language, Reason, Concept, the Urban, or culture are examples for performable conceptual entities for which an objectifying externalization is impossible.6 Whenever we refer to them we already need them to express them. It is meaningless and methodologically silly to try to objectify them, say as we usually pretend to do for concepts like chair, table ball etc. Yet, even in those cases the explication could never be finitized, i.e. finally closed. This setting corrodes any attempt for a “closed”, i.e. formal analysis of the Urban, much like it does in the case of language. In other words, we find a strong self-referentiality. Wittgenstein phrased it as the “paradox of rule-following” in §201 in his Philosophical Investigations [9].

For Wittgenstein the consequence has been clear: Language, as form, as a performance as well as with regard to the conveyed meaning has to be anchored in the form of life. It is not possible to establish an investigation, whether about language or anything other, that would be complete by itself. In philosophical terms: No investigation about some observable can provide sufficient reason, which quickly amounts to the fact that there is no such thing as self-sufficient sufficient reason at all.

Hence, the attempt of a “scientific language” (Carnap) is nonsense. Language is performed much like a game or a play, where the rules are quite volatile and in themselves subject of the play. There are some rules that we follow, yet the rules are neither complete, nor fully determinable, neither stable nor “justifiable” at all.

In written German for instance, we find clearly separated sentences and each word has a clear positional value and a distinct grammatical type. Yet, the borders of a sentence, or a few of them, is almost never a representative of a proposal. And what is going to be said is almost never representable as a proposal. While this aspect is present in written language, writing can be conceived as a means to limit this effect—or to play explicitly with it. In spoken language, however, the situation aggravates dramatically, as even sentences appear almost never as a complete(d) unit. Instead, what is created by talking together, on any side of the discourse, is much more a probabilistic field of densities and potentials that is only usable = understandable as a multi-channel diachronically organized braid of possible stories, from which we as participants agree on focusing to a particular one. Yet, this focus certainly does not remove any of the other threads. I am absolutely sure that this “structure” applies to any other language, at least Indo-European language as well. I mean, that’s the whole issue of rhetoric.

Hence Wittgenstein came up with the idea that language always comes as a language game [9]. Meaning is nothing else than usage, which in case of language refers to the couple of “interpretation” and the “prompt to interpret”. Thus, meaning is neither a private affair, nor a mental one, nor could it be determined by somebody or apriori.

Why do I anatomize the language process with such an emphasis, despite our main topic is the Urban, and the particular form of reason(s) that spring out from it?

Well, there are two reasons for that. Firstly, I want to demonstrate that the grammatical rules and all the rules that we actually could talk about with respect to language games do not, by no means, tell us anything about the nature of the play. Even in chess, which is a strictly determinable game, we find different styles in the way the players contribute to the individuation of the game. Secondly, it should have become clear that language can’t be conceived in any way as a process that contains precisely determinable entities, or that even would be itself determinable. The impression of clarity is an illusion triggered by the habits around its usage. Language and its usage is essentially is a probabilistic process, despite the school grammars, and despite the positivist propaganda of contemporary linguistics.

Language games can be instantiated in extremely different ways, of course. Ultimately, we even could not claim that there is a determinable content in practiced speech. Content appears only upon a bag of retrograde interpretations, each spanning across a different time span, each of them with different resolution, each of them with different intensity. Language games and the putative content change with context, such that there won’t be a ever such a thing like an repeated utterance. Everything we say, we say it for the first time, despite and because we practice a certain style, caring thereby for our grown and growing habits.

We now can ask for the consequences of all of that for a theory of the Urban. I think, we just could perform the analogous move, that is, we may introduce the concept of the “Urban Game”. Everything we said above about language games applies to Urban Games as well.

We will discuss this concept of the Urban Game in more detail in a later piece. For the time being, we just would like to touch two issues. Firstly, we may say that the “Urban Game” takes the role of the Wittgensteinian “showing”. They are not only shaped by the urban environment, many of them would not even take place at all. While they could be described, of course, with respect to their visible parts, such descriptions would not catch up with their consequences, their sense and meaning. There is no single, crisp effect associated to them, they just release kind of “excitation” into the probabilistic network of the urban fabric. Essentially, we can’t describe the effect without pointing to the entirety of the city, its whole becoming. In this way, Urban Games work as kind of media, conveying the amorphous, unspecific showing (up) of the culture (reflexively: “es zeigt sich”), and also as a means to show the expectation of this mediated excitation (transitively). This refers to quite different activities and moves, as the category of Urban Games comprises the whole spectrum between legislation and installation. Secondly, the concept of “Urban Game” certainly allows to respect the aforementioned self-referentiality. And as we have seen, it demands for probabilistic concepts when describing them, like it is the case for language games. Probably even more important, it also provides a stable conceptual bridge between the individual and the communal level of urban affairs.

Regarding architecture, a typical Urban Game is the semiosical (!) play with styles. Semiosis is the spreading and branched and “culturally embedded” probabilistic process of creating new (Peircean) signs, i.e. to establish a new sign-practice. Venturi and his collaborators have been the first (and since then seriously neglected ones) that emphasized the importance of the dimension of the sign. While Koolhaas in his Junkspace [10] pejoratively lamented about the fact that

Through our ancient evolutionary equipment, our irrepressible attention span, we helplessly register, provide insight, squeeze meaning, read intention; we cannot stop making sense out of the utterly senseless… (p.188)

it is also certainly true that the city is a quite special breeding site for new signs, demanding ever for more interpretation, despite all the habituation [11]. And equally certainly, a term like “architectural incongruence” isn’t helpful to any extent, particularly when used in combination with the idea of a “mature streetscape”. For Michael Conzen, proponent of the British school of urban morphologists and who coined these terms, the semiotic dimension is simply irrelevant, calling them “linguistic problems” [12]. One has to know that Conzen beliefs in the reasonability to investigate the layout of the town map as a separate subject, albeit influenced by culture at large, while (as a geographer) at the same time he rejects the outbound attempt to benefit from other disciplines like biology. In his attempt to stay aware of the need of theory, he readily adopts phenomenological patterns, pimped by leaning towards Cassirer. Yet, Conzen not only completely fails to understand the role of theory, by means of that orientation he also remains entirely within the modernist tradition, even in its raw version, that is, not understanding the importance of the linguistic turn. In the next essay we will discuss this issue further.

It is important to see that in the context of the Urban neither language games nor of course Urban Games are necessarily bound to a particular speaker in a particular situation. Urban arrangements transform everything into probabilistic affairs.

The “Urban Game” always comprises language games, of course. Else, it provides a bridge between issues of matter, power and language. The language-driven perspective, which is also a semiotically7 driven perspective, includes the speech-act, which in our case includes the extension of the delocutionary act, that is, the open play that goes beyond mere rule-following.8

There are important consequences for any theory about Urban, for a critique of Urban Reason, but also for any kind of practice. We can refer only to the most important ones here:

  • 1. The Urban can’t be addressed analytically, hence it is also impossible to implement any kind of representational top-down control or planning without annihilating the Urban.
  • 2. The Urban Game is a potentially rule-changing social performance.
  • 3. There is no “complete” empirical description of the Urban, that is, any anticipatory model will fail at least partially. This failure has to be covered by an appropriate treatment of and attitude towards risk.
  • 4. The Urban can’t be constructed.
  • 5. The Urban may appear in an unlimited diversity.

Note that these items are not based on “values” or “attitudes”. They are the result of a rigorous philosophical argument.

There is still another issue that we can derive from language philosophy. With regard to language it is misguided to ask about some kind of absolute, global or stable meaning. Instead we have to ask: Which (kind of) language game she or he is playing? Since we are interested in theory here, this transforms immediately into a methodological issue. Regarding the Urban, we have to be clear about the relation between actions and concepts.

3. Schemata of a Critique of Urban Reason

For our purposes it is sufficient to distinguish two aspects of actions. Firstly, there is the aspect of rule-following. The rules implied by an action are chosen either due to some anticipatory “calculation” or due to the influence of the form of life. It is reasonable to expect that in most cases both sources are active. Whether the actions are based on free will or not is not relevant for us here.

The second aspect of actions that we’d like to distinguish concerns about what often is considered as “unintended effects”. Of course, the issues around acting upon the external world are much larger than just that. Actions unfold into material re-arrangements, they are a major component of irreversibility, hence they provoke what we previously called the “existential resistance”. The changes “then” are subject of further interpretation.

These two aspects, rule-following and the couple of acting and interpreting that are tied together through irreversibility, make clear that there is no direct link between concepts and actions. From a quite different perspective we achieved the same result earlier when introducing the choreostemic space. There we argued that in any move besides modeling and concepts also mediality and virtuality have to be taken into consideration, notably all of them conceived as transcendent entities (not: transcendental!). Also related to this issue is what the philosopher John McDowell called the unboundedness of concepts, according to him an inevitable consequence of the Myth of the Given. [13]

From this we can now proceed to the basic structure of theory building. Yet, insofar as we don’t want to just provide some rules, seemingly out of the blue, we‘d like to stress the point that we propose a “conscious,” that is a critical approach. A critical approach concerns about the conditions that are implied by setting it up. One of these concerns, and probably the major one, is language, regarded as a transcendent condition. Another one is the transcendentality itself, which causes the concept of Concept to be not only transcendent, but also virtual. A critical approach to theory building can’t stop, however, here, just stating that there are transcendent aspects. We also need to explicate the (abstract) mechanisms that are in charge in the field made from theory, structural models, predictive models and the organization of operations.

In a first and rather coarse step we can distinguish three layers that are important for theory building regarding the Urban:

  • – The operational level, including politics, legislation, immaterial and material logistics, the construction of infrastructure and all individual activities as well;
  • – The categorical work, providing the concepts that determine what could be expressed at all concerning the Urban;
  • – The model layer between the first two areas, providing concepts that enable us to describe the dynamics of the Urban on the structural level.

Here, a small remark about the operational level is probably indicated. Operations have to be distinguished from actions. We conceive of operations here indeed as the application of operators to the material world, whether physical or social. Actions comprise, in contrast to that, much more, e.g. models and concepts. Yet, precisely those we tried to make visible, including their relations among each other. The concept of action is hiding that inner structure. Operations can’t be regarded just as rule-following. To operate means to flexibly adapt to unforeseen contextual influences in order to actualize the respective model(s). It is clear that matter will exert some “resistance” to that, existential resistance. The world can’t be mapped to analytical descriptions by principle, hence operations always have to deal with some gap and ignorance.

This may be depicted as shown in the following figure 1. The brackets here should not be understood as objective borders, of course, it just reflects a particular focus. On both sides, regarding the conceptual area, i.e. philosophy, and the operational area, i.e. largely politics, are manifolds by themselves. Actually, there is no clear border between the fields, just “gravitational” spots. Additionally, one should resist analytical habits that would imply a certain directionality in this field. The field may be entered from either side, and any kind of sequence is possible, given the actual context and the individuality of persons engaging in the process. Yet, the scheme allows to organize that sequence, or to simply talk about it. That is, the process of theory building as well as its application are critical also insofar as the externalization may trigger a secondary symbolization.

Figure 1: Generalized methodological layering for the binding of abstract thought to operations.

The scheme is a projection of the choreostemic space, both simplifying and extending it. The “concept” area is subject of philosophy. Note that the three layers are mutually dependent; the dependency of these layers works in either direction. More exactly we may say that these fields are dependent on each other in a particular way. They build a high-dimensional fluid moebius fractal.

Let us briefly visit the two conceptual components, the moebioid and the fractal. A fractal can be created in several ways, which however are all traceable to a procedure called self-affine mapping. An example for a simple self-affine mapping in 2-dimensional space with 2 surfaces is the leaf of the fern (see figure 2a), by the Peano-curve, the Sierpinski triangle, or the Koch snowflake curve. Inversely, fractals are created also recursive sub-division procedures.

A moebioid is a n-dimensional body with a topological “defect”. Despite a 3-dimensional moebioid exists in 3 dimensions, it has only 1 topological surface, instead of the usual 2 surfaces. There is no “inside” or “outside” with it, as you can observe if draw a closed circle. (Astonishingly, you can even fill water “into” a Moebius bottle despite their is no “inside”.) A moebioid is also conceivable as a knot, though not built from threads but from surfaces. As it is the case for trivial, that is smooth knots, moebioids become flat = unknotted in higher dimensions. A fractal moebioid, however, can’t be unknotted in higher dimensions. (I have no proof for this, it is just a conjecture)

Just as a small remark: This concept about theory work (and the potential working of theory) has been deeply inspired by Deleuze&Guattari’s “What is Philosophy”[14], particularly the sections about concepts and the “Plane of Immanence”. You will find a strong resemblance, for instance concerning the fractal structure, the distinction between the concept and the field they generate, etc.. Nevertheless, what we propose here is an extension of Deleuze’s work, so to speak, down-stream towards politics and logistics. Deleuze himself always refused to approach these areas, focusing on philosophical aspects. [15] Actually, I regard the binding between theory and politics, mediated through models, as one of the most interesting ones, not just with regard to architecture and urbanism, and for sure I will prepare a dedicated essay about it (working title so far: “Braidings between Immanence and Politics: The Case of Urban Tales.”).

Back to our scheme from figure 1. Our requirement is that any of the three fields contains any sequence from the three fields. Fortunately, the sequences do not grow very much due to pragmatic reasons. In other words, it needs to be treated by a self-affine mapping in order to approximate the actual arrangements in socio-mental settings, while at the same time the actual form of the “embedding” or framing is only a matter of relative phase, i.e. pseudo-location on the surface of the moebioid. Additionally, the resulting figure should not be expected to be a fixed geometrical entity. Rather, it is fluid, pruning some sequences, bringing any of the field-like components to the surface through foldings, etc. A distantly approximating impression is provided by figure 2b, just click to to see the projections moving.

Operations can not do without deeply integrated models, as it is the case for concepts. There are no “pure” models, or concepts, either, of course. Which compartment is surrounded by the others is dependent on the respective purpose, i.e. context and style, I suppose. in the following we will try to develop this scheme into an abstract space that could be used to trace the dynamics of the Urban.

Figure 2a: The fern leaf as a simple example for a self-affine mapping.

The next two images provide visualizations of projections of objects (not of fractals!) in high-dimensional spaces, the first in figure 2b more “conventional” (it is different aspects of a Calabi-Yau-manifold, which takes an important role in String theory, found here), the second in figure 2c more artistic and moebioid (found here).

Figure 2b: A grid of projections of the 6-dimensional Calabi-Yau-manifolds into 3-dimensional space. Note that a projection from higher to lower dimensionality not only creates knots and moebius figures, there is also no single definite projection, hence the grid.

Figure 2c: This image actually has been produced by weaving a lightstick, capturing it with long exposure times, not by any kind of digital rendering of numericals.

Despite the scheme from figure 1 is still quite coarse, we nevertheless can say that the most important part of this scheme is the one referring to theory, the categorical work. This includes all the modes that are being used to apply abstract concepts for the derivation of the concepts assignable to the intermediate layer. Hence, the categorical work fully constrains what could be expressed about the Urban, but also what could be recognized, modeled, anticipated and integrated into the symbolic constitution of a particular urban instance, whether it is by means of population dynamics or of more or less centrally organized activities. It constrains entirely what can be thought and said, whether on the level of the generic model, on the level of actual models, or with respect or logistic or political actions.

From that we can conclude three things. (1) The conceptual part has to be abstract enough. Reasoning about geometric forms, generative grammars and other forms of “automated” (or state-bound) methods to generate forms, the “origin of the pictorial” following Paul Klee or Wassily Kandinsky, all of such approaches are certainly not abstract enough, neither for doing theory work in architecture nor in the context of the Urban. (2) We need appropriate concepts and techniques to derive such concepts for creating structural models. (3) Both together have to allow for the derivation of political actions that are compatible with basic philosophical insights, with appropriate ethical and political positions. This would include, for instance, the discourse about sustainability, which is definitely neither a trivial nor a eco-technical issue.

Anyway, we may propose that the methodological layering shown above is indeed a generalizable scheme for the binding of abstract thought to operations. We just have to add that it should be conceived more as a high-dimensional methodological field with blurred borders between the components. As we already mentioned, there are many proposals that suffer from a considerable methodological “binding problem”, from either side. This causes critical developments particularly in those domains where we can find self-referentiality, for instance in linguistics or urbanism through their subjects “language” and/or “culture”. Examples for such critical developments are the whole movement of idealism, or, somehow as its pretended counterpart, the denial of theory. As a further abundant methodological fault we may count representationalism and the closely related believe in the dominance of common sense, as Deleuze has been pointing out (for details see this previous essay).

Of course, we have to explicate the model layer. Yet, before that we first have to take the thread up again that is put down by the importance and the guiding role of the concepts.

It is quite important to understand that concepts are transcendent, but neither universal nor eternal. They are not transcendental either, which would mean that they represent the demand for some kind of ultimate origin. There is also nothing with them that could be called “truth”. Concepts act more like hubs for semiotic processes that allow for and organize certain kinds of “vectorial traffic”, yet without maintaining any kind of materiality—even not a symbolic one—on their own. This position of the concepts inherits towards language.

Precisely here we can exclude any philosophical framework as a proper candidate that does not respect the primacy of concepts and language in the genealogy of a theory.9 Among the rejected attitudes we comprise phenomenology, external realism, existentialism, positivism, structuralism, and deconstructivism.

So, we can ask now: What else?

4. The Core

Actually, it is quite simple. The core of any Urban Theory, as well as its critique, must necessarily comprise the following two questions:

  • 1.How to speak about the Urban?
  • 2.How to actualize the Urban Games?

These questions are far from being “only of theoretical” significance, “theoretical” used here in the inappropriate, common sense way. It is for instance simply meaningless to address questions of sustainability without first answering those, as it is superfluous to engage in research about planning without a proper answer to those. What we also meet here is the eternal (and internal) tension of conservatism: what to conserve, the status quo, the dynamics or the potential? In order not to demolish itself, it must stick to the conservation status quo, which on the other hand abolishes any reasonability. We certainly have to care not to trap the concept of sustainability in the same dilemma.

Another area where the dominance of language and the conceptual may appear surprising is public services, particularly concerning the essential flows, i.e. energy and water. We will discuss this in more detail in the application section below.

What we find here is nothing else than a very practical consequence of Wittgenstein’s famous, almost proverbial, proposal: The borders of one’s language constitute the borders of one’s world. Inversely, we always can conclude that in case these questions will not be addressed explicitly they necessarily are answered implicitly. Yet, this also means that the answers will be most likely inconsistent, arbitrary, and contingent, without any possibility to set up a reasonable discourse about the urgent local issues.

It is of utmost importance to understand that these important questions can’t be answered without reference to two rather divergent areas, albeit they are also deeply and strongly linked to each other: (1) the predominant Form of Life that is practiced in a community, and (2) the metaphysical setup on the level of the individuals.

It is precisely here that we find the entrance point for “modernism”, whether the “original”, i.e. European version, or in its segregated form in the case of Singapore. Across the decades and centuries there is of course a co-evolution of the Form of Life and its accompanying metaphysics.

5. Metaphysics

As we have described earlier, modernism can be described by a characteristic set of beliefs. The dominant component of this set, however, is the strong belief in the necessity of metaphysical independence. Note that the idea of identity builds just the other side of the coin, essentially, independence and identity are almost synonymic from the philosophical perspective. In our essays about the role of logic and our add-on to the Deleuzean dual concept of Difference & Repetition, the choreostemic space, we discussed the alternative to identity and independence: transcendental difference.

Though historically comprehensible, independence is as little justifiable as any other metaphysical belief. The fact is simply that you can tell different and different kind of stories, some being more extensible and more fruitful than others. Anyway, this belief into independence informed everything in Western societies at least for several hundred years up to present times, with origins deep in classic Greek thought and with a particular blossoming at the end of the 19th century and the 1950ies/1960ies. Even Descartes and a whole series of scientists from Newton to Helmholtz would not have been thinking the way they did without it.

This independence has a range of strong correlates. One of the most influential is the belief in the indispensability of centralized control. A more abstract companion is the belief in centers and middle points itself [16], together with the cosmology of the sphere [17]. Traces of that can be found in architecture—from Boullée to Buckminster—as well as in urbanism, particularly as the phantasm of the “ideal city” that has been prevailing throughout the centuries.

Figure 3a: Etienne L. Boullée, Kenotaph for Newton (1784)

Figure 3b: Claude-Nicolas Ledoux, Dwelling for the Gardener in an utopian ideal city, ~1800.

The sphere and the implied importance of the concept of the center-point did not only show up as utopian buildings. It was also used, and is still being used, for the layout of cities. The phantasm of the “ideal city” has been poisoning the discourse about the Urban up to our days.

Figure 4a: Nowa Huta, a Polish city built to praise the heroism of the mine workers in former communist Poland.

Figure 4b: Palma Nova, near Venice, Italy. Note, that in former times the costs for the fortification caused a drive for circular layouts for geometrical reasons. Palma Nova still exists. Yet, in former times people didn’t want to live there.

.

Even today density is often misunderstood as a center of a radial symmetrical arrangement, with Manhattan being the great and pleasant exception.

With regard to methodology, statistics as it is practiced since the mid of the 19th century up today, is deeply structured by the independence assumption, which, as a matter of fact, renders it incapable to deal with patterns. In urban environments, the deep modernistic belief in independence led to forms reflecting crystalline growth, that is, the most primitive form of growth, which also is the least adaptive one.

Fortunately, things are changing. Well, they change slowly, but steady. The first incentive stems from biology, of course. In biology, nothing makes sense under the assumption of independence. Everything is meaningful only if conceived as a historically constrained processual manifold, called evolution, yet which also includes complexity. The second incentive comes—astonishingly—from physics, yet from the “non-classical” area of physics, in particular the physics on sub-atomic scales.

Changing the metaphysical setup in order to pave the way for a more appropriate understanding of the Urban means to drop the addiction to the sphere, of independence, of the object, of the territory, to leave behind the strive for identity as a constant as well as the representational attitude in (“explicit”) controlling and planning. Maybe you already detected the remote reference to the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze here.10 It is rather important to understand that all these items are not “universal” in any respect. They just follow from certain methodological considerations, influenced for instance by the insight into the primacy of language. Yet, even if language and concepts can be considered to play a transcendent role, universality does not follow from that.

6. Dropping the Spheres

The revolution that started to erode the deterministic scientific cosmogony towards a de-centered metaphysical cosmology is still running at high rates. In many areas its main messages are still not assimilated. Modernism and its detrimental offspring prevail.

The first “step” into that revolution was the discovery of in-computability. In-computability is a principle barrier that could not be overcome by more accurate measures. Actually, on the level of the sub-atomic world accuracy does not make much sense. Basically, there are three contributions:

  • 1. Poincaré’s investigation of the three-body-problem (~1900), leading to the first description of chaotic systems.
  • 2. The invention of Quantum physics from Planck (~1890) to Schrödinger (~1950), including the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.
  • 3. The investigation of dissipative processes by Prigogine (~1975).

The second “step”, which also stretches across several decades, derives from the paradoxical situation of quantum physics. On the one hand, the so-called “Standard Model” is quite successful. For instance, a simple principle has been deduced that allowed the prediction of the existence of formerly unknown sub-nuclear particles. There is some kind of order for the set of particles.

Figure 5. The “periodic System” of elementary particles according to the Standard Model. Despite the usual graphical depiction conveys seemingly a certain degree of simplicity, it is neither not that simple, nor does it display the open issues. In other words, it is some kind of propaganda.

On the other hand, it fails completely, as it does not allow to create a super-symmetric theory, that is, a theory that combines all of the four fundamental forces in nature.

As a result, some—if not many—basic observations are still unexplained, on the mesocosmic, rather small scales as well as on the cosmic scales (cf. [23]). Let us just pick three of the most salient gaps. First, there is no explanation of electro-magnetism that goes beyond its phenomenal description. In other words, physicists still don’t understand exactly what a “charge” is, say of an electron. Secondly, the “condensation” of elementary particles from “clouds” of extremely high “temperature”, e.g. sub-nuclear gluon plasma, is not understood. All physicists can say is simply: it happens. One of the gaps, according to the physicist Quigg, of the Standard Model concerns what makes a top quark a top quark and an electron an electron. Both seemingly don’t have further internal structure, both have electrical charge, though the quark only 1/3 of an elementary charge owned by the electron. Thirdly, now on the cosmic scale, there is complete ignorance in physics about the so-called “dark matter”. Would the “Standard Model” be indeed applicable and accurate, neither of the three phenomena should remain inexplicable.11

This situation gave rise to a still heavily disputed theoretical framework that is completely different from the “Standard Model” (SM). It is the so-called String Theory, more recently extended into M-Theory (MST).

The difference between those two frameworks is tremendous. In fact, they follow different and incommensurable metaphysical belief sets, which provides the reason that their case is particularly interesting for us.

Aspect

Standard Model

String Theory

conventional Space-Time

presupposes it

induces it

Basic Form

spherical particles or sections of space with 3-d rotational symmetry

1-dimensional strings of energy of approximately defined, positive length, the Planck length (10-33m)

Sub-atomic Particles

extremely concentrated energy, but the mechanism of creating inertial as well as rest mass is unknown

amplitude of vibration

Type of Particles

existential, produce of condensation frThere are many fundamental differences between the two frameworks, yet, the basic ones that are interesting for us here are the following:om gluon plasma, but mechanisms/rules are unknown

modes of vibration

Particle-Wave Dualism

phenomenal existent

irrelevant

4 Basic Forces

gravitation remains incommensurable (even if the Higgs Boson would be confirmed)

gravitation is a consequence, a unified theory is possible

Structure of Space

3 spatial dimensions+1 temporal dimension, presupposed

~10 abstract dimensions, from which the mesocosmic space derives through “overlapping” of low-dimensional (2d) projections

Basic Characteristics of the Framework

existential, claims desperately a “God”-particle, the Higgs-boson

generative, existence is not a central concept

Philosophical Status of the implied Image of Thought

based on identity and representation, with energy as an onto-realistic fact

based on difference and form (information), with energy as a mediator

Conceptual Status

it is a model (indeed)

it is a theory, i.e. an orthoregulative set of rules about how to generate a model

Note that it does not make sense to think of the strings as kind of objects. It is not possible to draw them, despite there are many artistic interpretations around. The basic architectonic difference between the frameworks is their relation to the concept of mechanism. The Standard Model is based on 19th century attitudes, expressing the initial claim that logic is imprinted to nature. There is no place for incorporating information as a separate entity. Causality and information are not distinguished, which ultimately leads to pseudo- paradoxes12. There is even the claim of perfect analyticity, that is, calculability, despite quantum physics itself proposes the uncertainty principle. It is precisely this architectonic flaw of trying contradictory things that lead to the “paradoxes” of current mainstream interpretations of the Quantum world.

The String Theory, in contrast, comprises a proposal of a mechanism that creates kinds of matter based on different information. String Theory describes the form of energy, where different forms—in this case different modes of “vibration”—lead to different kinds of matter. It concerns all particles, even photons, i.e. electromagnetic waves.

Both models, however, share an extremely important property: in some way or another, the describe a probabilistic, yet quantized world.

The sub-atomic world is not a continuous one. That means that it is impossible to have a smooth transition from a “natural law”, expressed in an analytic formula, and the observation of the behavior of those tiny “objects”. At some point we thus need an abstract transition that creates a quantum. Despite physics can only state that there is the quantum, incapable to “explain” the why, we may well say that this transition is induced by a transfer of information, e.g. by a measurement. In other words, the objects and their phenomenal appearance is dependent on the measurement, whether this is imposed by another particle without an experimenter or by the apparatus and the actions of the experimenter. Before measurement, however, particles are not particles at all. There are only waves of probability. That transition is called decoherence. The whole arrangement is thus one of information. The quantum introduces one of the conditions of identifiability: discontinuity. The other condition is memory, which we find only in the String Theory. As we already said above, the greatest defect in Standard Theory is the architectonic flaw that it conflates causality and information, which in turn is a consequence of its representational characteristic.

Nevertheless, from all of that it should be clear that quantum physics developed a strikingly different tool-set as compared to that of statistical mechanics. There, particles—atoms or molecules in this case—are conceived as tiny billiard balls, almost without spatial extension. Initially, statistical mechanics did not know anything about information. Yet, statistical mechanics introduced another important perspective into the realm of potential expressions: the population. In some way, we may conceive the whole 19th century as the century of the discovery or invention of the population, from the French Revolution to Darwin to Helmholtz.

In quantum physics, particularly in String Theory, the modernist assumptions collapse.

  • 1. There are no objects independent of measurement, quite to the contrary, measurement is a form of information transfer that induces the way how the microscopic world transits=transforms=decoheres into a macro world.
  • 2. There is no independence at all.
  • 3. The basic mode of description is based on probability, that is information and risk.
  • 4. Induced generation and probabilistic relation supersede existential claims.
  • 5. Computability is a matter of context and performing interaction.
  • 6. There is no complete analytic, i.e. symbolic description for the transition from micro to macro.

So, if the modernist belief set has been already seriously corroded even in physics, why should we continue to stick to it in a field like urbanism? We’d suggest to drop existentialist attitudes completely, concerning both theoretical as well as performative and material aspects, and with it all the anti-cultural procedures like representational top-down planning.

Some important questions could be derived here. What else can we learn from the example of quantum physics, particularly for urbanism? Is there a “standard model” in urbanism, drawing mainly on existential claims like objecthood? How would a stringy theory of the Urban look like? How could we assimilate a probabilistic perspective into our methodological setup?

At least one aspect of those open issues could be addressed right now. We have seen that in quantum physics the separation between observer and the observed breaks down. The reason is that measurement takes place on the same scale, within the same actualization or form of matter. Measurement itself introduces indistinguishability. The result is known as wave-particle dualism, linked by decoherence. And it is probably not the last strangeness physicists are enforced to handle, just think about the yet unknown quality of what they call dark matter and dark energy.

Well, the similarity of scale and kind is not limited to physics. We find it everywhere in cultural studies. Unfortunately enough, it is rarely recognized at all. It is still to be unleashed what decoherence could mean for cultural and urban studies, but for sure there are similar kinds of processes, strictly limiting what can be measured. Probably, we could even say that the self-referentiality introduced by the sameness of measurement scales shows up as quantum effect as well. One of the possible candidates for a cultural “quantum” is nothing else than the sign as it is formulated by Peircean semiotics. For “quantum” just means that there is no countability, nor identifiability beyond it. Probably, we have to be aware of “quantum effects”, mediated by different “particles”, in any cultural study.

Indeed, the Peircean sign is fully compatible with probabilistic foundations, for it marks a continuous field of actional densities, from which eventually an actual vector or reference is taken. This way we could say that Peircean signs and the signs in the Urban are isomorph (at least). The urban quantum-sign raises the issue of the symbol, which is often treated in a rather unsuitable manner, mainly in the context of the question of identity or identification and the related issue of historical continuity. Yet, the topics of the symbol, there symbolicalness and symbolability we have to postpone to a later piece (without forgetting about the probabilistic foundations).

7. Revisiting the Core

After this small excursion into the world of physics, which allowed us to harvest some promising conceptual tools, we return to our starting point, the topic of approaching a theory about the Urban. This we sketched by the following two questions:

  • 1. How to speak about the Urban?
  • 2. How to actualize the Urban Games?

The first of those questions could be said to relate to the field between the conceptual and the performative13, while the second would link the performative with the story-telling and the political. Again, the two questions or perspectives do certainly not delineate ideally (geometrically) separated fields. We already mentioned that Urban Games comprise language games. Additionally, they work from different directions, creating a complex dynamics. As a suitable metaphor for this we may cite fluid dynamics, especially of free streams such like the Gulf stream.

Figure 6a: The Gulf stream in the North Atlantic, departing from the east coast of America westward towards Europe (source). Red color means high differential velocity. A lot of vortices can be seen in a highly complex dynamics, creating patterns of mutual embedding.

Figure 6b. Vortices in a turbulent stream. As in case of the Gulf steam, there is no clear border, i.e. no separability between two mixing streams.

Let us focus the first issue for now, the mode and the possibility of explications as it is constrained by conceptual tools on various levels.

From previous work and the results achieved here so far we can fix some basic requirements for the explication of the model layer from figure 1.

Table 2: Basic requirements for a theory about the Urban.

Aspect

Characteristics

type of processes

differentiation, behavior

methodological frame

probabilistic, generative

architectonic constraint

satisfying self-referentiality

internal structural dynamics

construction by elementarization

The four basic types of structural model perspectives that match these requirements are

Growth

establishing persistent form (“Gestalt”, morphos) by attachment (either positive or negative), or more general, by a change in magnitude in some property (or properties); we may call it morphodiny (grk. dino, abstractly: to give, provide)

Networks

describing the form of matter capable for re-arranging information;

Associativity

for the transition from probabilistic processes to propositional statements, i.e. the basis for symbolification and encoding/decoding;

Complexity

for pattern creation and morphogenesis, i.e. the transition from order to organization as a self-stabilizing process.14

All of them we introduced in previous essays, yet in a slightly different context, which means that in the future we will provide updates to them such to match better the wording of urbanism.

These structural models share four eminently important properties: (1) They are all relational. (2) They are all built from “elements”. (3) These elements in turn provide docking sites for the even more abstract conceptual layer and the metaphysical attitudes behind them. (4) They allow to derive anticipatory models that directly engage with operational issues.

It is crucial to understand that these four categories are simply different perspectives, or language games, useful for talking about differentiation. Whenever we find a process that produces something different, whether as novelty or as some kind of alteration, we may take one of these perspectives. Yet, we won’t be able to talk about form and the “becoming different” without those categories as a group. In general terms, these four categories are to be conceived again as elements that we can use to construct a space (an aspectional one!), or likewise a scale that allows to compare things

A second group of categories is needed to take the perspective of the process itself. We may distinguish the basic qualities in the arrangement of matter and information, which is nothing else than the orchestration of dynamical change.

The scale is actually being built along the differential weight of matter or information. If the weight of matter or plans (symbolic quasi-matter) is more pronounced than that of information, then we call it usually development, if the matter becomes less relevant, we find either evolution, or still further down in the same direction, learning;

Thus we can see that form (morphos), adaptation and behavior build an almost continuous space, and thus, quite important, also a subjectivating scale to describe the dynamics of things. In turn, talking about changing things by just referring to one of these perspectives, whether on the objectivating or on the subjectivating scale, always must be rated as a inadmissible reduction.

Note that the “Relational Turn” is completely incompatible with modernism and its belief set. From a modernist perspective, the particular role of the above mentioned four structural perspectives remains simply invisible, for it is even impossible to talk about the dynamic effects and emergences of relationality within the limits of modernist concepts. Interestingly, throughout the 20ieth century, more and more scientific disciplines discovered the necessity for  relational turn, from biology (Rashevsky, 1935, Rosen 1991 [28]) thru economics to architecture (Lorenzo-Hemmer [29]).

In order to support the transition into the are of anticipatory models, the structural models have to support some quite essential processes. Any of them has to…

  • — be formalizable,
  • — be capable to provide scales for different kinds of measurement ,
  • — be operationalizable for actual construction of measurements,
  • — allow for active comparatistics.

Without support for these constructive properties a structural model would be hardly of any value.

Figure 7: Three methodological layers. The model layer showing only the main types of structural models. The other component of the model layer, the anticipatory models are not shown.

All four types of structural models can be used also for describing the transition between the material and the informational. Interestingly, they apply both with respect to the empirically observable processes as well as the methodological concerns, where they serve the transfer from concepts to action.

Finally, we can fill the model layer with more concrete aspects, creating something like an associative field. Of course, and in striking contrast to the short list of structural models, this field is by far not complete. Actually, on the level of anticipatory modeling we find already the influence of the unlimited number of forms of life. This does not mean that a particular form of life would provide an infinite number of possible moves. Quite the contrary is true. However, it definitely does mean that the forms of life can’t be constrained, or limited in their number, apriori, or top-down. Anything else results directly in chauvinist or imperialist patterns.

Figure 8: A possible explication of the model layer, now showing a mixture of structural and anticipatory models as an associative field.

Concepts like the aspection, the choreosteme, or the theory of theory can be used as conceptual tools, but they are also conceptual categories.15 Some of its components are still quite abstract and strictly non-representative. Thus, the intermediate “model” layer in its entirety may be also conceived as a multinomial or multi-perspectival generic model.

Similar to the model layer the explication could be done for both the conceptual layer as well as the operational domain. Together they probably establish what Foucault once called the field of proposals and propositions. Since we here are interested in and arguing towards the Urban, this field also represents a possible instantiation of “Urban Reason”. We just should not forget that story-telling, the playful delocutionary speech-act, provides the nodes and strings and knots that will bind everything together.

Once we manage to be able to keep all three areas alive simultaneously, whether we are engaged in political operations or in philosophical concepts, we can expect to understand the schemata that can be used to perform a Critique of Urban Reason. From this vantage point, finally, again being conscious about delocution, the playful story-telling, we can start to think the construction of the city. Probably only from this perspective.

8. Tokens, Types

If we consider the four basic constituents of the model layer also as major mechanisms of actual differentiation processes, then an interesting issue appears. Given the enormous variety of urban forms, concerning morphology, material and immaterial organization, and cultural processes, we could address the question whether we could derive a classificatory scheme, or distinguish certain types.

One could think of at least two purposes of such a classification, albeit both are concerned with the topos of the “Urban in Time”. We may for instance ask about the evolution of Urban life forms, in a similar way as it is done in biology with respect to natural evolution. This purpose would be directed to the past, putatively allowing for a better understanding of the history of the city and of urban arrangements.

David Shane proposed an approach to the description of forms that could well be called a hermeneutical one, thus being closely related to this evolutionary attitude [29]. When describing the forms he derives abstract elements of construction, attaches empirical instances and distils an evolutionary sequence of the form of the city. He distinguishes Archi Città, Cine Città and Tele Città. Each of them is characterized by a particular cultural setup that precipitates in typical morphological structures. Thus, Shane is able to build a kind of metric for “measuring” by the distinguished elements of “citiness”. These elements comprise two morphological forms on the level of built matter: armatures and enclaves. Highly interesting, however, he also includes Foucaultian heterotopias as a third element of citiness. He even proceeds differentiates heterotopia induced by material crisis from heterotopia of immaterial illusion. The heterotopia comprises incommensurable components, hence it is nothing else than an instance of the opposing forces that is a major element of complexity. Shane’s approach clearly exceeds for instance Tom Mayne’s approach who distinguishes different kinds of armatures and maneuvers in order to build a morphological taxonomy. Mayne also invokes the concept of complexity, yet, he doesn’t arrive at a comparable level of generality. Not quite surprising, Mayne’s work tends to the figural and representational. One of his main clients is the federal government of the U.S.A.

Both, Shane and Mayne are heading for a taxonomy. Shane’s achievement in his “Recombinant Urbanism” [30] is more abstract and thus more general than Mayne’s “Combinatory urbanism” [31]. Mayne got caught by the primacy of aspects of form, to which he assigns behavior, rather than the opposite as it is the case in Shane’s approach. For Shane, behavior comes first. Thus, Shane is able to reflect about city theory while Mayne provides case studies. These are beautiful to look at, but there is no theory, even as Mayne tries to distil a “method” from it as common denominator.

Yet, even Shane does not arrive at a theory of differentiation. He just describes it, almost in a phenomenological manner. Underpinning the description with plausible arguments does not yield a theory of differentiation. Hence, Shane’s approach is still not suitable to derive a taxonomy of city-contexts. But his results are perfectly compatible with the abstract structure we propose here.

Another “problem” with the approach as proposed by Shane is its tendency towards global interpretations. An extension of his work would be needed focusing more on the dynamic mechanisms. Together then it would be possible to create a classification scheme for urban neighborhoods that would tell the urbanist which “species” he is dealing with.

The second purpose of a classification or a taxonomy is not directed to the past, but rather more to the future. The model of differentiation could provide a means to anticipate struggles and to organize precisely the differentiation in the desired manner, without getting caught by inherent limitations due to metaphysical blindness. The paradigmatic example for such a potential deadlock is provided by the case of Singapore, as we have discussed in the previous essay. Another example is Mumbai, where the city administration imposes embryological principles onto a self-organizing urban body. This creates a deep mismatch since the city itself is at least on the verge of developing the capability for learning, that is, a very dynamic form of differentiation (at least in some parts of it).

This brings us to the application perspective.

9. The Application Perspective

In this last section we will show some examples for the “binding problem” regarding the relation between theory and operation.

So far we have introduced the abstract structure that is necessary for binding theory, models and operations together. We are convinced that without this structure, that any neglect of this structure leads to pathological consequences, particularly with respect to all those domains that deal with observations from the social or cultural realm. These consequences could be labelled the “binding problem”. Note that there is no particular addressee, since it concerns any concept and any operation, whether on the level of urban politics or on the level of implementing urban infrastructure.

Philosophical stances develop their specific binding deficit, think for instance of analytical philosophy where one can find the dismissal of metaphysics, while political operations may induce likewise instances of another kind of typical binding deficit. Common to all these deficits is some structural inconsistency, or even internal contradiction concerning central issues of the respective stance, often appearing as kind of (pseudo-)paradox.

Metaphysics is involved in this binding whether one is aware of it or not. We have argued that metaphysical belief sets constrain what can be perceived, recognized, expressed and conceived. Now let us see how such belief unfolds in actual reality.

The examples we choose for this essay are the supply of water and energy, and the movement that called itself “Metabolism”.

Water

One of the most striking examples is provided by the challenge of providing clean water in urban areas of developing countries. The problem is usually rendered into terms of necessary investment and uncontrolled growth of slums, accompanied by corruption or other forms of weakness in government. Together, these factors seem to prevent the installation of a sufficiently stable system of water pipes. Well, the actual problem, however, is precisely this rendering. Why? 

If we resort to the results discussed above we immediately can ask about the theoretical conditions that lead to that rendering. These conditions have nothing to do with the living conditions or political conditions. It is the metaphysical belief in central control and the belief in the possibility of rationalist, if not even deterministic planning that is creating the visible part of the problem.16 Central control as well as the belief in rigorous planning are both top-down approaches, hence they are applicable only to development, yet not to open evolution. Development, on the other hand, requires a fixation of side-conditions, which results in a particular model of differentiation: the abstract embryo. (Again: note that the biological type serves as a structural sibling, not even as a model!) Actually, we all should stop talking exclusively about “urban development”. Concerning the differentiation processes it is quite urgently to be completed with “urban evolution” and “urban learning”.

Usually, in urban differentiation processes the fixation of side-conditions is not possible, whether due to ethical or practical reasons. The result is that the problem persists, and with it the suffering of the people, the examples are countless, particularly all around in Africa. It is both a scandal as well as it is ridiculous that provision of water has been declared to be the major problem of the urban areas in the South.

Dropping the belief in planning, control and development immediately directs the attention to local solutions. Any local solution for material resources need an identifiable source, available storage and the organization of flows. Everybody can see the material arrangements of that basic setup. It is not an anonymous flow anymore. Regarding water, all of that can be established—astonishingly enough—in a strictly local manner, even in less developed areas.

Recently, Najiyah Alwazir described a project called RAINS that was conducted in Sanaa, the capital of Jemen. The project designed a solution for the problem of water shortage, which is a quite pressing issue in the mostly arid climate of Jemen. As a developing or even “underdeveloped” country, Jemen does not provide a stable, pervasive and abundant infrastructure. According to RAINS, the core element of the solution is thus the installation of appropriate private=local storage capacities, since in Sanaa there is a short raining period two times a year. Storage devices can be made almost from everything, especially however from various sorts of plastic. Yet, storing water for months is not without problems. For instance, it needs to be heated which requires additional energy.

But where to take water from locally, when there is none, if the raining season doesn’t provide enough water, or huge storage devices can’t be realized? Well, it is not true that there is no water. There is almost always water around, even in arid areas of the tropical or subtropical latitudes. It is in the air. The respective technology is blastingly simple. Basically, it is a windmill that creates pressure in the closed circuit of a heat pump, in other contexts also known as refrigerator. (read the respective story here). Nicely enough, the technology can be scaled, from hi-tech to low-tech, from small to big. A mid-sized turbine produces up to 1000 liters per day. Yet, low-tech turbines would work as well, requiring only very little investment, besides the fact that it creates lots of workplaces.

Without any exaggeration we can say that if there will be (is?) any scarcity of water (or energy, as we will see in the next section), then exclusively due to modernist stupidity or cynical politics. Scenarios like that imagined in the projective documentation about the consequences of global warming, “Les temps changent,” [32] are complete nonsense, since they mechanically recite the catastrophe against which there is allegedly no measure that society, i.e. the centrally administered state could take.

Water is not only an essential resource for living beings. The principle “water from air” can be integrated into any kind of architecture in order to use it as the basis of passive cooling. It should be clear that such infrastructural solutions become thinkable only if the modernist belief set is left behind.

Energy

Not only in developing countries, or the urban areas in the South, problems prevail due to the addiction to modernist belief sets. In industrialized countries there is a quite similar issue.

Currently, countries like Germany or Switzerland are propagating the so-called “Energy Turn” (official grm.: “Energiewende”), meaning that the required energy supply should be organized through so-called “regenerative sources” (which actually is a mis-nomer), that is from wind energy and solar energy. The problem imposed by this change is that the individual source is both rather small and rather volatile regarding its output, as compared with large power plants.

The modernist “solution” has been propagated as the so-called “smart grid”. A lot of computers are thought to be needed to distribute the electricity from many small sources and to minimize the peak-capacities, using the existing grid. Yet, smart grids do not change the principle for distributing the electrical energy at all: it remains centralized.

Thinking locally leads to a completely different solution, quite analogous to the water story. We need local producers, which in this case is simply the solar panel on the roof. And we need some storage, in other words batteries. In fact, what can be forecasted is a whole new culture of energy storage, across many scales. Fortunately, the market already started to offer such storage devices. IBC Solar offers devices for individual buildings, and ABB is working on large scale storage devices. There is also a solution involving methane and fuel cells in a closed loop system. The most funny thing, however, is the possibility to create methane, the main component of mineral gas, directly from the CO2 from air and hydrolyzed water (descriptions in german, in engl.). The tendency is the same as in the case of water: decentralization, and democratization, emergence of local infrastructures for storage and distribution. Astonishingly, the involved chemical reaction is known for more than 100 years, and wind power is an equally traditional source of energy. It was modernist thinking preventing its appearance on the engineers’ (and investors) radar. And nowadays, they again think of it only in large, expensive, technically difficult to handle installations, which therefore would have to be administered and run following the paradigm of centralization.

It is clear that the result could be a completely different kind of organization for the grid and a completely different kind of differentiation processes. Bottom-up processes lead automatically to the emergence of cluster- or cell-like organization.17 Such an organization not only automatically provides redundancy. It also will create suitably designed and unforeseeable business opportunities on the fly, which in ecology is called niche creation. To large parts it will be privately owned (on the level of cells), just the overarching informational organization may be provided by institutions. Such, institutions become clients rather than remaining providers. It is clear, that only in such a bottom-up organized energy culture we will see a true market for usable energy differences, quite in contrast to the oligopolistic (at best) fake we have to deal with today.

Most important, however, replacing top-down with bottom-up ultimately results in a change of metaphysical attitudes. Away from the orientation towards the lithosphere, turning around towards the solar stream of usable energy. In one of the next essays we will discuss this in more details by means of reviewing an upcoming book about the issue.

Metabolism

As a third example for illustrating the binding problem regarding the relation between theory and operation we will briefly visit the idea of metabolism, or organicism in a wider perspective, with regard to architecture and urbanism.

Metabolism is a biological concept. It describes the capability of living cells or even whole organisms to grow, to differentiate and to maintain their structure. Etymologically, metabolism means “a change”, that is the observation of a particular change. Metabolic processes are observable as large variety of well-orchestrated changes, that form a dynamic “equilibrium”, i.e. a phenomenologically more or less stable macroscopic appearance, which however rests on myriads of changes on the microscopic level. Yet, it must be understood, that metabolic processes are dissipative processes, meaning that they create a surplus of entropy in order to build up structures, that is, negentropy. Creating a surplus of entropy requires quite excessive consumption of energy differences, turning them into heat radiation.

Above all, metabolism is not simply a particular change. Its orchestration requires a preceding structure, including the respective functional compartments. And this change is devised to a particular function, the synthesis of new morphological structures as well as their break-down and recycling. Such, biological metabolism denotes “change within structures that leads to change of morphology”. This does not mean, however, that the shortcut “metabolism is morpho-change” is allowed. Rather we have to consider that we have different levels of integration with respect to the changes, linked together by emergence and deposits—just as in any complex system.

The idea of metabolism was by no means revolutionary at that time in the beginnings of the 1960ies. It just extended a line of thinking that prevailed in architecture and urbanism at least for 30 years in advance. In architecture and urbanism, the idea of organicism appeared the first time in the work of Frank Lloyd Wright, already in the first or second decade of the 20th century. Yet, his notion of organicism had only little to do with organisms, or the Kantian organon. Wright called himself a modernist, and such his assimilation aimed for things like “super-nature,” designs better than nature. He tried to extract principles that almost naturally would lead to good design. All of this is utterly naïve, of course.

A next important step was the adoption of the concept of the organism into the Charta of Athens in 1933. Planners obviously felt overwhelmed by the complexity and vitality of cities, and perhaps by their own ignorance about that, that the notion of “city as organism” has been quite popular. Additionally, corporeality has been subject of heroism all around the developed countries throughout the 1930ies. A bit later Sigfried Giedion (1941) referenced organisms explicitly as a template for built architecture in his famous “Space, Time and Architecture: The Growth of a New Tradition”. Yet, growth is not developed as a concept there, and time is conceived just as “history”, but rather not as an intrinsic result of the Urban, something which had to wait until Aldo Rossi’s (1984) critique of modernist conceptions of cities and architecture.

Yet, a city is not an organism, of course. Despite both entities, cities as well as organisms, can be said to be complex entities, the actual mechanisms are quite different. Simply spoken, in a city, we do not find a Golgi-apparatus, and in the cell we don’t find  mayors or administration.

This topic appeared also in the discourse about urban morphology. In the recent two decades or so, the quarrel between the various schools on urban morphology happened to become really serious. The Italian school around Caniggia traditionally embraced the idea of the organism as kind of a template for thinking about urban form. Yet, they didn’t used it as a template for deriving a theoretical position, they approached it more in a sympathetic mood. This caused a fierce critique by Michael Conzen [12], one of the popes of the area:

In a recent issue of Urban Morphology, Nicola Marzot offered an interpretation of my approach to urban morphology as compared to that of Caniggia who ‘equated human history and natural history. Each entailed th processes of birth, development, maturity and death. And there was a clear implication of the products of human endeavours.’ If Caniggia really said that he would have committed an obvious absurdity, for the existence of an urban settlement is a fundamentally different thing from the life of a human individual. (p.78)

Yet, Conzen too has obviously been completely unable to derive a theoretical position himself from his almost infinite catalog of particulars. Of course, he is a pope, and as such he could not do without installing the need for exegesis.

What is needed is a suitable binding between predictive models that are used in operations and structural models that allow a transition or integration towards the conceptual level. In fact, and quite unfortunately, up today and with the exception of the approach we proposed earlier, even the concept of complexity wasn’t presented in a useful form so far. One of the dramatic effects of misunderstood organicism as envisioned by the Athens Charta was the program of de-densifying the core of the cities. Of course, the opposite, densification, can’t be limited to just the material aspects as for instance in case of the Banlieues of Paris (F), which additionally follows the crystalline growth model. In the context of the Urban, densification has to be understood always as an issue of mediality. Media in turn require densified semiosis, which will emerge only on the basis of sufficient diversity of life forms within the same physical space.

In both cases, with Wright and with the Athens Carta, we can observe a binding problem in the theory work, leading to a literal, representational adoption of concepts from another domain. As Girard puts it,

one should avoid allegory, which consists in replacing the object with its metaphor. ([33] p.136, his emphasis)

What is missing in both cases, in Wright’s writing as well as in the Athens Charta, is a proper concept of differentiation18 that could have been used as a binding element.

Before the background of the discourse about sustainability19 and regenerative cities20 the ideas of the Japanese Metabolists from the early 1960ies gain increasing attention. Koolhaas & Obrist are just the most recent ones publishing an anthology about them, though probably the most serious one, as it consists of lots of interviews with still living former proponents of the group and with sketches of drawings.

What is this Japanese “Metabolism” about? In a recent interview with a German newspaper about his book Koolhaas praises their intention [34]:

Kiyonori Kikutake explains why at that time they haven’t been satisfied by the time-honored laws about form and function any more, and they tried to transfer the life cycle of birth and growth to town planning and construction and architecture.21

If nothing else, then this citation definitely demonstrates Koolhaas’ interest in a theory of differentiation for urbanism and architecture. Yet, it also uncovers Koolhaas’ own deficits, which he shares with many other “experts” of the field. On his conscious radar only expansion appears, albeit in his practice he applied embryological principles several times, e.g. in case of Casa da Musica.

Kiyonori Kikutake [35] writes

Metabolism” is the name of the group […]. We regard human society as a vital process […]. The reason why we use such a biological word, the metabolism, is that, we believe, design and technology should be a denotation of human vitality.

And Kisho Kurokawa specifies (cited after [36] p.81):

…if spaces were composed on the basis of the theory of the metabolic cycle, it would be possible to replace only those parts that had lost their usefulness and in this way to contribute to the conservation of resources by using buildings longer.

Later, Kurokawa extended the Metabolists’ approach into a theory of “symbiosis” to be applied to urbanism, architecture and their relation to nature. Yet, despite their approach—as far it is conveyed in their writings—is certainly sympathetic, it is not so much more than that. It provides an early support of the idea of sustainability, but there are neither structural nor predictive models, there is no theory of differentiation and no reflection about metaphysical conditions. There is just a fluffy use of a biological metaphor and the operations, that is, building as operation and politics of building. Not quite surprisingly, they conceive of themselves also as modernists, publishing the “last manifesto” in urbanism. Looking to their built matter, it becomes clear that the Metabolists’ approach is deeply infected by cybernetics. The implied model of differentiation and morphogenesis that they applied is close to crystalline growth, as it is demonstrated by the Nagakin Capsule Tower from 1972. It looks like an unorderly grown crystal. Thus it fits to the overall impression that in case of the Capsule Tower (and its many replicates throughout Japan) the core idea of the Metabolists never got realized. Not a single capsule has been replaced. Crystals do not replace parts of themselves, dependent on the physical circumstances they either grow forever, fall into everlasting stasis or get destroyed. At least Kikutake’s private “Sky House” has been slightly modified throughout its life cycle ([37], p.17). But there is nothing particular “metabolizing” with it.

In both type of buildings, the communal as well as the solitary one, “metabolism” has been implemented on the physical level. We have to rate this just as an indication of missing abstraction. Above we said that the shortcut “metabolism is morpho-change” isn’t allowed at all, since this would neglect the emergence relation between morpho-structures and producer changes in the complex system “cell”, for which biologists developed a particular perspective of metabolism. The Metabolists neglect precisely this layering of the complex system. Such, however, the Metabolists’ theory is nothing else than a metaphor, victimized to flatness by modernist reduction.

In some way, this renders the Metabolists that always claimed to propose a “utopia” as late descendants of the idea of the “Ideal City”. As the label already conveys, it’s just idealism, which always suffers from the double illusion implied by all top-down approaches.

Japanese Metabolism headed for adaptivity. Such they have been years ahead of the mainstream. Yet, the honourable intention haven’t been backed by structural models, there are no predictive models present in their approach, no abstraction towards a theory of differentiation, no reflection about the conditionability. Well, okay, even philosophy wasn’t developed far enough, Deleuze still breeding on the foundations of his philosophy. And cell biology itself has been completely absorbed by cybernetics, as one can see in the works of Monod. It is not our intention to blame anybody here. But it must be clear, that the Japanese Metabolism could not be transferred into our times due to its structural deficiencies.

10. Urban Strings

In an interview about his S,M,L,XL, conducted in 2001, Koolhaas mentioned that

“Compared with the metropolises of the industrial nations, Lagos is 50 to 100 years ahead.“[38]22

Given the seemingly chaotic condition of Lagos, the failure of its official urban services and organizations, in other words, its immaterial infrastructures, that seems like a bold and weird statement. Yet, Koolhaas addresses nothing less than a change in the metaphysical setup.

“We have been interested in the fact that at the one hand all organizational systems fail, on the other hand, however, the city nevertheless is functioning. […] The reason for that being that the inhabitants organize themselves in micro-systems.”23

Bottom-up organizational processes are not compatible with the major claims of the modernist belief set, particularly the idea of independence. Self-organization starting on the micro-level requires the metaphysical primacy of relation.

As we mentioned already several times, here and in previous essay, our impression is that Koolhaas is clearly interested in the processual aspects of differentiation, where others not even got a grip to the fact that we are in need of a metaphysics of differentiation. As a guest editor of an issue of the “wired”, he mentioned [39]:

“Where space was considered permanent, it now feels transitory—on its way to becoming.”

In an earlier interview from 1994, he explicitly referred to a characteristic of complex systems, opposing forces, denying the economically and politically motivated”Taylorization” into defined fields of function. Regarding the central station in Lille, a mega-structure Koolhaas was engaged to generate, he relied on the “alchemia of mixed use”, something that he had been cherishing in his famous “Delirious New York”.

The understanding of complex, self-organizing entities differs dramatically from linear entities. Analytic and thus a comprehensive symbolic representation, e.g. as some kind of a “law” is possible only for the latter. Trying to do the same for the former usually ends in some kind of disaster. For in that case anticipation based on the assumption of linearity inevitably fail at any point in time for whatever reason, that is for no particular reason, despite the fact that for some time the model could have been working quite well. Complex entities can’t be controlled, as there is no law, there are just mechanisms, actualized in a manifold of mutually penetrating populations. The best one can try is to tune the side-conditions of the respective processes. Yet, there is no guarantee for a particular outcome.

In other words, if urbanism claims to respect the moral and ethical conditions of the inhabitants (see for instance this, then traditional attitudes to planning and development have to be dropped. Respect for people is incompatible to the mere concept of development. Implementing plans is always and necessarily accompanied by violence, even if that violence is not visible from within the plan.

Yet, if we talk about mechanisms, the question raises, which are the subjects of those mechanisms? Where to find them and how to talk about these mechanisms?

If we consider the case of models of complex systems, such as the Gray-Scott-model, we’d probably distinguish certain elementary species. In case of the Urban, these species can’t be representational or even material, I guess, as it is the case in those models, which assume them to be particular kinds of molecules.

So, we may adjust our question slightly. We now can ask, what are the elementary, abstract species that we need to build appropriate models of the Urban?

Approaching this question requires a framework, and a reasonable choice is that of differentiation, from the metaphysical level down to the operational and back. Previously we identified three levels of actualization for differentiation, which can be rendered into different forms. The basic form is certainly the trinity of development, evolution and learning. Yet, there are transpositions of this basic theme; any of those would be worthwhile to be subject for further investigation, yet, we just list them here:

  • – embryos, populations (or brains) and evolution (minds as hosts of ideas),
  • – plans, probabilization and mediatization,
  • – automation, participation and (abstract) creativity,
  • – form, process and virtualization,
  • – the particular, the species and the general (concepts).

These basic aspects all have to be thought of as principles that actualize exclusively in local contexts. The geographic space of a city could be consequently thought of as a highly dynamic and volatile patchwork of such actualizations, and each of those could be assigned to one of the three levels or types of differentiation. This patchwork is by no means randomly arranged, of course. We have to think of it more in terms of said complex system, built from several components. Yet, again, in contrast to the simulated models, we should defy the temptation of assuming any kind of global rules for the interaction of the respective “species”.

Any possible pairing within the trinity of differentiation is inherently contradictory, albeit this contradiction is not a mutual one, it is a directed one. Embryos neither evolve nor do they learn. Learning, however, definitely comprises “embryonic” as well as “evolutionary” phases, without exhausting them. Inversely, while there is quite some play in learning processes, there is only little of it in evolutionary and almost none in embryonic processes.

Building upon notions from biology, even if we use it in a quite abstract way as structural schemata, immediately relate us to a number of objections. The most thorough ones have been posed by Anthony Giddens in his “Constitution of Society” (1986) regarding evolution. Yet, albeit Giddens is certainly right in criticizing the direct application or transfer of the biological theory about evolution into the realm of the social, his critique commits the same mistake (p.228). His image of evolution remains by far too naive, and partially even severely misunderstood, as to justify his objections against evolutionary theory and his final rejection. Nevertheless, he correctly emphasizes that talking about the realm of the social involves processes of largely “immaterial” signification. While such processes imply learning, it also remains true that this does not imply an incompatibility with a generalized theory of evolution. The same holds for adapting the notion of the embryo, or of growth. We just have to be always aware that these are modes of talking.

It is clear, that we can speak about differentiation only by also invoking probabilistic concepts. On the other hand, differentiation not only concerns individuals in their life history, but also as subjects of those differentiation processes.

This highlights an interesting issue, as play is eminently social and development is not less distinct a matter of automation. We can read the whole period of unfolding modernism, starting with the end of the Middle Ages, as a continued battle between participation and automation. In some way, cities and the Urban form of life provide just a further, upfolded field for the eternal contest between control and play, between constraints and overturn, between automation and participation. Yet, it is also true that it is the Urban as a life form that transformed battlegrounds into playing fields, thereby rendering the aterritorial into a local as well as a global social practice. Hopefully, it is the Urban and the respective life form that renders the nation and the underlying detrimental ideas insignificant.

The patches in the urban patchwork of various kinds of differentiation processes certainly influence each other, but it is an issue of future research to determine whether and to which grade the interaction of those differentiation processes can be arranged in separate classes.

So, let’s return to the question of the species. Probably it is quite reasonable to assume the species being subject to the mechanisms of the Urban to be just the instances of those three types of differentiation processes. In figure 7 above we introduced 4 types of structural models as candidates for solving the binding problem in theory works, namely growth, networks, associativity and complexity.

Result 1

This assemblage we now can simplify by subsuming it to the concept of differentiation as we have discussed it so far, of course, without dropping those four components, as they are growth, networks, associativity and complexity. Yet, this differentiation still resides in the realm of models, hence we have to call it “generic differentiation”. The abstract (meta-)structure suitable to overcome the binding problem regarding theories about cultural processes as well as their political instantiation would look like so:

Figure 9: Generic Differentiation as key element for solving the binding problem of theory works. Three things are important here: (i) the charts depicts the elementary module of a fluid moebioid fractal, since there is no separability between the three parts. They are mutually embedded into each other. (ii) “Concept” is a transcendent entity (see this for the argument). (iii) The brackets need to be conceived as the “realm of method”, which is something that we still have to accomplish (in one of the next essays). A similar structure may be suitable for the foundation of a planning theory (also to be discussed in some future essay).

Note, that the basic metaphysical stance of this methodological structure builds upon the “probabilistic relational”, which directly derives from the (Deleuzean) transcendental difference as soon as we care about any kind of application, or rule following. Deleuze bound the repetition as sort of a still transcendental application closely to his concept of the transcendental difference.

The field of models can be summarized by the differential (in the Deleuzean sense) of the four basic types of designs, namely growth, networks, associativity and complexity. Any of them leads to some kind of “change,” whether as a horizontal difference or a vertical differential. Else, any of them is capable to “associate” or to “grow”, they all are kind of networks (just of various degree of fluidity), and they all refer to complexity, and last but not least they all are (basic) forms for the description of the transition from mainly material to mainly immaterial contexts (material/immaterial here used in the common sense as a first conceptual approach, yet, actually there is no categorical difference between them: just think about the quasi-materiality of symbols and the form of energy in String theory). We can’t delve further into this matter here, but I think it will be highly rewarding to develop a vocabulary and expressions in order to establish the respective space that then could be called the “Space of Generic Differentiation”.

Result 2

Above, in the context of figure 1, we already mentioned that this scheme as we have developed it starting with figure 1 up to here is only the atomic module of a fluid moebioid fractal. (not the city or any other empiric entity is meant to be a fractal here, but rather the dynamics of theory itself!) This very same module is part of any theory work, yet, both the weights of the three parts as well as the parameters for the mapping into the more mature forms must be expected to be very different.

Such, we finally arrived at a conceptualization for theory work that is applicable to any science, even to philosophy. One of the nice things is that it makes the categorical difference between hard and social sciences to vanish, without neglecting the actual differences. But we definitely removed the existentialist contamination or even intoxication from the socio-mental landscape.

Result 3

A small remark about the philosophical consequences shall be allowed here. We already mentioned, thru result 1 and result 2, that the structure shown in figure 9 above would represent the basic module for the category of change. Of course, we do not conceive change as something that could be objectively determined, because there is something in the outer world that cold be called “pure change”. We propose neither to follow Kant in his favor for physicalist aprioris, nor the external (=naive) realists.

Instead, our category of change “socializes” the Kantian approach. As such it complements the structure that we called the choreostemic space. That space describes the fundamental conditionability of becoming, without telling anything about the actual mechanisms to move around in this space. The category of change (as the moebioid fractal) focuses the individual and his actual moves, that is its use of concepts and its corporeal activities. After the linguistic turn there is no space for physics any more, regarding the realm of human affairs. The apriori is not space and time, it is generic differentiation, concepts and the political corporeality.

Note that time is a language game about the scale of measurement for changes. If there is no change, or if change is not determinable, then there is no time. Examples for that are the “life form” of the photon or black holes, where no signal can be transferred any more, because photons get fixed.

Result 4

Above, in the chapter about String Theory, we said that it describes the form of energy, where different forms lead to different kinds of matter. Could we assimilate or even transfer the structure of that theory into a critical theory about the Urban?

Well, the first thing for which we have to identify a parallel is the notion of energy. Probably the hottest candidate for a similar role with regard to the Urban, that is for culture, is mediality. Like in the case of energy, density plays a crucial role for it (cf. [40]). All of the four components of our generic differentiation are strongly dependent on mediality, induced by densification processes. Changing levels, this holds true even for generic differentiation itself, as part of the theoretical structure as shown in figure 9.

We certainly can say that the form of mediality, that is, the way it gets instantiated, is able to create very different urban styles. Think about the difference between a Maya city, with some 70’000 inhabitants, where most of the mediality is related to religious affairs, and then about a typical radio city (Berlin 1939?), a TV city (Los Angeles), and an internet city (Seoul?). Or about Manhattan, where mediality found a quite unique instantiation, comprising interpersonal contacts and high density of heterotopias. Or about Shanghai with its extreme neon density.

As mediality gets actualized in different ways, so the proportion of our four components of the Generic Differentiation. Without any doubt one can find the traces of the establishment of a particular proportion, that is, the location  of the Urban Game in a particular “region” in the (yet to be formulated) space of Generic Differentiation, in the built assemblage of urban neighborhoods, as well as in its individual and characteristic “urban look & feel”. Or in other word, the “quality” of a particular “city”. Generic differentiation is somehow the inverse or a n abstract consequence of mediality.

Result 5

Here in this figure 9, much like for the figures above, we don’t provide any detail about the conceptual and the operational side. Of course, both areas comprise their own rich structure. Yet, in order to avoid the binding problem, both the concepts and the operations need to be compatible to the model layer, at least insofar as the three components develop suitable docking sites.

Result 6

The structure in figure 9 above can be read in two very different ways. This is not  just due to the possibility of different vantage points, its more a kind of a principle duality.

The first one derives from a choreostemic perspective. In this case the structure describes the forces that lead to particular trajectories in the choreostemic space, representing a particular style to think about the city and to act within it, whether as an individual or as a population.

The second way to conceive of the structure is as the Urban itself, as the life form of the Urban, that is as the actualization of a Foucaultian field of proposals. In both cases the three areas of concept, differentiation and operation are not at all separated or separable. They form a field of simultaneous activity throughout, with varying degrees of overlapping and mutual infection.

In such a setting, story-telling takes an important role: it creates a dynamic fabric from all the relational elements, the tiny Urban Strings, of which myriads over myriads are produced all the time, released to float around in unpredictable yet beautifully arranged patterns, spanning from logistics to anticipation and metaphysics, providing the mere possibility for Urban meaning and Urban Reason.24

Notes

1. As in the preceding essays, we use the capital “U” if we refer to the urban as a particular quality and as a concept, in order to distinguish it from the ordinary adjective that refers to common sense understanding.

2.The terminus “speaking about” is by no means a trivial one. First, it implies that language is used and in turn we have to respect the transcendental role of language (for more details see here, and here). This has been not only the center point of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, it also resulted in a “revolution” throughout philosophy—unfortunately largely only in philosophy so far, the so-called “Linguistic Turn.” Particularly scientists are often quite forgetful about that. Secondly, “speaking about” also means that concepts have to be used. As we discussed in the context of the choreostemic space, concepts are also transcendent.

3. Here, philosophy is not understood as a domain that creates rules of a good life. Instead, we conceive it as a technique of thinking; as such it is helpful to explore the rules and principles of human affairs as a social process. Philosophy has no representational content!

4. Case of Bombay, informal workers.

5. For more details please the essays about modeling.

6. Previously we called such concepts “Strongly Singular Terms”. For details please refer to “Formalization and Creativity as Strongly Singular Terms”.

7. Concerning semiotics as always: CS Peirce.

8. Umberto Eco (2002): Semiotik der Theateraufführung. In: Wirth, Uwe (Hrsg.): Performanz. Zwischen Sprachphilosophie und Kulturwissenschaft. Frankfurt/M. S.262-276.

9. This is even true for the “hardest science” of all, physics. Even as physics benefits from the luxury of a stable external referent, though that referent has to be recognized as an unknown. This stability allows for a closed and quite fast loop between building and testing anticipatory models on the one hand, and inventing concepts on the other. This stability is possible only if the subject of the respective investigations is strictly a-historic, a-contextual and an-individual. Nevertheless it remains true that even the concepts of physics are at least partially dependent on the respective form of life. In sciences that deal with historic contingency like biology and all of the human sciences including architecture and urbanism, this stability is not present in principle.

10. Gilles Deleuze developed a dedicated counterdraft to these concepts, mainly in Difference & Repetition [18], A Thousand Plateaus [19], and Logic of Sense [20].

11. Note that even the discovery of the putative Higgs-Boson wouldn’t change much with regard to these open issues.

12. Usually, paradoxes are just a consequence of contradictions either in the metaphysical setup or in the course of their instantiation. Pseudo-paradoxes can be provoked also by choosing to few dimensions for the description of a problem. (for details see Deleuzean Move, footnote 3, and Vagueness: The Structure of Non-Existence.)

13. In German language the book “Performanz” edited by the semiotician Uwe Wirth [21]; unfortunately, I don’t know of any comparable work in English language.

14. Talking about complexity and story-telling may remind inevitably to Charles Jencks’ “jumping universe”, where he, among other things invokes the science of complexity and post-modernism as kind of twin-siblings. We clearly disassociate from Jencks’ writings, for multiple reasons so. It is nothing else than esoterism. He not only fails to accurately use the concept of fractals and chaos, he also misses to describe the mechanisms through which that “chaos” gets actualized. He does not provide any model for growth and differentiation, just using fractals as the universal weaponry. It is not really surprising that he finally ends up with cosmogonic phantasies.

We not only reject this kind of poor “theorizing,” but also post-modernism as a valuable way of talking about architecture or urbanism. Both suffer seriously from the binding problem, ending in wild speculations. It is telling that Jencks tries to proof the existence of a battle between modernist and post-modernist thinking. Nothing could be more unmasking. Above all, his crusade seems to be politically motivated. What we try instead in this series of essays is to provide a sound abstract structure for a value-free theory, from which a rich scape of models can be derived.

The post-modernist attitude of “not only function, but also fiction” (H.Klotz, The history of postmodern architecture, 1986) remains flat and representationalist, such as Hollein’s Juweliergeschäft (Wien 1972-1974). As Venturi once demonstrated, any arbitrary facade is semiotically active. Yet, the interpretation is not on the side of the designer! Thus, the “fiction” of the post-modernists are misplaced, and miles away from the story-telling Koolhaas is organizing for us and into which we may embed and integrate ourselves. In a later piece we will discuss the metaphysics, the hidden resentment and the limitations of post-modernism in greater detail.

15. Most of the items of that layer that is mediating between theory and operations we already discussed in earlier essays. Note that the set of possible terms of that map is far from being complete, albeit it certainly provides a useful cross-section. Links : choreosteme, complexity, model, orthoregulation, learning, memory, evolution, theory, aspection, network, probabilism, adaptivity, associativity, behavioral coating, operationalization.

16. Note that these beliefs are not to be mixed up with values. Values themselves are anyway highly problematic. Values are quite effective to abolish any discourse, since—by definition—they are not justifiable. Hence it is dangerous to invoke them “too early”. Actually, values that purport some representational attitude about a moral “good(ness)”, should be dropped altogether, except some last solitary and transcendental principle. According to Wilhelm Vossenkuhl [26], a German philosopher (mainly Kant, Wittgenstein and Ethics) and political scientist, all the other claimed values should be replaced by the techné of organizing discourses about the difficult challenges.

17. For details about morphogenesis through self-organization and complexity see this essay.

18. Differentiation not only includes morphogenesis sensu strictu, that is with regard to “purely” material aspects. It is anyway not possible to separate the material from the immaterial as the modernists and positivists always claimed. Differentiation and growth apply to the immaterial as well. In our essay about Koolhaas and Singapore we explicated three perspectives onto differentiation, for which we find varying grades of materiality: development, evolution and learning. also note that Deleuze’s work may be conceived as a philosophy of differentiation, whether concerning development, evolution or learning.

19. Sustainability that is backed by the the idea of protection [24,25,26]

20. Recently, Anna Leidreiter proposed to change perspective from mere sustainability (see previous footnote) to regeneration and “circular metabolism”. Despite we certainly agree with the intention, her approach is still suffering from the binding problem. There is no theory of differentiation, just a more or less metaphorical use of the concept of metabolism. Metabolism anyway is always organized by many overlapping “cycles”. It is naïve or even wrong that natural ecosystems run without producing waste, as she claims. In natural ecosystems there is a lot of decay, debris and sedimentation. How would debris look like with respect to the Urban?

Fitting to these suggestions is another point. Earlier we already pointed out that sustainability requires persistent adaptivity, and this in turn can be achieved only by complexity, that is self-organization, transition from order to organization, and emergence. As such it can’t be directly implemented, of course. In other words, planning and sustainability exclude each other.

21. German original: „Kiyonori Kikutake erklärt, warum ihnen die altehrwürdigen Gesetze der Form und Funktion damals nicht mehr ausreichten und sie versuchten, den Lebenszyklus von Geburt und Wachstum auf Städtebau und Architektur zu übertragen.“

22. German original: „Lagos ist den Metropolen der Industrienationen um 50 bis 100 Jahre voraus.“

23. German original : „Wir haben uns dafür interessiert, wie einerseits alle Organisationssysteme versagen, die Stadt aber andererseits trotzdem funktioniert. Das liegt daran, dass die Einwohner sich in Mikrosystemen organisieren.“

24. We are well aware of the fact that a concept like “generic differentiation”, particularly if it comprises growth and networks as sub-concepts, relates to the discourse about urban form, or urban morphology. For 15 years now, this discourse gets more and more organized through the journal “Urban Morphology”, issued by the International Seminar on Urban Form ISUF. This discourse suffers considerably from the binding problem, hence, any kind of naivity can be found there. Typically for the underdeveloped stage of the field is the fact that there are (still) at least two “schools”, inherited from times long ago (the French, the Italian, the Anglo-Saxon schools). Of course, there are also the great pioneers (pope-eneers?), celebrated individuals like Caniggia or Conzen. Yet, identifying the more valuable contributions requires (and deserves) a dedicated treatment. This will be the topic our next piece: How to speak about (urban) forms?

References

  • [1] Rem Koolhaas (1995), Whatever happened to Urbanism. In: O.M.A., Rem Koolhaas and Bruce Mau, S,M,X,XL. Crown Publishing Group, 1997. p.1009-1089.
  • [2] Herzog & deMeuron, How do Cities differ? Introductory text to the course of study on the cities of Naples – Paris – The Canary Islands – Nairobi at the ETH Studio Basel – Contemporary City Institute. In: Gerhard Mack (Ed.). Herzog & de Meuron 1997-2001. The Complete Works. Volume 4. Basel / Boston / Berlin, Birkhäuser, 2008. Vol. No. 4. pp. 241-244.First published in: Jacques Herzog: Terror sin Teoría. Ante la ‘Ciudad indiferente’. In: Luis Fernández-Galiano (Ed.). Arquitectura Viva. Herzog & de Meuron, del Natural. Vol. No. 91, Madrid, Arquitectura Viva, 07.2003. p. 128. available online.
  • [3] Wolfgang Stegmüller, Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie, Band II Theorie und Erfahrung, Teil G: Strukturspecies. T-Theoretizität. Holismus. Approximation. Verallgemeinerte intertheoretische Relationen. Inkommensurabilität. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg 1986.
  • [4] Thomas S. Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 1962.
  • [5] John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1969.
  • [6] O.M.A., Rem Koolhaas and Bruce Mau, S,M,X,XL. Crown Publishing Group, 1997.
  • [7] Kisho Kurokawa, From Metabolism to Symbiosis. John Wiley 1992.
  • [8] Rem Koolhaas & Hans Ulrich Obrist. Project Japan: Metabolism Talks. Taschen, Berlin 2011.
  • [9] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations.
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  • [22] Charles Jencks, The Architecture of the Jumping Universe. Wiley-Academy 2001.
  • [23] Website of the Fermi-Lab: http://home.fnal.gov/~carrigan/pillars/Quarks.htm ; http://www.fnal.gov/pub/inquiring/matter/madeof/index.html.
  • [24] World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), Our Comm on Future (1987), page 24, para 27.
  • [25] World Summit on Social Development (1995), Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, page 5.
  • [26] World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002), Plan of Implementation, page 8.
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  • [29] Timothy Druckrey (2003). Relational Architecture: the work of Rafael Lozano-Hemmer, in: Debates & Credits. Media/Art/Public Domain. De Balie-Centre for Culture and Politics. Amsterdam 2003. p.69.
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  • [34] Barbara Nolte, „Unser westlicher Blick liefert Zerrbilder“, Interview mit Rem Koolhaas, 12.02.2012 in: Der Tagesspiegel (Berlin). available online.
  • [35] Kiyonori Kikutake et al. Preface, Metabolism: Proposals for New Urbanism. Tokyo 1960.
  • [36] Jennifer Johung, Replacing Home: From Primordial Hut to Digital Network in Contemporary Art. Minnesota University Press, Minneapolis 2012.
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  • [38] Ulrike Knöfel und Marianne Wellershoff (2001). „Eine der besten Erfindungen“, Interview mit Rem Koolhaas, 15.10.2001, in: DER SPIEGEL 42/2001, available online.
  • [39] Rem Koolhaas (2003). Editorial, The New World. 30 Spaces for the 21st Century. wired, Issue 11.06 | June 2003. available online.
  • [40] Vera Bühlmann, inhabiting media. Thesis, Basel 2009.

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