Modernism, revisited (and chunked)

July 19, 2012 § Leave a comment

There can be no doubt that nowadays “modernism”,

due to a series of intensive waves of adoption and criticism, returning as echoes from unexpected grounds, is used as a label, as a symbol. It allows to induce, to claim or to disapprove conformity in previously unprecedented ways, it helps to create subjects, targets and borders. Nevertheless, it is still an unusual symbol, as it points to a complex history, in other words to a putative “bag” of culture(s). As a symbol, or label, “modernity” does not point to a distinct object, process or action. It invokes a concept that emerged through history and is still doing so. Even as a concept, it is a chimaera. Still unfolding from practice, it did not yet move completely into the realm of the transcendental, to join other concepts in the fields most distant from any objecthood.

This Essay

Here, we continue the investigation of the issues raised by Koolhaas’ “Junkspace”. Our suggestion upon the first encounter has been that Koolhaas struggles himself with his attitude to modernism, despite he openly blames it for creating Junkspace. (Software as it is currently practiced is definitely part of it.) His writing bearing the same title thus gives just a proper list of effects and historical coincidences—nothing less, but also nothing more. Particularly, he provides no suggestions about how to find or construct a different entry point into the problematic field of “building urban environments”.

In this essay we will try to outline how a possible—and constructive—archaeology of modernism could look like, with a particular application to urbanism and/or architecture. The decisions about where to dig and what to build have been, of course, subjective. Of course, our equipment is, as almost always in archaeology, rather small, suitable for details, not for surface mining or the like. That is, our attempts are not directed towards any kind of completeness.

We will start by applying a structural perspective, which will yield the basic set of presuppositions that characterizes modernism. This will be followed by a discussion of four significant aspects, for which we will hopefully be able to demonstrate the way of modernist thinking. These four areas concern patterns and coherence, meaning, empiricism and machines. The third major section will deal with some aspects of contemporary “urbanism” and how Koolhaas relates to that, particularly with respect to his “Junkspace”. Note, however, that we will not perform a literary study of Koolhaas’ piece, as most of his subjects there can be easily deciphered on the basis of the arguments as we will show them in the first two sections.

The final section then comprises a (very) brief note about a possible future of urbanism, which actually, perhaps, already has been lifting off. We will provide just some very brief suggestions in order to not appear as (too) presumptuous.

Table of Content (active links)

1. A structural Perspective

According to its heterogeneity, the usage of that symbol “modernity” is fuzzy as well. While the journal Modernism/modernity, published by John Hopkins University Press, concentrates „on the period extending roughly from 1860 to the mid-twentieth century,“ while galleries for “Modern Art” around the world consider the historical period since post-Renaissance (conceived as the period between 1400 to roughly 1900) up today, usually not distinguishing modernism from post-modernism.

In order to understand modernism we have to take the risk of proposing a structure behind the mere symbolical. Additionally, and accordingly, we should resist the abundant attempt to define a particular origin of it. Foucault called those historians who were addicted to the calendar and the idea of the origin, the originator, or more abstract the “cause”, “historians in short trousers” (meaning a particular intellectual infantilism, probably a certain disability to think abstractly enough) [1]. History does not realize a final goal either, and similarly it is bare nonsense to claim that history came to an end. As in any other evolutionary process historical novelty builds on the leftover of preceding times.

After all, the usage of symbols and labels is a language game. It is precisely a modernist misunderstanding to dissect history into phases. Historical phases are not out there, or haven’t been  there. It is by far more appropriate to conceive it as waves, yet not of objects or ideas, but of probabilities. So, the question is what happened in the 19th century that it became possible to objectify a particular wave? Is it possible to give any reasonable answer here?

Following Foucault, we may try to reconstruct the sediments that fell out from these waves like the cripples of sand in the shallow water on the beach. Foucault’s main invention put forward then in his “Archaeology” [1] is the concept of the “field of proposals”. This field is not 2-dimensional, it is high-dimensional, yet not of a stable dimensionality. In many respects, we could conceive it as a historian’s extension of the Form of Life as Wittgenstein used to call it. Later, Foucault would include the structure of power, its exertion and objectifications, the governmentality into this concept.

Starting with the question of power, we can see an assemblage that is typical for the 19th century and the latest phase of the 18th. The invention of popular rights, even the invention of the population as a conscious and a practiced idea, itself an outcome of the French revolution, is certainly key for any development since then. We may even say that its shockwaves and the only little less shocking echoes of these waves haunted us till the end of the 20th century. Underneath the French Revolution we find the claim of independence that traces back to the Renaissance, formed into philosophical arguments by Leibniz and Descartes. First, however, it brought the Bourgeois, a strange configuration of tradition and the claim of independence, bringing forth the idea of societal control as a transfer from the then emerging intensification of the idea of the machine. Still exhibiting class-consciousness, it was at the roots of the modernists rejection of tradition. Yet, even the Bourgeois builds on the French Revolution (of course) and the assignment of a strictly positive value to the concept of densification.

Without the political idea of the population, the positive value of densification, the counter-intuitive and prevailing co-existence of the ideas of independence and control neither the direction nor the success of the sciences and their utilization in the field of engineering could have been emerging as it actually did. Consequently, right to the end of the hot phase of French Revolution, it was argued by Foucroy in 1794 that it would be necessary to found a „Ecole Polytechnique“1. Densification, liberalism and engineering brought another novelty of this amazing century: the first spread of mass media, newspapers in that case, which have been theorized only approx. 100 years later.

The rejection of tradition as part of the answer to the question “What’s next?” is perhaps one of the strongest feelings for the modernist in the 19th century. It even led to considerable divergence of attitudes across domains within modernism. For instance, while the arts rejected realism as a style building on “true representation,” technoscience embraced it. Yet, despite the rejection of immediate visual representations in the arts, the strong emphasis on objecthood and apriori objectivity remained fully in charge. Think of Kandinsky’s “Punkt und Linie zu Fläche“ (1926), or the strong emphasis of pure color (Malevich), even of the idea of purity itself, then somewhat paradoxically called abstractness, or the ideas of the Bauhaus movement about the possibility and necessity to objectify rules of design based on dot, line, area, form, color, contrast etc.. The proponents of Bauhaus, even their contemporary successors in Weimar (and elsewhere) never understood that the claim for objectivity particularly in design is impossible to be satisfied, it is a categorical fault. Just to avoid a misunderstanding that itself would be a fault of the same category: I personally find Kandinsky’s work mostly quite appealing, as well as some of the work by the Bauhaus guys, yet for completely different reasons that he (they) might have been dreaming of.

Large parts of the arts rejected linearity, while technoscience took it as their core. Yet, such divergences are clearly the minority. In all domains, the rejection of tradition was based on an esteem of the idea of independence and resulted predominantly in the emphasis of finding new technical methods to produce unseen results. While the emphasis of the method definitely enhances the practice of engineering, it is not innocent either. Deleuze sharply rejects the saliency of methods [10]:

Method is the means of that knowledge which regulates the collaboration of all the faculties. It is therefore the manifestation of a common sense or the realisation of a Cogitatio natura, […] (p.165)

Here, Deleuze does not condemn methods as such. Undeniably, it is helpful to explicate them, to erect a methodology, to symbolize them. Yet, culture should not be subordinated to methods, not even sub-cultures.

The leading technoscience of these days had been physics, closely followed by chemistry, if it is at all reasonable to separate the two. It brought the combustion engine (from Carnot to Daimler), electricity (from Faraday to Edison, Westinghouse and Tesla), the control of temperature (Kelvin, Boltzmann), the elevator, and consequently the first high-rise buildings along with a food industry. In the second half of 19th century it was fashionable for newspapers to maintain a section showing up the greatest advances and success of technoscience of the last week.

In my opinion it is eminently important to understand the linkage between the abstract ideas, growing from a social practice as their soil-like precursory condition, and the success of a particular kind of science. Independence, control, population on the one side, the molecule and its systematics, the steam and the combustion engine, electricity and the fridge on the other side. It was not energy (in the form of wood and coals) that could be distributed, electricity meant an open potential for an any  of potential [2]. Together they established a new Form of Life which nowadays could be called “modern,” despite the fact that its borders blur, if we could assume their existence at all. Together, combined into a cultural “brown bag,” these ingredients led to an acceleration, not to the least also due to the mere physical densification, an increase of the mere size of the population, produced (literally so) by advances in the physical and biomedical sciences.

At this point we should remind ourselves that factual success does neither legitimize to expect sustainable success nor to reason about any kind of universal legitimacy of the whole setup. The first figure would represent simply naivety, the second the natural fallacy, which seduces us to conclude from the actual (“what is”) to the deontical and the normative (“what should be”).

As a practice, the modern condition is itself dependent on a set of beliefs. These can neither be questioned nor discussed at all from within the “modern attitude,” of course. Precisely this circumstance makes it so difficult to talk with modernists about their beliefs. They are not only structurally invisible, something like a belief is almost categorically excluded qua their set of conditioning beliefs. Once accepted, these conditions can’t be accessed anymore, they are transcendental to any further argument put forward within the area claimed by these conditions. For philosophers, this figure of thought, the transcendental condition, takes the role of a basic technique. Other people like urbanists and architects might well be much less familiar with it, which could explain their struggling with theory.

What are these beliefs to which a proper modernist adheres to? My list would look like as that given below. The list itself is, of course, neither a valuation nor an evaluation.

  • – independence, ultimately taken as a metaphysical principle;
  • – belief in the primacy of identity against the difference, leading to the primacy of objects against the relation;
  • – linearity, additivity and reduction as the method of choice;
  • – analyticity and “lawfulness” for descriptions of the external world;
  • – belief in positively definable universals, hence, the rejection of belief as a sustaining mental figure;
  • – the belief in the possibility of a finally undeniable justification;
  • – belief that the structure of the world follows a bi-valent logic2, represented by the principle of objective causality, hence also a “logification” and “physicalization” of the concept of information as well as meaning; consequently, meaning is conceived as being attached to objects;
  • – the claim of a primacy of ontology and existential claims—as highlighted by the question “What is …?”—over instances of pragmatics that respect Forms of Life—characterized by the question “How to use …?”;
  • – logical “flatness” and the denial of creativity of material arrangements; representation
  • – belief in the universal arbitrariness of evolution;
  • – belief in the divine creator or some replacement, like the independent existence of ideas (here the circle closes).

It now becomes even more clear that is not quite reasonable to assign a birth date to modernism. Some of those ideas and beliefs haven been around for centuries before their assembly into the 19th century habit. Such, modernism is nothing more, yet also nothing less than a name for the evolutionary history of a particular arrangement of attitudes, believes and arguments.

From this perspective it also becomes clear why it is somewhat difficult to separate so-called post-modernism from modernism. Post-modernism takes a yet undecided position to the issue of abstract metaphysical independence. Independence and the awareness for the relations did not amalgamate yet, both are still, well, independent in post-modernism. It makes a huge, if not to say cosmogonic difference to set the relation as the primary metaphysical element. Of course, Foucault was completely right in rejecting the label of being a post-modernist. Foucault dropped the central element of modernism—independence—completely, and very early in his career as author, thinking about the human world as horizontal (actual) and vertical (differential) embeddings. The same is obviously true for Deleuze, or Serres. Less for Lyotard and Latour, and definitely not for Derrida, who practices a schizo-modernism, undulating between independence and relation. Deleuze and Foucault never have been modern, in order to paraphrase Latour, and it would be a serious misunderstanding to attach the label of post-modernism to their oeuvre.

As a historical fact we may summarize modernism by two main achievements: first, the professionalization of engineering and its rhizomatically pervasive implementation, and second the mediatization of society, first through the utilization of mass media, then by means of the world wide web. Another issue is that many people confess to follow it as if they would follow a program, turning it into a movement. And it is here where difficulties start.

2. Problems with Modernism

We are now going to deal with some of the problems that are necessarily associated to the belief set that is so typical for modernism. In some way or another, any basic belief is burdened by its own specific difficulties. There is no universal or absolute way out of that. Yet, modernism is not just an attitude, up to now it also has turned into a large-scale societal experiment. Hence, there are not only some empirical facts, we also meet impacts onto the life of human beings (before any considerations of moral aspects). Actually, Koolhaas provided precisely a description of them in his “Junkspace” [3]. Perhaps, modernism is also more prone to the strong polarity of positive and negative outcomes, as its underlying set of believes is also particularly strong. But this is, of course, only a quite weak suggestion.

In this section we will investigate four significant aspects. Together they hopefully provide kind of a fingerprint of “typical” modernist thinking—and its failure. These four areas concern patterns and coherence, empiricism, meaning and machines.

Before we start with that I would like to visit briefly the issue raised by the role of objects in modernism. The metaphysics of objects in modernism is closely related to the metaphysical belief of independence as a general principle. If you start to think “independence” you necessarily end up with separated objects. “Things” as negotiated entities do barely exist in modernism, and if so, then only as kind of a error-prone social and preliminary approximation to the physical setup. It is else not possible, to balance objects and relations as concepts. One of them must take the primary role.

Setting objects as primary against the relation has a range of problematic consequences. In my opinion, these consequences are inevitable. It is important that neither the underlying beliefs nor their consequences can’t be separated from each other. For a modernist, it is impossible, to drop one of these and to keep the other ones without stepping into the tomb of internal inconsistency!

The idea of independence, whether in its implicit or its explicit version, can be traced back at least to scholastics, probably even to the classic where it appeared as Platonic idealism (albeit this would be an oversimplification). To its full extent it unfolded through the first golden age of the dogma of the machine in the early 17th century, e.g. in the work of Harvey or the philosophy of Descartes. Leibniz recognized its difficulties. For him perception is an activity. If objects would be conceived as purely passive, they would not be able to perceive and not to build any relation at all. Thus, the world can’t be made of objects, since there is a world external to the human mind. He remained, however, being caught by theism, which brought him to the concept of monads as well as to the concept of the infinitesimal numbers. The concept of the monads should not be underestimated, though. Ultimately, they serve the purpose of immaterial elements that bear the ability to perceive and to transfer them to actual bodies, whether stuffed with a mind or not.

The following centuries brought just a tremendous technical refinement of Cartesian philosophy, despite there have been phases where people resisted its ideas, as for instance many people in the Baroque.

Setting objects as primary against the relation is at the core of phenomenology as well, and also, though in a more abstract version, of idealism. Husserl came up with the idea of the “phenomenon”, that impresses us, notably directly, or intuitively, without any interpretation. Similarly, the Kantian “Erhabenheit”, then tapered by Romanticism, is out there as an independent instance, before any reason or perception may start to work.

So, what is the significance of setting objects as primary constituents of the world? Where do we have to expect which effects?

2.1. Dust, Coherence, Patterns

When interpreted as a natural principle, or as a principle of nature, the idea of independence provokes and supports physical sciences. Independence matches perfectly with physics, yet it is also an almost perfect mismatch for biological sciences as far as they are not reducible to physics. The same is true for social sciences. Far from being able to recognize their own conditionability, most sociologist just practice methods taken more or less directly from physics. Just recall their strange addiction to statistics, which is nothing else than methodology of independence. Instead of asking for the abstract and factual genealogy of the difference between independence and coherence, between the molecule and harmony, they dropped any primacy of the relation, even its mere possibility.

The effects in architecture are well-known. On the one hand, modernism led to an industrialization, which is reaching its final heights in the parametrism of Schumacher and Hadid, among others. Yet, by no means there is any necessity that industrialization leads to parametrism! On the other hand, if in the realm of concepts there is no such thing as a primacy of relation, only dust, then there is also no form, only function, or at least a maximized reduction of any form, as it has been presented first by Mies von der Rohe. The modularity in this ideology of the absence of form is not that of living organisms, it is that of crystals. Not only the Seagram building is looking exactly like the structural model of sodium chloride. Of course, it represents a certain radicality. Note that it doesn’t matter whether the elementary cells of the crystal follows straight lines, or whether there is some curvature in their arrangements. Strange enough, for a modernist there is never a particular intention in producing such stuff. Intentions are not needed at all, if the objects bear the meaning. The modernists expectation is that everything the human mind can accomplish under such conditions is just uncovering the truth. Crystals just happen to be there, whether in modernist architecture or in the physico-chemistry of minerals.

Strictly spoken, it is deeply non-modern, perhaps ex-modern, to investigate the question why even modernists feel something like the following structures or processes mysteriously (not: mystical!) beautiful, or at least interesting. Well, I do not know, of course, whether they indeed felt like that, or whether they just pretended to do so. At least they said so… Here are the artefacts3:

Figure 1: a (left): Michael Hansmeyer column [4] ,b (right): Turing-McCabe-pattern (for details see this);

.

These structures are neither natural nor geometrical. Their common structural trait is the local instantiation of a mechanism, that is, a strong dependence on the temporal and spatial local context: Subdivision in case (a), and a probabilistically instantiated set of “chemical” reactions in the case of (b). For the modernist mindset they are simply annoying. They are there, but there is no analytical tool available to describe them as “object” or to describe their genesis. Yet, both examples do not show “objects” with perceivable properties that would be well-defined for the whole entity. Rather, they represent a particular temporal cut in the history of a process. Without considering their history—which includes the contingent unfolding of their deep structure—they remain completely incomprehensible, despite the fact that on the microscopical level they are well-defined, even deterministic.

From the perspective of primary objects they are separated from comprehensibility by the chasm of idealism, or should we say hyper-idealistic conditioning? Yet, for both there exists a set of precise mathematical rules. The difference to machines is just that these rules describe mechanisms, but not anything like the shape or on the level of the entirety. The effect of these mechanism on the level of the collective, however, can’t be described by those rules for the mechanism. They can’t be described at all by any kind of analytical approach, as it possible for instance in many areas in physics and, consequently in engineering, which so far is by definition always engaged in building and maintaining fully determinate machines. This notion of the mechanism, including the fact that only the concept of mechanism allows for a thinking that is capable to comprehend emergence and complexity—and philosophically potential—, is maybe one of the strongest differences between modernist thinking and “organicist” thinking (which has absolutely nothing to do with bubble architecture), as we may call it in a preliminarily.

Here it is probably appropriate to cite the largely undervalued work of Charles Jencks, who proposed as one of the first in the domain of architecture/urbanism the turn to complexity. Yet, since he had not a well-explicated formulation (based on an appropriate elementarization) at his disposal, we had neither been able to bring his theory “down to earth” nor to connect it to more abstract concepts. People like Jencks, Venturi, “parts of” Koolhaas (and me:)—or Deleuze or Foucault in philosophy—never have been modernist. Except the historical fact that they live(d) in a period that followed the blossoming of modernism, there is not any other justification to call them or their thinking “post-modern”. It is not the use of clear arguments that those reject, it is the underlying set of beliefs.

In modernism, that is, in the practice of the belief set as shown above, collective effects are excluded apriori, metaphysically as well as methodologically, as we will see. Statistics is by definition not able to detect “patterns”. It is an analytic technique, of which people believe that its application excludes any construction. This is of course a misbelief, the constructive steps are just shifted into the side-conditions of the formulas, resulting in a deep methodological subjectivity concerning the choice of a particular technique, or formula respectively.

This affects the perspective onto society as well as individual perception and thought. Slightly metaphorically spoken, everything is believed to be (conceptual) dust, and to remain dust. The belief in independence, fired perhaps by a latent skepticism since Descartes, has invaded the methods and the practices. At most, such the belief, one could find different kinds of dust, or different sizes of the hives of dust, governed by a time-inert, universal law. In turn, wherever laws are imposed to “nature”, the subject matter turns into conceptual dust.

Something like a Language Game, let it even be in combination with transcendental conditionability, must almost be incomprehensible for a modernist. I think they even do not see there possibility. While analytic philosophy is largely the philosophy that developed within modernism (one might say that it is thus not philosophy at all), the philosophical stances of Wittgenstein, Heidegger or Deleuze are outside of it. The instances of misunderstanding Wittgenstein as a positivist are countless! Closely related to the neglect of collective effects is the dismissal of the inherent value of the comparative approach. Again, that’s not an accusation. Its just the description of an effect that emerges as soon as the above belief set turns into a practice.

The problem with modernism is indeed tricky. On the one hand it blossomed engineering. Engineering, as it has been conceived since then, is a strictly modernist endeavor. With regard to the physical aspects of the world it works quite well, of course. In any other area, it is doomed to fail, for the very same reasons, unfortunately. Engineering of informational aspects is thus impossible as it is the engineering of architecture or the engineering of machine-based episteme, not to mention the attempt to enable machines to deal with language. Or to deal with the challenges emerging in the urban culture. Just to avoid misunderstandings: Engineering is helpful to find technical realizations for putative solutions, but it never can deliver any kind of solution itself, except the effect that people assimilate and re-shape the produces of urban engineering through their usage, turning them into something different than intended.

2.2. Meaning

The most problematic effects of the idea  of “primary objects” are probably the following:

  • – the rejection of creational power of unconscious or even purely material entities;
  • – the idea that meaning can be attached to objects;
  • – the idea that objects can be represented and must be represented by ideas.

These strong consequences do not concern just epistemological issues. In modernism, “objectivity” has nothing to do with the realm of the social. It can be justified universally and on purely formal grounds. We already mentioned that this may work in large parts of physics—it is challenged in quantum physics—but certainly not in most biological or social domains.

In his investigation of thought, Deleuze identifies representationalism ([9], p.167) as one of the eight major presuppositions of large parts of philosophy, especially idealism in the line from Platon, Hegel, and Frege up to Carnap.

(1) the postulate of the principle, or the Cogitatio natura universalis (good will of the thinker and good nature of thought); (2) the postulate of the ideal, or common sense (common sense as the concordia facultatum and good sense as the distribution which guarantees this concord); (3) the postulate of the model, or of recognition (recognition inviting all the faculties to exercise themselves upon an object supposedly the same, and the consequent possibility of error in the distribution when one faculty confuses one of its objects with a different object of another faculty); (4) the postulate of the element, or of representation (when difference is subordinated to the complementary dimensions of the Same and the Similar, the Analogous and the Opposed); (5) the postulate of the negative, or of error (in which error expresses everything which can go wrong in thought, but only as the product of external mechanisms); (6) the postulate of logical function, or the proposition (designation is taken to be the locus of truth, sense being no more than the neutralised double or the infinite doubling of the proposition); (7) the postulate of modality, or solutions (problems being materially traced from propositions or, indeed, formally defined by the possibility of their being solved); (8) the postulate of the end, or result, the postulate of knowledge (the subordination of learning to knowledge, and of culture to method). Together they form the dogmatic image of thought.

Deleuze by no means attacks the utility of these elements in principle. His point is just that these elements work together and should not be taken as primary principles. The effect of these presuppositions are disastrous.

They crush thought under an image which is that of the Same and the Similar in representation, but profoundly betrays what it means to think and alienates the two powers of difference and repetition, of philosophical commencement and recommence­ment. The thought which is born in thought, the act of thinking which is neither given by innateness nor presupposed by reminiscence but engendered in its genitality, is a thought without image.

As engineer, you may probably have been noticing issue (5). Elsewhere in our essay we already dealt with the fundamental misconception to start from an expected norm, instead from an open scale without imposed values. Only the latter attitude will allow for inherent adaptivity. Adaptive systems never will fail, because failure is conceptually impossible. Instead, they will cease to exist.

The rejection of the negative, which includes the rejection of the opposite as well as dialectics, the norm, or the exception, is particularly important if we think about foundations of whatsoever (think about Hegel, Marx, attac, etc.) or about political implications. We already discussed the case of Agamben.

Deleuze finally will arrive at this “new imageless image of thought” by understanding difference as a transcendental category. The great advantage of this move is that it does not imply a necessity of symbols and operators as primary, as it is the case if we would take identity as primary. The primary identical is either empty (a=a), that is, without any significance for the relation between entities, or it needs symbolification and at least one operator. In practice, however, a whole battery of models, classifications and the assumptions underlying them is required to support the claim of identity. As these assumptions are not justifiable within the claim of identity itself, they must be set, which results in the attempt to define the world. Obviously, attempting so would be quite problematic. It is even self-contradicting if contrasted with the modernists claim of objectivity. Setting the difference as primary, Deleuze not only avoids the trap of identity and pre-established harmony in the hive of objects, but also subordinates the object to the relation. Here he meets with Wittgenstein and Heidegger.

Together, the presupposition of identity and objecthood is necessarily and in a bidirectional manner accompanied with another quite abundant misunderstanding, according to which logic should be directly applicable to the world. World here is of course “everything” except logic, that is (claimed) objects, their relations, measurement, ideas, concepts and so on. Analytic philosophy, positivism, external realism and the larger movement of modernism all apply the concept of bi-valent logic to empirical entities. It is not really a surprise that this leads to serious problems and paradoxa, which however are pseudo-paradoxa. For instance, universal justification requires knowledge. Without logical truity in knowledge universal justification can’t be achieved. The attempt to define knowledge as consisting of positive content failed, though. Next, the formula of “knowledge as justified belief” was proposed. In order not to fall prey to the Gettier-problem, belief itself would have to be objectified. Precisely this happened in analytic philosophy, when Alchourron et al. (1985) published their dramatically (and overly) reduced operationalization of “belief”. Logic is a condition, it is transcendental to its usage. Hence, it is inevitable to instantiate it. By means of instantiation, however, semantics invades equally inevitable.

Ultimately due to the presupposed primacy of identity, modernists are faced with a particular difficulty in dealing with relations. Objects and their role should not be dependent on their interpretation. As a necessary consequence, meaning—and information—must be attached to objects as quasi-physical properties. There is but one single consequence: tyranny. Again, it is not surprising that at the heights of modernism the bureaucratic tyranny was established several times.

Some modernists would probably allow for interpretation. Yet, only as a means, not as a condition, not as a primacy. Concerning their implications, the difference between the stances is a huge one. If you take it simply as a means, keeping the belief into the primacy of objects, you still would adhere to the idea of “absolute truth” within the physical world. Ultimately, interpretation would be degraded into an error-prone “method”, which ideally should have no influence onto the recognition of truth, of course. The world, at least the world that goes beyond the mere physical aspects, appears as a completely different one if relations, and thus interpretation is set as primary. Obviously, this implies also a categorical difference regarding the way one approaches that world, e.g. in science, or the way one conceives of the possible role of design. Is a nothing else than myth that a designer, architect, or urbanist designs objects. The practitioners in these professions design potentials, namely that for the construction of meaning by the future users and inhabitants (cf. [5]). There is nothing a designer can do to prevent a particular interpretation or usage. Koolhaas concludes that regarding Junkspace this may lead to a trap, or kind of a betrayal [3]:

Narrative reflexes that have enabled us from the beginning of time to connect dots, fill in blanks, are now turned against us: we cannot stop noticing—no sequence is too absurd, trivial, meaningless, insulting… Through our ancient evolutionary equipment, our irrepressible attention span, we helplessly register, provide insight, squeeze meaning, read intention; we cannot stop making sense out of the utterly senseless… (p.188)

I think that on the one hand Koolhaas here accepts the role of interpretation, yet, and somewhat contradictory, he is not able to recognize that it is precisely the primacy of interpretation that enables for an transformation through assimilation, hence the way out of Junkspace. Here he remains modernist to the full extent.

The deep reason being that for the object-based attitude there is no possibility at all to recognize non-representational coherence. (Thus, a certain type of illiteracy regarding complex texts is prevailing among “true” modernists…)

2.3. Shades of Empiricism

Science, as we understand it today—yet at least partially also as we practice it—is based on the so-called hypothetico-deductive approach of empiricism (cf. [6]). Science is still taken as a synonym for physics by many, even in philosophy of science, with only very few exceptions. There, the practice and the theory of Life sciences are not only severely underrepresented, quite frequently biology is still reduced to physics. Physicists, and their philosophical co-workers, often claim that the whole world can be reduced to a description in terms of quantum mechanics (among many others cf. [7]). A closely related reduction, only slightly less problematic, is given by the materialist’s claim that mental phenomena should be explained completely in biological terms, that is, using only biological concepts.

The belief in empiricism is implemented into the methodological framework that is called “statistics”. The vast majority of the statistical tests rest on the assumption that observations and variables are independent from each other. Some tests are devised to test for independence, or dependence, but this alone does not help much. Usually, if dependency is detected, then the subsequent tests are rearranged as to fit again the independence assumption. In other words, any possibly actual coherence is first assumed to be nonexistent. By means of the method itself, the coherence is indeed destroyed. Yet, once it is destroyed, you never will get it back. It is quite simple: The criteria for any such construction are just missing.

From this perspective, statistics is not scientific according to science’s own measures; due to its declared non-critical and  non-experimental stance it actually looks more like ideology. For a scientific method would perform an experiment for testing whether something could be assumed or not. As Nobel laureate Konrad Lorenz said: I never needed statistics to do my work. What would be needed instead is indeed a method that is structurally independent of any independence assumption regarding the observed data. Such a method would propose patterns if there are sufficiently dense hints, and not , otherwise. Without proposing one or the other apriori. From that perspective, it is more the representationalism in modernism that brings the problem.

This framework of statistics is far from being homogeneous, though. Several “interpretations” are fiercely discussed: frequentism, bayesianism, uncertainty, or propensity. Yet, any of them faces serious internal inconsistencies, as Alan Hajek convincingly demonstrated [8]. To make a long story short (the long version you can find over here), it is not possible to build a model without symbols, without concepts that require interpretation and further models, and outside a social practice, or without an embedding into such. Modernists usually reject such basics and eagerly claim even universal objectivity for their data (hives of dust). More than 50 years ago, Quine proofed that believing otherwise should be taken just as nothing else than a dogma [9]. This dogma can be conceived as a consequence of the belief that objects that are the primary constituents of the world.

Of course, the social embedding is especially important in the case of social affairs such like urbanism. The claim that any measurement of data then treated by statistical modeling (they call it wrongly “analysis”) could convey any insight per se is nothing but pretentious.

Dealing with data always results in some kind of construction, base don some methods. Methods, however, respond differentially to data, they filter. In other words, even applying “analytical” methods involves interpretation, often even a strong one. Unfortunately for the modernist, he excluded the possibility of the primacy of interpretation at all, because there are only objects out there. This hurdle is quickly solved, of course, by the belief that the meaning is outside of interpretation. As result, they believe, that there is a necessary progress towards the truth. For modernists: Here you may jump back to subsection 3.2. …

2.4. Machines

For le Corbusier a house is much like a “machine for living in”. According to him, a building has clear functions, that could be ascribed apriori, governed by universal relations, or even laws. Recently, people engaged in the building economy recognized that it may turn problematic to assign a function apriori, as it simply limits the sales arguments. As a result, any function from the building as well as from the architecture itself tends to be stripped away. The “solution” is a more general one. Yet, in contrast to an algebraic equation that will be instantiated before used, the building actually exists after building it. It is there. And up today, not in a reconfigurable form.

Actually, the problem is created not by the tendency for more general, or even pre-specific solutions. It turns critical if it generality amalgamates with the modernist attitude. The category of machines, which is synonymic to ascribing or assigning a function (understood as usage) apriori, doesn’t accept any reference to luxury. A machine that would contain properties or elements that don’t bear any function, at least temporarily, other than pleasure (which does not exist in a world that consists only of objects) would be badly built. Minimalism is not just a duty, it even belongs to the grammar of modernism. Minimalism is the actualization and representation of mathematical rigidity, which is also a necessity as it is the only way to use signs without interpretation. At least, that is the belief of modernists.

The problem with minimalism is that it effectively excludes evolution. Either the produce fits perfectly or not at all. Perfectness of the match can be expected only, if the user behaves exactly as expected, which represents nothing else than dogmatism, if not worse. Minimalism in form excludes alternative interpretations and usages, deliberately so, it even has  to exclude the possibility for the alternative. How else to get rid of alternatives? Koolhaas rightly got it: by nothingness (minimalism), or by chaos.

3. Urbanism, and Koolhaas.

First, we have of course to make clear that we will be able to provide only a glimpse to the field invoked by this header. Else, our attempts here should not be understood as a proposal to separate architecture from urbanism. Both, regarding theory and implementation they more and more overlap. When Koolhaas explains the special situation of the Casa do Musica in Porto, he refers to processes like continuation of certain properties and impressions from the surround to be continued inside of the building. Inversely, any building, even any persistent object in a city shifts the qualities of its urban surround.

Rem Koolhaas, once journalist, then architect, now for more than a decade additionally someone doing comparative studies on cities has performatively demonstrated—by means of his writings such as “S,M,L,XL”, “Generic City” or “Junkspace”—that a serious engagement about the city can’t be practiced as a disciplinary endeavor. Human culture moved irrevocably into a phase where culture largely means urban culture. Urbanists may be seen as a vanishing species that became impossible due to the generality of the field. “Culturalist” is neither a proper domain nor a suitable label. Or perhaps they moult into organizers of research in urban contexts, similarly as architects are largely organizers for creating buildings. Yet, there is an important difference: Architects may still believe that they externalize something. Such a belief is impossible for urbanists, because they are part of the culture. It is thus questionable, if a project like the “Future Cities Laboratory” should indeed be called such. It is perhaps only possible to do so in Singapore, but that’s the subject of one of the next essays.

Rem Koolhaas wrote “Delirious New York” before turning to architecture and urbanism as a practitioner. There, he praised its diversity and manifoldness that, in or by means of his dreams, added up to the deliriousness of Manhattan, and probably also of his own.

Without any doubt, the particular quality of Manhattan is its empowering density, which is not actualizing as the identical, but rather as heterotopia, as divergence. In some way, Manhattan may be conceived as the urban precursor of the internet [11], built first in steel, glass and concrete. Vera Bühlmann writes:

Manhattan space is, if not yet everywhere, so at least in the internet potentially everywhere, and additionally not limited to three, probably even spatial dimensions.4

Urbanism is in urgent demand of an advanced theory that refers to the power of networks. It was perhaps this “network process” that brought Koolhaas to explore the anti-thesis of the wall and the plane, the absolute horizontal and vertical separation. I say anti-thesis, because Delirious New York itself behaves quite ambiguously, half-way between the Hegelian, (post-)structuralist dialectics and utopia on the one side and an affirmation of heterotopias on the other hand as a more advanced level of conceptualization alienating processes, which always are also processes of selection and individuation into both directions, the medium and the “individual”. Earlier scholars like Aldo Rossi have been too early to go into that direction as networks weren’t recognizable as part of the Form of Life. Even Shane is only implicitly referring to their associative power (he does not refer to complexity as well). And Koolhaas was not either, and probably is still not aware of this problematics.

Recently, I have been proposing one of the possible approaches to build such a theory, the according concepts, terms and practices (for more details see [12]). It is rather important, to distinguish two very basic forms of networks, logistic and associative networks. Logistic networks are used everywhere in modernist reasoning about cities and culture. Yet, they exclusively refer to the network as a machine, suitable to optimize the transport of anything. Associative networks are completely different. They do not transfer anything, they swallow, assimilate, rearrange, associate and, above all, they learn. Any associative network can learn anything. The challenge is, particularly for modernist attitudes, that it can’t be controlled what exactly an associative network is going to learn. The interesting thing about it is that the concept of associative networks provides a bridge to the area of advanced “machine”-learning and to the Actor-Network-Theory (ANTH) of Bruno Latour. The main contribution of ANTH is its emphasis of agency, even of those mostly mineral material arrangements that are usually believed to have no mental capacity.

It is clear, that an associative network may not be perceived at all under the strictly practiced presupposition of independence, as it is typical for modernism. Upon its implementation, the  belief set of modernism tends to destroy the associativity, hence also the almost inevitable associations between the more or less mentally equipped actors in urban environments.

When applied to cities, it breaks up relations, deliberately. Any interaction of high-rise buildings, so typical for Manhattan, is precluded intentionally. Any transfer is optimized just along one single parameter: time, and secondarily, space as a resource. Note that optimization always requires the apriori definition of a single function. As soon as would allow for multiple goals, you would be faced with the necessity of weighting and assigning subjective expectations, which are subjective precisely due to the necessity of interpretation. In order to exclude even the possibility for it, modernists agree hastily to optimize time (as a resource under the assignment of scarcity and physicality), once being understood as a transcendental condition.

As Aldo Rossi remarked already in the 1960ies [13], the modernist tries to evacuate any presence of time from the city. It is not just that history is cut off and buried, largely under false premises and wrong conclusions, reducing history just to institutional traditions (remember, there is no interpretation for a modernist!). In some way, it would have been even easy to predict Koolhaas’ Junkspace already in the end of the 19th century. Well, the Futurologists did it, semi-paradoxically, though. Quite stringent, Futurism was only a short phase within modernism. This neglect of time in modernism is by no means a “value” or an intention. It is a direct logical consequence of the presupposed belief set, particularly independence, logification and the implied neglect of context.

Dis-assembling the associative networks of a city results inevitably in the modernist urban conceptual dust, ruled by the paradigm of scarce time and the blindness against interpretation, patterns and non-representational coherence. This is in a nutshell, what I would like to propose as the deep grammar of the Junkspace, as it has been described by Koolhaas. Modernism did nothing else than to build and to actualize it conceptual dust. We may call it tertiary chaos, which has been—in its primary form—equal to the initial state of indiscernability concerning the cosmos as a whole. Yet, this time it has been dictated by modernists. Tertiary chaos thus can be set equal to the attempt to make any condition for the possibility of discernability vanishing.

Modernists may not be aware that there is not only already a theory of discernability, which equals to the Peircean theory of the sign, there is also an adaptation and application to urbanism and architecture. Urbanists probably may know about the name “Venturi”, but I seriously doubt that semiotics is on their radar. If modernists talk about semiotics at all, they usually refer to the structuralist caricature of it, as it has been put forward by de Saussure, establishing a closed version of the sign as a “triangle”. Peircean signs—and these have been used by Venturi—establish as an interpretive situation. They do not refer to objects, but just to other signs. Their reference to the world is provided through instances of abstract models and a process of symbolification, which includes learning as an ability that precedes knowledge. (more detail here in this earlier essay) Unfortunately, Venturi’s concept have scarcely been updated, except perhaps in the context of media facades [14]. Yet, media facades are mostly and often vastly misunderstood as the possibility to display adverts. There are good arguments supporting the view that there is more about them [15].

Modernists, including Koolhaas employ a strange image of evolution. For him (them), evolution is pure arbitrariness, both regarding the observable entities and processes as well as regarding the future development. He supposes to detect “zero loyalty-and zero tolerance-toward configuration“ ([3] p.182). In the same passage he simultaneously and contradictory misses the „”original” condition“ and blames history for its corruptive influence: „History corrupts, absolute history corrupts absolutely.“ All of that is put into the context of a supposedly “”permanent evolution.”“ (his quot. marks). Most remarkably, even biologists as S.J. Gould, pretending to be evolutionary biologist, claims that evolution is absolutely arbitrary. Well, the only way out of the contrasting fact that there is life in the form we know about it is to assume some active divine involvement. Precisely this was the stance of Gould. People like Gould(and perhaps Koolhaas) commit the representationalist fault, which excludes them from recognizing (i) the structural tendency of any evolution towards more general solutions, and (ii) the there is an evolution of evolutionarity. The modernist attitude towards evolution can again be traced back to the belief into metaphysical independence of objects, but our interest here is different.

Understanding evolution as a concept has only little to do with biology and the biological model that is called “natural evolution”. Natural evolution is just an instance of evolution into physico-chemical and then biological matter. Bergson has been the first who addressed evolution as a concept [16], notably in the context of abstract memory. In a previous essay we formalized that approach and related it to biology and machine-learning. At its basics, it requires a strict non-representational approach. Species and organisms are expressed in terms of probability. Our conclusion was that in a physical world evolution inevitably takes place if there at least two different kinds or scales of memory. Only on that abstract level we can adopt the concept of evolution into urbanism, that is, into any cultural context.

Memory can’t be equated to tradition, institutions or even the concrete left-overs of history, of course. They are just instances of memory. It is of utmost importance here, not to contaminate the concept of memory again with representationalism. This memory is constructive. Memory that is not constructive, is not memory, but a stock, a warehouse (although these are also kinds of storage and contribute as such to memory). Memory is inherently active and associative. Such memory is the basic, non-representative element of a generally applicable evolutionary theory.

Memory can not be “deposited” into almost geological layers of sediments, quite in contrast to the suggestions of Eisenman, whom Rajchman follows closely in his “Constructions”.

The claim of “storable memory” is even more disastrous than the the claim that information could be stored. These are not objects and items that are independent of an interpretation, they are the processes of constructive of guided interpretation. Both “storages” would only become equal to the respective immaterial processes under the condition of a strictly deterministic set of commands. Even the concept of the “rule” is already too open to serve the modernist claim of storable memory.

It is immediately clear that the dynamic concept of memory is highly relevant for any theory about urban conditions. It provides a general language to derive particular models and instances of association, stocks and flows, that are not reducible to storage or transfers. We may even expect that whenever we meet kind of material storage in an urban context, we also should expect association. The only condition for that just being that there are no modernists around… Yet, storage without memory, that is, without activity remains dead, much like but even less than a crystal. Cripples in the sand. The real relevance of stocks and flows is visible only in the realm of the non-representational, the non-material, if we conceive it as waves in abstract density, that is as media, conveying the potential for activity as a differential. Physicalists and modernists like Christianse or Hillier will never understand that. Just think of the naïve empirics, calling it cartography, they are performing around the world.

This includes deconstructivism as well. Derrida’s deconstructivism can be read as a defense war against the symbolification of the new, the emerging, the complex, the paradox of sense. His main weapon is the “trail”, of which he explicitly states that it could not be interpreted at all. Such, Derrida as master of logical flatness and modernist dust is the real enemy of progress. Peter Sloterdijk, the prominent contemporary German “philosopher”5, once called Derrida the “Old Egyptian”. Nothing would fit better to Derrida, who lives in the realm of shadows and for whom life is just a short transitory phase, hopefully “survived” without too much injuries. The only metaphor being possible on that basis is titanic geology. Think of some of Eisenman’s or Libeskind’s works.

Figure 2: Geologic-titanic shifts induced by the logical flatness of deconstructivism

a: Peter Eisenman, Aronoff Center for Design and Art in Cincinnati (Ohio) (taken from [11]); the parts of building are treated blocks, whose dislocation reminds to that of geological sediments (or the work of titans).

b: Daniel Libeskind, Victoria and Albert Museum Boilerhouse Extension. Secondary chaos, inducing Junkspace through its isolationist “originality”, conveying “defunct myths” (Koolhaas in [3], p.189).

Here we finish our exploration of generic aspects of the structure of modernist thinking. Hopefully, the sections so far are sufficiently suited to provide some insights about modernism in general, and the struggles Koolhaas is fighting with in “Junkspace”.

4. Redesigning Urbanism

Redesigning urbanism, that is to unlock it from modernist phantasms is probably much more simple than it may look at first sight. Well, not exactly simple, at least for modernists. Everything is about the presuppositions. Dropping the metaphysical believe of independence without getting trapped by esotericism or mysticism might well be the cure.Of course, metaphysical independence need to be removed from any level and any aspect in urbanism, starting from the necessary empirical work, which of course is already an important part of the construction work. We already mentioned that the notion of “empirical analysis” pretends neutrality, objectivity (as independence from the author) and validity. Yet, this is pure illusion. Independence should be abandoned also in its form of searching for originality or uniqueness, trying to set an unconditional mark in the cityscape. By that we don’t refer to morphing software, of course.

The antidote against isolationism, analyticity and logic is already well-known. To provide coherence you have to defy splintering and abjure the believe in (conceptual) dust. The candidate tool for it is story-telling, albeit in a non-representational manner, respecting the difference and heterotopias from the beginning. In turn this also means to abandon utopias and a-topias, but to embrace complexity and a deep concept of prevailing differentiation (in a subsequent essay we will deal with that). As citizens, we are not interested in non-places and deserts of spasmodic uniqueness (anymore) or the mere “solution of problems” either (see Deleuze about the dogmatic image of thought as cited above). Changing the perspective from the primacy of analysis to the primacy story-telling immediately reveals the full complexity of the respective Form of Life, to which we refer here as a respectful philosophical concept.

It is probably pretentious to speak such about urbanism as a totality. There are of course, and always have been, people who engaged in the urban condition based on a completely different set of believes, righteous non-modern. Those people start with the pattern and never tear them apart. Those people are able to distinguish structure, genesis and appearance. In biology, this distinction has been instantiated into the perspectives of the genotype, the phenotype, and, in bio-slang, evo-devo, the compound made from development, growth and evolution. These are tied together (necessarily) by complexity. In philosophy, the respective concepts are immanence, the differential, and the virtual.

For urbanism, take for instance the work of David Shane (“Recombinant Urbanism“). Shane’s work, which draws much on Kelly’s, is a (very) good starting point not only for any further theoretical work, but also for practical work.

As a practitioner, one has to defy the seduction for the totality of a master plan, as the renowned parametricists actualize in Istanbul, Christianse and his office did recently in Zürich at the main station. Both are producing pure awfulness, castles of functional uniformity, because they express the totality of the approach even visually. Even in Singapore’s URA (Urban Development Authority), the master plan has been relativised in favor of a (slightly) more open conceptualization. Designer’s have to learn that not less is more, but rather that partial nothingness is more. Deliberately non-planning, as Koolhaas has repeatedly emphasized. This should not be taken representationally, of course. It does not make any sense to grow “raw nature”, jungles within the city, neither for the city, nor for the “jungle”. Before a crystal can provide soil for real life, it must decay, precisely because it is a closed system (see next figure 3). Adaptive systems replace parts, melt holes to build structures, without decaying at all. We will return to this aspect of differentiation in a later article.

Figure 3: Pruitt-Igoe (St.Louis), getting blasted in 1972. Charles Jencks called this event “one of the deaths of modernism”. This had not been the only tear-down there. Laclede, a neighborhood nearby Pruitt-Igoe, made from small, single-flat houses failed as well, the main reasons being an unfortunate structure of the financial model and political issues, namely separation of “classes” and apartheid. (see this article).

The main question for finding a practicable process therefore is: How to ask, which questions should we address in order to build an analytics under the umbrella of story-telling, that avoids the shortfalls of modernism?

We might again take a look to biology (as a science). As urbanism, biology is also confronted with a totality. We call it life. How to address reasonable, that is fruitful questions to that totality? Biology already found a set of answer, which nevertheless are not respected by the modernist version of this science, mainly expressed as genetics. The first insight was, that “nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.”[17] Which would be the respective question for urbanism? I can’t give an answer here, but it is certainly not independence. This we can know through the lesson told by “Junkspace”. Another, almost ridiculous anti-candidate is sustainability, as far as it is conceived in terms of scarcity of mainly physical resources instead of social complexity. Perhaps we should remember the history of the city beyond its “functionality”. Yet, that would mean to first develop an understanding of (abstract) evolution, to instantiate that, and then to derive a practicable model for urban societies. What does it mean to be social, what does it mean to think, both taken as practice in a context of freedom? Biology then developed a small set of basic contexts along to which any research should be aligned to, without loosing the awareness (hopefully) that there are indeed four of such contexts. These have been clearly stated by Nobel laureate Tinbergen [18]. According to him research in biology is suitably structured by four major per­spectives: phylogeny, ontogeny, physiology and behavior. Are there similarly salient dimensions for structuring thought in urbanism, particularly in a putative non-modernist (neither modernist, not post-modernist) version? Particularly interesting are, imho, especially the intersections of such sub-domains.

Perhaps differentiation (as a concept) is indeed a (the) proper candidate for the grand perspective. We will discuss some aspects of this in the next essay: it includes growth and its modes, removal, replacement, deterioration, the problem of the generic, the difference between development and evolution, and a usable concept of complexity. to name but a few. In the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, particularly the Thousand Plateaus, Difference and Repetition and the Fold, we already can find a good deal of theoretical work about he conceptual issues around differentiation. Differentiation includes learning, individually and collectively (I do NOT refer to swarm ideology here, nor to collectivist mysticism either!!!), which in turn would bring in the (abstract) mental into any consideration of urbanism. Yet, wasn’t mankind differentiating and learning all the time? The challenge will be to find a non-materialist interpretation of those in these materialist times.

Notes

1. Cited after [11]

2. Its core principles are the principle of excluded middle (PEM) and the  principle of non-contradictivity (PNC). Both principles are equivalent to the concept of macroscopic objects, albeit only in a realist perspective, i.e. under the presupposition that objects are primary against relations. This is, of course, quite problematic, as it excludes an appropriate conceptualisation of information.

Both, the PEM and PNC allow for the construction of paradoxes like the Taylor Paradox. Such paradoxes may be conceived as “Language Game Colliders”, that is as conceptual devices which commit a mistake concerning the application of the grammar of language games. Usually, the bring countability and the sign for non-countability into conflict. First, it is a fault to compare a claim with a sign, second, it is stupid to claim contradicting proposals. Note, that here we are allowed to speak of “contradiction”, because we are following the PNC as it is suggested by the PNC claim. The Taylor-Paradox is of course, like any other paradox, a pseudo-problem. It appears only due to an inappropriate choice or handling of the conceptual embedding, or due to the dismissal of the concept of the “Language Game”, which mostly results in the implicit claim of the existence of a “Private Language”.

3. Vera Bühlmann, “Articulating quantities, if things depend on whatever can be the case“, lecture held at The Art of Concept, 3rd Conference: CONJUNCTURE — A Series of Symposia on 21st Century Philosophy, Politics, and Aesthetics, organized by Nathan Brown and Petar Milat, Multimedia Institute MAMA in Zagreb, Kroatia, June 15-17 2012.

4. German orig.: “Manhattan Space ist, wenn schon nicht überall, so doch im Internet potentiell überall, und zudem nicht mehr auf drei vielleicht gar noch räumliche Dimensionen beschränkt.”

5. Peter Sloterdjik does not like to be called a philosopher

References

  • [1] Michel Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge. Routledge 2002 [1969].
  • [2] Vera Bühlmann, Printed Physics, de Gruyter, forthcoming.
  • [3] Rem Koolhaas (2002). Junkspace. October, Vol. 100, “Obsolescence”, pp. 175-190. MIT Press
  • [4] Michael Hansmeyer, his website about these columns.
  • [5] “Pseudopodia. Prolegomena to a Discourse of Design”. In: Vera Bühlmann and Martin Wiedmer . pre-specifics. Some Comparatistic Investigations on Research in Art and Design. JRP| Ringier Press, Zurich 2008. p. 21-80 (English edition). available online;
  • [6] Wesley C. Salmon, Causality and Explanation. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1998.
  • [7] Michael Epperson (2009). Quantum Mechanics and Relational Realism: Logical Causality and Wave Function Collapse. Process Studies, 38(2): 339-366.
  • [8] Alan Hájek (2007). The Reference Class Problem is Your Problem Too. Synthese 156 (3):563-585.
  • [9] W.v.O. Quine (1951), Two Dogmas of Empiricism. The Philosophical Review 60: 20-43.
  • [10] Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. Columbia University Press, New York 1994 [1968].
  • [11] Vera Bühlmann, inhabiting media. Thesis, University of Basel (CH), 2009.
  • [12] Klaus Wassermann (2010). SOMcity: Networks, Probability, the City, and its Context. eCAADe 2010, Zürich. September 15-18, 2010. (pdf)
  • [13] Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the City. MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.) 1982 [1966].
  • [14] Christoph Kronhagel (ed.), Mediatecture, Springer, Wien 2010. pp.334-345.
  • [15] Klaus Wassermann, Vera Bühlmann, Streaming Spaces – A short expedition into the space of media-active façades. in: Christoph Kronhagel (ed.), Mediatecture, Springer, Wien 2010. pp.334-345. available here. available here
  • [16] Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory. (Matière et Mémoire 1896) transl. N.M. Paul & W.S. Palmer. Zone Books 1990.
  • [17] Theodore Dobzhansky, Genetics and the Origin of Species, Columbia University Press, New York 1951 (3rd ed.) [1937].
  • [18] Niko Tinbergen (1963). On Aims and Methods in Ethology, Z. Tierpsych., (20): 410–433.

۞

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Junkspace, extracted.

July 16, 2012 § Leave a comment

Some years after “The Generic City” Koolhaas published

a further essay on the problematic field of identity: “Junkspace” (JS).[1] I think it is a good idea to introduce both of them and to relate them before discussing the issues of this field by ourselves.

Unlike “The Generic City” (TGC), which was constructed as kind of a report about a film script, JS is more like a “documentary manifesto,” certainly provocative (for thought?), but also not a theory. “Junkspace” throws a concept in/out, according to its message, one could say. As in TGC, Koolhaas tries to densify and to enhance contrasts in order to render the invisible visible. Its language thus should not be misunderstood as “apocalyptic” or the like, or as a reference to actual “facts”. We else must consider that even documentations are inevitably equipped with theories and models, intentions and expectations. The biggest difference between the two essays is probably the fact that in JS Koolhaas does not try to keep distance through the formal construction of the writing. Hence, it may be legitimate to read his essay indeed as kind of a seriously taken diagnosis.

In many ways, JS reads as a critique of modernism and of post-modernism, not just as attitudes in architecture, but rather concerning the whole culture, ending in a state where the “cosmetic is the new cosmic.” Albeit critique is not made (too) explicit, trying to avoid bringing in explicit value statements, the tone of JS appears negative. Yet, it does so only upon the reader’s interpretation. “Junkspace is a low-grade purgatory.” In Christian mythology, everybody had to pass it, the good ones and the evil ones, except the bravest saints, perhaps. Failure is expressed, but by referring to a certain otherworldliness: “We do not leave pyramids.”

The style of JS is ambiguous itself, presumably intentionally so. On the one hand, it reminds to mathematical, formal series of sentences. Sections often start with existential proposals: “Junkspace is …”. Together, as a series, or a hive, these imply  unspoken axioms. On the other hand it seems as if Koolhaas hesitates to use the figure of logic, or accordingly of cause and effect, with regard to the Junkspace itself. Such, Koolhaas exhibits performatively a clear-cut non-modern, or should we say “meta-modern”, attitude. By no means this should be taken as kind of some irrationality, though. We just find lines of historical developments, often even only historizing contrasts. This formal structure is anything but a self-righteous rhetoric game, it’s more like a necessary means to maintain some distance to modernism. The style of JS could be considered as (empty) rhetoric only from within  a modernist attitude.

Before we deal further with modernism (below, and more extensively here), I first want to list my selection of core passages. The sections in Koolhaas’ text are neither enumerated nor divided by headlines (no hierarchies! many “…”! a Junkspace…), so I provide the page numbers in order to facilitate reference. Additionally, I enumerated the pieces for referencing them from within our own writing.

Here is the extract from Junkspace; it is of  course hard to do such a selection—even if we allow for a total of 59 passages—, as JS is rather densely written. Koolhaas begins with some definitions before turning to its properties, readings and implications:

Précis of “Junkspace”

(p.175)

1. “Identity” is the new junk food for the dispossessed, globalization’s fodder for the disenfranchised … […] Junk-Space is the residue mankind leaves on the planet. The built […] product of modernization is not modern architecture but Junkspace. Junkspace is what remains after modernization has run its course, or, more precisely, what coagulates while modernization is in progress, its fallout. Modernization had a rational program: to share the blessings of science, universally. Junkspace is its apotheosis, or meltdown.

2. Junkspace is the sum total of our current achievement;

3. It was a mistake to invent modern architecture for the twentieth century. Architecture disappeared in the twentieth century; we have been reading a footnote under a microscope hoping it would turn into a novel;

4. […] our concern for the masses has blinded us to People’s Architecture. Junkspace seems an aberration, but it is the essence, the main thing. the product of an encounter between escalator and air-conditioning.

5. Continuity is the essence of Junkspace.

(p.176)

6. Junkspace is sealed, held together not by structure but by skin, like a bubble.

7. Junkspace is a Bermuda Triangle of concepts, an abandoned petri dish: it cancels distinctions, undermines resolve, confuses intention with realization. It replaces hierarchy with accumulation, composition with addition. […] A fuzzy empire of blur, it […] offer[s] a seamless patchwork of the permanently disjointed. […] Junkspace is additive, layered, and lightweight, not articulated in different parts but subdivided, […].

8. Junkspace’s iconography is 13 percent Roman, 8 percent Bauhaus and 7 percent Disney (neck and neck), 3 percent Art Nouveau, followed closely by Mayan.

(p.177)

9. Junkspace is beyond measure, beyond code … Because it cannot be grasped, Junks pace cannot be remembered. It is flamboyant yet unmemorable, like a screen saver;

10. Junkspace’s modules are dimensioned to carry brands;

11. Junkspace performs the same role as black holes in the universe: they are essences through which meaning disappears.

12. Junkspace is best enjoyed in a state of post-revolutionary gawking. Polarities have merged.

13. Modern architecture […] exposes what previous generations kept under wraps: structures emerge like springs from a mattress.

14. Junkspace thrives on design, but design dies in Junkspace […] Regurgitation is the new  creativity.

15. Superstrings of graphics, […] LEDs, and video describe an authorless world beyond anyone’s claim, always unique, utterly unpredictable, yet intensely familiar.

(p.178)

16. Junkspace sheds architectures like a reptile sheds skins, is reborn every Monday morning.

17. Architects thought of Junkspace first and named it Megastructure, the final solution to transcend their huge impasse.

18. In Junkspace, the tables are turned: it is subsystem only, without superstructure, orphaned particles in search of a framework or pattern.

19. Each element performs its task in negotiated isolation.

20. Instead of development, it offers entropy.

21. Change has been divorced from the idea of improvement. There is no progress; like a crab on LSD, culture staggers endlessly sideways …

22. Everywhere in Junkspace there are seating arrangements, ranges of modular chairs, even couches, as if the experience Junkspace offers its consumers is significantly more exhausting than any previous spatial sensation;

(p.179)

23. Junkspace is fanatically maintained, the night shift undoing the damage of the day shift in an endless Sisyphean replay. As you recover from Junkspace, Junkspace recovers from you.

24. Traditionally, typology implies demarcation, the definition of a singular model that excludes other arrangements. Junkspace represents a reverse typology of cumulative, approximative identity, less about kind than about quantity. But formlessness is still form, the formless also a typology.

25. Junkspace can either be absolutely chaotic or frighteningly aseptic-like a best-seller-overdetermined and indeterminate at the same time.

26. Junkspace is often described as a space of flows, but that is a misnomer; flows depend on disciplined movement, bodies that cohere. Junkspace is a web without a spider; […] It is a space of collision, a container of atoms, busy, not dense …

(p.180)

27. Junkspace features the tyranny of the oblivious: sometimes an entire Junkspace comes unstuck through the nonconformity of one of its members; a single citizen of an another culture-a refugee, a mother-can destabilize an entire Junkspace, […]

28. Flows in Junkspace lead to disaster: department stores at the beginning of sales; the stampedes triggered by warring compartments of soccer fans;

29. Traffic is Junkspace, from airspace to the subway; the entire highway system is Junkspace […]

30. Aging in Junkspace is nonexistent or catastrophic; sometimes an entire Junkspace—a department store, a nightclub, a bachelor pad-turns into a slum overnight without warning.

(p.181)

31. Corridors no longer simply link A to B, but have become “destinations.” Their tenant life tends to be short: the most stagnant windows, the most perfunctory dresses, the most implausible flowers. All perspective is gone, as in a rainforest (itself disappearing, they keep saying … ).

32. Trajectories are launched as ramp, turn horizontal without any warning, intersect, fold down, suddenly emerge on a vertiginous balcony above a large void. Fascism minus dictator.

(p.182)

33. There is zero loyalty—and zero tolerance—toward configuration, no “original” condition; architecture has turned into a time-lapse sequence to reveal a “permanent evolution.” … The only certainty is conversion-continuous-followed, in rare cases, by “restoration,” the process that claims ever new sections of history as extensions of Junkspace.

34. History corrupts, absolute history corrupts absolutely. Color and matter are eliminated from these bloodless grafts.

35. Sometimes not overload but its opposite, an absolute absence of detail, generates Junkspace. A voided condition of frightening sparseness, shocking proof that so much can be organized by so little.

36. The curse of public space: latent fascism safely smothered in signage, stools, sympathy … Junkspace is postexistential; it makes you uncertain where you are, obscures where you go, undoes where you were. Who do you think you are? Who do you want to be? (Note to architects: You thought that you could ignore Junkspace, visit it surreptitiously, treat it with condescending contempt or enjoy it vicariously … because you could not understand it, you’ve thrown away the keys … But now your own architecture is infected, has become equally smooth, all-inclusive, continuous, warped, busy, atrium-ridden …)

(p.183)

37. Restore, rearrange, reassemble, revamp, renovate, revise, recover, redesign, return-the Parthenon marbles-redo, respect, rent: verbs that start with re-produce Junkspace …

38. Junkspace will be our tomb.

39. Junkspace is political: It depends on the central removal of the critical faculty in the name of comfort and pleasure.

40. Not exactly “anything goes”; in fact, the secret of Junkspace is that it is both promiscuous and repressive: as the formless proliferates, the formal withers, and with it all rules, regulations, recourse …

41. Junkspace […] is the interior of Big Brother’s belly. It preempts people’s sensations. […] it blatantly proclaims how it wants to be read. Junkspace pretends to unite, but it actually splinters. It creates communities not out of shared interest or free association, but out of identical statistics and unavoidable demographics, an opportunistic weave of vested interests.

(p.184)

42. God is dead, the author is dead, history is dead, only the architect is left standing … an insulting evolutionary joke … A shortage of masters has not stopped a proliferation of masterpieces. “Masterpiece” has become a definitive sanction, a semantic space that saves the object from criticism, leaves its qualities unproven, its performance untested, its motives unquestioned.

43. Junkspace reduces what is urban to urbanity. Instead of public life, Public SpaceTM: what remains of the city once the unpredictable has been removed …

44. Inevitably, the death of God (and the author) has spawned orphaned space; Junkspace is authorless, yet surprisingly authoritarian … At the moment of its greatest emancipation, humankind is subjected to the most dictatorial scripts.: […] The chosen theater of megalomania—the dictatorial—is no longer politics, but entertainment.

45. Why can’t we tolerate stronger sensations? Dissonance? Awkwardness? Genius? Anarchy? … Junkspace heals, or at least that is the assumption of many hospitals.

(p.185)

46. Often heroic in size, planned with the last adrenaline of modernism’s grand inspiration, we have made them (too) human;

47. Junkspace is space as vacation;

(p.186)

48. Junkspace features the office as the urban home, a meeting-boudoir. […] Espace becomes E-space.

49. Globalization turns language into Junkspace. […] Through the retrofitting of language, there are too few plausible words left; our most creative hypotheses will never be formulated, discoveries will remain unmade, concepts unlaunched, philosophies muffled, nuances miscarried … We inhabit sumptuous Potemkin suburbs of weasel terminologies. Aberrant linguistic ecologies sustain virtual subjects in their claim to legitimacy, help them survive … Language is no longer used to explore, define, express, or to confront but to fudge, blur, obfuscate, apologize, and comfort … it stakes claims, assigns victimhood, preempts debate, admits guilt, fosters consensus. […] a Satanic orchestration of the meaningless …

50. Intended for the interior, Junkspace can easily engulf a whole city.

(p.187)

51. Seemingly at the opposite end of Junkspace, the golf course is, in fact, its conceptual double: empty, serene, free of commercial debris. The relative evacuation of the golf course is achieved by the further charging of Junkspace. The methods of their design and realization are similar: erasure, tabula rasa, reconfiguration. Junkspace turns into biojunk; ecology turns into ecospace. Ecology and economy have bonded in Junkspace as ecolomy.

52. Junkspace can be airborne, bring malaria to Sussex;

(p.188)

53. Deprivation can be caused by overdose or shortage; both conditions happen in Junkspace (often at the same time). Minimum is the ultimate ornament, a self-righteous crime, the contemporary Baroque.

54. It does not signify beauty, but guilt.

55. Outside, in the real world, the “art planner” spreads Junkspace’s fundamental incoherence by assigning defunct mythologies to residual surfaces and plotting three-dimensional works in leftover emptiness. Scouting for authenticity, his or her touch seals the fate of what was real, taps it for incorporation in Junkspace.

56. The only legitimate discourse is loss; art replenishes Junkspace in direct proportion to its own morbidity.

(p.189)

57. […] maybe the origins of Junkspace go back to the kindergarten …

58. Will Junkspace invade the body? Through the vibes of the cell phone? Has it already? Through Botox injections? […] Is each of us a mini-construction site? […]

(p.190)

59. Is it [m: mankind] a repertoire of reconfiguration that facilitates the intromission of a new species into its self-made Junksphere? The cosmetic is the new cosmic… ◊

Modernism

JS is about the consequences of modernism for architecture and for urbanism. Koolhaas does not hesitate to explicate it: Modernization, modernism ends in a “meltdown”. As an alternative he offers the “apotheosis”, a particular quality as a Golden Calf of modernization. Within the context of urban life and architectural activities, this outcome shows up as “Junkspace”. The essence of it is emptiness, isolation, splintering, arbitrariness. Its “victory” is named by its offer, entropy, and its essence is continuity. Probably it is meant as kind of a tertiary chaos, vanishing any condition for the possibility of discernability, unfortunately as the final point attractor. We will see.

Koolhaas describes Junkspace as an unintended outcome of a global collective activity. Obviously, Koolhaas is struggling with that, or with the unintendedness of the effect, in other words with emergence and self-organization. Emergence and self-organization can be understood exclusively in the wider context of complexity as we have outlined it previously (see this piece). The concept of complexity as we have constructed it is by no means anti-scientific in a fundamental sense. Yet, it is a severe challenge to scientism as it is practiced today, as our concept explicitly refers to a reflected conceptual embedding, something that is still excluded from natural science today. Anyway, complexity as an explicated concept must be considered as a necessary part of architectural theory, if we take Koolhaas and his writings such as “Junkspace” serious. Without it, we could not make sense of the difference between standardization and homogenization, between uniqueness and singularity, between history and identity, between development and evolution, or between randomness and heterotopia.

Modernism and its effects is the not so hidden agenda of JS. We have to be clear about this concept—at least concerning its foundations, albeit we will not find space enough here for discussing or even just listing its branches that reach not only till Marcuse’s office in Frankfurt—if we want to understand neo-leftist interpretations of JS as that by Jameson (“Future City” [2]), and the not so hidden irony expressed by the resonating label “Future Cities Lab” that denotes the urbanism project of the Department of Architecture (one of the biggest in Europe) of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETHZ). It is also the name of a joint venture between National University of Singapore (NUS) and ETHZ. Yes, they indeed call it Lab(oratory), a place usually producing hives of “petri dishes,” either abandoned (see 7. above) or “containing” the city itself (see section 8.1. of “The Generic City”), and at the same time still, and partially contradictory to its practices, an oratory of modernism. Perhaps. (more about that later).

Latest here we have to address the question:
What is the problem with modernism?

This will be the topic of the next post.

References
  • [1] Rem Koolhaas (2002). Junkspace. October, Vol. 100, “Obsolescence”, pp. 175-190. MIT Press. available here
  • [2] Fredric Jameson, Future City, New Left Review NLR 21, May-June 2003, pp. 65-79. available here

۞

The Generic City — a Précis

July 14, 2012 § Leave a comment

Before we are going to discuss “The Generic City”

we want to provide a selection of its most salient sentences, (almost) without any further comment.

“The Generic City” (TGC) is organized into 17 sections, each comprising one further level of enumerated subsections, consisting often just of a single sentence. This structure and the diction of the piece reminds a bit to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, albeit this resemblance is not substantial to any regards. The status of the writing qua its style is problematic, as we will see later in the dedicated essay. It is probably appropriate to read it just as kind of a dramatization, without much explicit theoretical attitude (despite many perceive it as theoretical  work). For instance, a film or a story may have an end, if we consider them as an event, but a theory certainly does not.

Here I provide all headings and a selection of proposals that can be found in TGC, because I think that it has to be taken as an entirety. This may even be intended by the formal structure. Usually, only single proposals are cited from TGC. I consider this practice as quite problematic. Nobody would cite a single scene from a film of Godard in an attempt to describe Godard’s work. Quite to the contrast, any scene in any film created by Godard may be interpreted only by taking into account all, or at least many, of his films. Such is the quality of the oeuvre of a filmmaker. Extracting a single scene leads almost inevitably to serious misunderstanding. Approaching Koolhaas we have (to try) to respect (t)his particular pragmatics.

This précis should be helpful in our discussion of it in one of the next essays.

The headings of the 17 main sections are:
1. Introduction 2. Statistics 3. General 4. Airport 5. Population  6. Urbanism 7. Politics 8. Sociology 9. Quarters 10. Program 11. Architecture 12. Geography 13. Identity 14. History 15. Infrastructure 16. Culture 17. End.

The selection of my proposals is the following.

1.1. Is the contemporary city like the contemporary airport—”all the same”? Is it possible to theorize this convergence? And if so, to what ultimate configuration is it aspiring? Convergence is possible only at the price of shedding identity. That is usually seen as a loss. But at the scale at which it occurs, it must mean something. What are the disadvantages of identity, and conversely, what are the advantages of blankness? What if this seemingly accidental—and usually regretted—homogenization were an intentional process, a conscious movement away from difference toward similarity? What if we are witnessing a global liberation movement: “down with character!” What is left after identity is stripped? The Generic?
1.6. The Generic City is the city liberated from the captivity of the center, from the straitjacket of  identity.
3.1. The Generic City is what is left after large section of urban life crossed over to cyberspace. […] This pervasive lack of urgency and insistence acts like a potent drug: it induces a hallicunation of the normal.
3.2. The serenity of the Generic City is achieved by the evacuation  of the public realm, as in an emergency fire drill. […] The urban plane now only accommodates necessary movement, fundamentally the car. […] What is new about this locomotive public realm is that it cannot be measured in dimensions.
3.3. The Generic City is fractal, an endless repetition of the same simple structural module.
3.4. Golf courses are all that is left of otherness.
3.6. Its main attraction is its anomic.
4.4. Airports come in two sizes: too big and too small. Yet their size has no influence on their performance.
5.1. The Generic City is seriously multiracial, on average …
5.2. The Generic City is always founded by people on the move, poised to move on. This explains the insubstantiality of their foundations.
6.1. The great originality of the Generic City is simply to abandon what does not work. […] In that sense, the Generic City accommodates both the primordial and the futuristic – in fact, only  these two.
6.2. The Generic City is held together […] by the residual. Supremely inorganic, the organic is the Generic City’s strongest myth.
6.3. The street is dead. […] Public art is everywhere—as if two deaths make a life.
6.4. The Generic city is on its way from horizontality to verticality.[…] All Generic Cities issue from tabula rasa; if there was nothing, now they are there.
6.5. The Generic City is the apotheosis of the multiple-choice concept: all boxes crossed, an anthology of all  the options. […] an arbitrary gene pool that sometimes produces amazing results.
6.9. The writing of the city may be indecipherable, flawed, but that does not mean that there is no  writing; it may simply be that we  developed a new illiteracy, a new blindness.
6.10. The best definition of the aesthetic of the Generic City is “free style”.
6.11. The roads are only for cars.
6.15. The Generic City presents the final death of planning. […] its most dangerous and  most exhilarating discovery is that planning makes no difference whatsoever. […] In this apotheosis of multiple choice it will never be possible again to reconstruct cause and effect. They work—that is all .
7.1. The Generic City has a (sometimes distant) relationship with a more or less authoritarian regime – local or national.
8.1. The Generic City is  sociology, happening. Each Generic City is a petri dish.
9.2. The Generic City had a past, once.
9.3. The In spite of its absence, history is the major preoccupation, even industry, of the Generic City.
9.4. Instead of specific memories, the associations the Generic City mobilizes are general memories, memories of memories: […] a déjà vu that never ends […]
9.8. Each Generic City has a waterfront, not necessarily with water—it can also be with desert, for instance—but at least an edge where it meets another condition […]
10.2. The only activity is shopping.
10.3. Hotels are becoming the generic accommodation of the Generic City, its most common building block. […] they are closest we have to urban existence.
10.4. The hotel now implies imprisonment.
11.2. The architecture of the Generic City is by definition beautiful.
11.4. Like everything else in the Generic City, its architecture is […] an epidemic of yielding no longer through the application of principle but through the systematic application of the unprincipled.
11.5. The Generic City elevates mediocrity to a higher level.
11.10. The style of choice is postmodern, and will always remain so. Postmodernism is the only movement that has succeeded in connecting the practice of architecture with the practice of panic. Postmodernism is not a doctrine […] but a method […]. […] it creates unconsciousness.
11.12. Is there a connection between the predominance of mirror in the Generic City […] and the “gifts” that […] were supposed to be the most efficient prsent for savages?
11.13. the infinite variety of the Generic City comes close […] to making variety normal [m: if not boring]: banalized, in a reversal of expectation, it is repetition that has become unusual, therefore, potentially, daring, exhilarating.
13.1. There is a calculated (?) redundancy in the iconography that the Generic City adopts.

14.1. Regret about history’s absence is a tiresome reflex. It exposes an unspoken consensus that history’s presence is desirable. […] A city is a plane inhabited in the most efficient way by people and processes, […] the presence of history only drags down its performance.
14.2. History present obstructs the pure exploitation of its theoretical value as absence.
14.3. The Generic City, like a sketch which is never elaborated, is not improved but abandoned. The idea of  layering, intensification, completion are alien to it. it has  no layers.
15.1. Instead of network and organism, the new infrastructure creates enclave and impasse: no longer the grand récit  but the parasitic swerve.
15.2. Infrastructure is no longer a […] response to a […] need but a strategic weapon, a prediction.
16.1. Only the redundant counts.
17.1. Imagine a Hollywood movie about the bible. […] Market scene: […] Now switch off the sound […] and reverse the film. The […] men and women stumble backward; the viewer no longer registers only humans but begins to note spaces between them. The center empties. […] Silence is now reinforced by emptiness. Relief …it’s over. That is the story of the city. The city is no longer. We can leave the theater now. ◊

Well, that’s it. I think it would be a misunderstanding to ask whether Koolhaas praises the advent of the Generic City or lament about it. It is also quite clear that this piece is not a theoretical work, despite the second sentence in the first paragraph (1.1.). It looks more like a script, or even a report about an unexplicated script of a not yet realized film. Actually, it is somehow very surprising that people indeed take this piece literally, whether they praise it or complain about it, as if it would describe obvious empirical “facts”!

If we take it as a script, or the report about such, the “genericity” of the theme spills over to the plot and the performance of the report and creates (dis-)harmonically breaking echoes. A script is generic with respect to the film. The report, however, treats it as a “fact”.

How could the explicated script look like? The first narrative level of that putative film would be some love story or crime story, or both together, like in Godard’s Alphaville, yet presumably in the back-office of a rhizomatic hotel, which spreads unpredictably above and beneath the “surface”. The castle, update version 7.004.
The second narrative level could be imagined as directed towards a hypothetical or phantastic Form of Life (Lebensform) in the near future, not so much different from our own. The third level of the narration would reflect the core concepts of  “The Generic City”, demonstrating their implications to the unfolding of human social and political activities. A potential forth level could demonstrate the emergent result of those activities, as emergence in the spectators minds, triggered by the film: Junkspace.

My point being here, that the genericity as it is implied by TGC requires a lot of work in order to find some actualization by constructing an instantiation. Neglecting or overlooking this necessity is not only an abundant trait in our contemporary society. It is even essential part of the whole program of modernism. We will discuss this in much more detail over here. Some years later, in the essay “Junkspace” (which we introduce in the sequel), Koolhaas critizes the modernist attitude more distinctly and visibly, on a more representational level.

To put it more directly: imho, it amounts to a drastic misunderstanding to regard the description from TGC as a description or even prescription of an actual city. It would be the same as to regard Gotham City, Alphaville or Blade Runner’s Los Angeles as actual cities. This misunderstanding can be comprehended as a response provoked by the typical belief set of modernism. It is funny to see that Koolhaas triggered that response apparently as an intended effect, perhaps fostered by the seemingly representational or even analytic-looking series of headings.

As the cinema film, whether produced in Hollywood or as “independent”, provides the possibility for processes of symbolization, TGC does as well. It exaggerates, densifies, draws in black and white what otherwise would remain fuzzy, unsayable, and unspoken. In some way, Koolhaas is a perhaps close relative of Jaques Tati, and TGC then would be the most recent sibling of “Play Time“. Even the title is already multi-faceted, invoking relations from Wittgenstein to the kindergarten.

The obvious reference to the genre of films opens a further important line of interpretation, a whole problematic field: time. Usually, time is not treated as a topic of its own significance in architecture, it is just a parameter, often even not mentioned at all. In the film, however, and historically at first in the cinema, time is not only shown through kinetics (moving bodies). Instead, cinema invented an image of time itself, as Deleuze has been demonstrating so lucidly [2]. Hence, Koolhaas’ writing “The Generic City” could be interpreted also as an implicit critique of “timeless” architecture or urbanism. Such, he would follow Aldo Rossi in his critique of modernism regarding the role of time [3].

Quite obviously, current conceptions of change in the city, or more general, of urban arrangements, follow the representational image of time, a kinetic image. At best, one would have to add, as urbanism can’t deal appropriately with shrinking cities, and what is called urban waste. It is rather telling that it is not called “urban fallow”, as in agriculture, where the fallow is part of a culture of change and cultivation. To put it directly: urbanism is lacking a theory of change, differenciation and differentiation.

This way, Koolhaas sails as an ex-static ex-modern replicate of Odysseus in the mare praespecificum, where the stars are projected to the sky each night in different constellations, where one could expect only islands of stability, inhabited by deceivingly hospitable syrenes.

This article has been created on July 14th, 2012, and has been republished in an extended form on July 26th, 2012.

References
  • [1] Rem Koolhaas, “The Generic City”. in: O.M.A., Rem Koolhaas, Bruce Mau (eds.), S, M, L, XL. Monacelli Press, 1995, p.1248-1264. available here
  • [2] Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2 – The Time Image. Athlone Press, London 1989.
  • [3] Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the City. MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.) 1982 [1966].

۞

Forms of Life

July 12, 2012 § Leave a comment

It’s Time to Change. At least a bit.

And at least, again.

As readers of this blog, you may already know that I easily exhibit my preferences to the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, as well as that of Gilles Deleuze. The former is known as a philosopher of language. The latter is not yet known as a philosopher of biology, especially of evolution. Both did not explain their subject. They worked with it. Of course, both of them did lots of other things as well. Anyway.

We started this blog as an investigation of some aspects of the future of machines. Hopefully, we came close(r) to what could be called philosophy. At least with regard to the two guys mentioned above I feel that I worked on their foundations. A gnome on the shoulders of giants, perhaps. Anyway.

Philosophy without reference to life and its forms remains irrelevant. “What is philosophy?” Deleuze and Guattari asked towards the end of the last century. What “is” it, indeed? A technique? A cure? A style? Touching the wall and stepping across the border? Sustainably practiced consciousness while talking to someone else? Maybe. We can feel clearly that the simplicity of this question is somewhat deceiving.

In the future, we will refer to the concepts we discussed (discovered? (re-)invented?) in the previous essays, using them to comment on things I come across. Contingently.

One of these areas is architecture, or to be more precise, urbanism. To me it seems, that there is only very little, and if, quite limited theory in this field. I mean, there are tons of models around, but almost no theory. Even in the Koolhaas’ writings, e.g. in Singapore Songlines. AMO/OMA does a lot of empiric research, into many directions, but where he refers to concepts like semiotics, he falls behind. Architects or so-called theoreticians in architecture often import certain patterns such as semiotics, grammar from linguistics, sociological stuff like feminism or the “inevitable” critique of capitalism. But these imports do not represent theory in architecture, as theory not only provides a frame for modeling, it provides a deep milieu with its own dimensionality (see this for more details), which would include the awareness about the style that shows up in ones own modeling. The pretended theories are merely templates for the interpretation of endless lists of phenomena. Some even try to turn architecture into a science. Or into some kind of machine. Or into some kind of psychoanalysis. All of this can’t provide theories, as little as historical accounts can do. We will hence deal (again) with the question about theory (in architecture).

Architecture is at the crossroads. Has been sitting on the crossing of roads now for quite some time. Probably since Versailles, or S,M,L,XL. Probably since Pruitt-Igoe and its blast. Or Venturi’s visit in Las Vegas. Who knows. Architecture always behaved as a crystallization site, a catalysatory seed of growth and differentiation for Forms of Life into which it was embedded and to which it has been contributing (Of course, that story is mutual one.). The visible part of all those sediments, strata, and layers that we call history of culture.

Yet, things started to change, I think. Architecture and its products do neither provide something (as functions) nor represent anything anymore. Hence, it is probably misplaced to ask about the any in architecture (see the “any conferences”). The stuff got active. Or will, or is currently becoming active. That stuff came to life. And this issue we can’t leave uncommented! Wittgenstein and Deleuze will contribute through my assimilations.

There is more than one aspect that these developments in the domains of architecture or urbanism share with our original topic of machine-based episteme or machines with mental capabilities. If you are a programmer, you probably know about the concept of “design patterns”. That concept has been introduced into architecture by Christopher Alexander, who originally has been trained as a mathematician. Remarkably, he also referred to behavioral sciences. Besides that there was of course also the notion of the “city as a machine”, or, some time ago, the “city as organism”. Both metaphors have probably been taken too serious at their time. Yet, Koolhaas, in the already mentioned Singapore Songline stated:

I have tried to decipher its reverse alchemy, understand its genealogy, do an architectural genome project, re-create its architectural songlines.” [p.1017, his emphasis]

My impression is that Koolhaas tried to find some structural analogue which would allow him to impose some reasonable order onto his empirical findings. Yet, he did not express it in this way. Maybe due to a missing theory. The problem with the genome is, well, it’s not really a “problem”, at least not for a biologist, that a genome needs an apparatus for translation, an egg, a mother. Which is the kind of relations between the female and the machine, here?

Honestly, Koolhaas also brings in the conceptual pattern of the songline. Did he refer to popular music of our times? Or that of Mozart and the particular relations between the libretto and the music? In any way, the songline is in utter need of the music. Unfortunately, Koolhaas does never ask about the music of the city, the music that the city is playing. Otherwise we would have met the composer Johannes Sistermanns, or he would have discovered the power of associativity (as an abstract concept).

Such, the first piece(s) will be a reconsideration of Koolhaas quite influential writings “Generic City“, “JunkSpace” and “Singapore Songlines”.
۞

The Text Machine

July 10, 2012 § Leave a comment

What is the role of texts? How do we use them (as humans)?

How do we access them (as reading humans)? The answers to such questions seem to be pretty obvious. Almost everybody can read. Well, today. Noteworthy, reading itself, as a performance and regarding its use, changed dramatically at least two times in history: First, after the invention of the vocal alphabet in ancient Greece, and the second time after book printing became abundant during the 16th century. Maybe, the issue around reading isn’t so simple as it seems in everyday life.

Beyond such accounts of historical issues and basic experiences, we have a lot of more theoretical results concerning texts. Beginning with Friedrich Schleiermacher who was the first to identify hermeneutics as a subject around 1830 and formulated it in a way that has been considered as more complete and powerful than the version proposed by Gadamer in the 1950ies. Proceeding of course with Wittgenstein (language games, rule following), Austin (speech act theory) or Quine (criticizing empirism). Philosophers like John Searle, Hilary Putnam and Robert Brandom then explicating and extending the work of the former heroes. And those have been accompanied by many others. If you wonder about linguistics missing here, well, then because linguistics does not provide theories about language. Today, the domain is largely caught by positivism and the corresponding analytic approach.

Here in his little piece we pose these questions in the context of certain relations between machines and texts. There are a lot of such relations, and even quite sophisticated or surprising ones. For instance, texts can be considered as kind of machines. Yet, they bear a certain note of (virtual) agency as well, resulting in a considerable non-triviality of this machine aspect of texts. Here we will not deal with this perspective. Instead, we just will take a look on the possibilities and the respective practices to handle or to “treat” texts with machines. Or, if you prefer, the treating of texts by machines, as far as a certain autonomy of machines could be considered as necessary to deal with texts at all.

Today, we can find a fast growing community of computer programmers that are dealing with texts as kind of unstructured information. One of the buzz-words is the so-called “semantic web”, another one is “sentiment analysis”. We won’t comment in any detail about those movements, because they are deeply flawed. The first one is trying to formalize semantics and meaning apriori, trying to render the world into a trivial machine. We repeatedly criticized this and we agree herein with Douglas Hofstadter. (see this discussion of his “Fluid Analogy”). The second is trying to identify the sentiment of a text or a “tweet”, e.g. about a stock or an organization, on the basis of statistical measures about keywords and their utterly naive “n-grammed” versions, without actually paying any notice to the problem of “understanding”. Such nonsense would not be as widespread if programmers would read only a few fundamental philosophical texts about language. In fact, they don’t, and thus they are condemned to visit any of the underdeveloped positions that arose centuries ago.

If we neglect the social role of texts for a moment, we might identify a single major role of texts, albeit we have to describe it then in rather general terms. We may say that the role of a text, as a specimen of many other texts from a large population, is its functioning as a medium for the externalization of mental content in order to serve the ultimate purpose, which consists of the possibility for a (re)construction of resembling mental content on the side of the interpreting person.

This interpretation is a primacy. It is not possible to assign meaning to text like a sticky note, then putting the text including the yellow sticky note directly into the recipients brain. That may sound silly, but unfortunately it’s the “theory” followed by many people working in the computer sciences. Interpretation can’t be controlled completely, though, not even by the mind performing it, not even by the same mind who seconds before externalized the text through writing or speaking.

Now, the notion of mental content may seem both quite vague and hopelessly general as well. Yet, in the previous chapter we introduced a structure, the choreostemic space, which allows to speak pretty precise about mental content. Note that we don’t need to talk about semantics, meaning or references to “objects” here. Mental content is not a “state” either. Thinking “state” and the mental together is much on the same stage as to seriously considering the existence of sea monsters in the end of 18th century, when the list science of Linnaeus was not yet reshaped by the upcoming historical turn in the philosophy of nature. Nowadays we must consider it as silly-minded to think about a complex story like the brain and its mind by means of “state”. Doing so, one confounds the stability of the graphical representation of a word in a language with the complexity of a multi-layered dynamic process, spanned between deliberate randomness, self-organized rhythmicity and temporary thus preliminary meta-stability.

The notion of mental content does not refer to the representation of referenced “objects”. We do not have maps, lists or libraries in our heads. Everything which we experience as inner life builds up from an enormous randomness through deep stacks of complex emergent processes, where each emergent level is also shaped from top-down, implicitly and, except the last one usually called “consciousness,” also explicitly. The stability of memory and words, of feelings and faculties is deceptive, they are not so stable at all.  Only their externalized symbolic representations are more or less stable, their stability as words etc.  can be shattered easily. The point we would like to emphasize here is that everything that happens in the mind is constructed on the fly, while the construction is completed only with the ultimate step of externalization, that is, speaking or writing. The notion of “mental content” is thus a bit misleading.

The mental may be conceived most appropriately as a manifold of stacked and intertwined processes. This holds for the naturalist perspective as well as for the abstract perspective, as he have argued in the previous chapter. It is simply impossible to find a single stable point within the (abstract) dynamics between model, concept, mediality and virtuality, which could be thought of as spanning a space. We called it the choreostemic space.

For the following remarks about the relation between text and machines and the practitioners engaged in building machines to handle texts we have to keep in mind just those two things: (i) there is a primacy of interpretation, (ii) the mental is a non-representative dynamic process that can’t be formalized (in the sense of “being represented” by a formula).

In turn this means that we should avoid to refer to formulas when going to build a “text machine”. Text machines will be helpful only if their understanding of texts, even if it is a rudimentary understanding, follows the same abstract principles as our human understanding of texts does. Machines pretending to deal with texts, but actually only moving dead formal symbols back and forth, as it is the case in statistical text mining, n-gram based methods and similar, are not helpful at all. The only thing that happens is that these machines introduce a formalistic structure into our human life. We may say that these techniques render humans helpful to machines.

Nowadays we can find a whole techno-scientific community that is engaged in the field of machine learning, devised to “textual data”. The computers are programmed in such a way that they can be used to classify texts. The idea is to provide some keywords, or anti-words, or even a small set of sample texts, which then are taken by the software as a kind of template that is used to build a selection model. This model then is used to select resembling texts from a large set of texts. We have to be very clear about the purpose of these software programs: they classify texts.

The input data for doing so is taken from the texts themselves. More precisely, they are preprocessed according to specialized methods. Each of the texts gets described by a possibly large set of “features” that have been extracted by these methods. The obvious point is that the procedure is purely empirical in the strong sense. Only the available observations (the texts) are taken to infer the “similarity” between texts. Usually, not even linguistic properties are used to form the empirical observations, albeit there are exceptions. People use the so-called n-gram approach, which is only little more than counting letters. It is a zero-knowledge model about the series of symbols, which humans interpret as text. Additionally, the frequency or relative positions of keywords and anti-words are usually measured and expressed by mostly quite simple statistical methods.

Well, classifying texts is something that is quite different from understanding texts. Of course. Yet, said community tries to reproduce the “classification” achieved or produced by humans. Such, any of the engineers of the field of machine learning directed to texts implicitly claims kind of an understanding. They even organize competitions.

The problems with the statistical approach are quite obvious. Quine called it the dogma of empiricism and coined the Gavagai anecdote about it, which even provides much more information than the text alone. In order to understand a text we need references to many things outside the particular text(s) at hand. Two of those are especially salient: concepts and the social dimension. Straightly opposite to the believe of positivists, concepts can’t be defined in advance to a particular interpretation. Using catalogs of references does not help much, if these catalogs are used just as lists of references. The software does not understand “chair” by the “definition” stored in a database, or even by the set of such references. It simply does not care whether there are encoded ASCII codes that yield the symbol “chair” or the symbol “h&e%43”. Douglas Hofstadter has been stressing this point over and over again, and we fully agree to that.

From that necessity to a particular and rather wide “background” (notion by Searle) the second problem derives, which is much more serious, even devastating to the soundness of the whole empirico-statistical approach. The problem is simple: Even we humans have to read a text before being able to understand it. Only upon understanding we could classify it. Of course, the brain of many people is trained sufficiently as to work about the relations of the texts and any of its components while reading the text. The basic setup of the problem, however, remains the same.

Actually, what is happening is a constantly repeated re-reading of the text, taking into account all available insights regarding the text and the relations of it to the author and the reader, while this re-reading often takes place in the memory. To perform this demanding task in parallel, based on the “cache” available from memory, requires a lot of experience and training, though. Less experienced people indeed re-read the text physically.

The consequence of all of that is that we could not determine the best empirical discriminators for a particular text in-the-reading in order to select it as-if we would use a model. Actually, we can’t determine the set of discriminators before we have read it all, at least not before the first pass. Let us call this the completeness issue.

The very first insight is thus that a one-shot approach in text classification is based on a misconception. The software and the human would have to align to each other in some kind of conversation. Otherwise it can’t be specified in principle what the task is, that is, which texts should actually be selected. Any approach to text classification not following the “conversation scheme” is necessarily bare nonsense. Yet, that’s not really a surprise (except for some of the engineers).

There is a further consequence of the completeness issue. We can’t set up a table to learn from at all. This too is not a surprise, since setting up a table means to set up a particular symbolization. Any symbolization apriori to understanding must count as a hypothesis. Such simple. Whether it matches our purpose or not, we can’t know before we didn’t understand the text.

However, in order to make the software learning something we need assignates (traditionally called “properties”) and some criteria to distinguish better models from less performant models. In other words, we need a recurrent scheme on the technical level as well.

That’s why it is not perfectly correct to call texts “unstructured data”. (Besides the fact that data are not “out there”: we always need a measurement device, which in turn implies some kind of model AND some kind of theory.) In the case of texts, imposing a structure onto a text simply means to understand it. We even could say that a text as text is not structurable at all, since the interpretation of a text can’t never be regarded as finished.

All together, we may summarize the issue of complexity of texts as deriving from the following properties in the following way:

  • – there are different levels of context, which additionally stretch across surrounds of very different sizes;
  • – there are rich organizational constraints, e.g. grammars
  • – there is a large corpus of words, while any of them bears meaning only upon interpretation;
  • – there is a large number of relations that not only form a network, but which also change dynamically in the course of reading and of interpretation;
  • – texts are symbolic: spatial neighborhood does not translate into reference, in neither way;
  • understanding of texts requires a wealth of external, and quite abstract-concepts, that appear as significant only upon interpretation, as well as a social embedding of mutual interpretation,.

This list should at least exclude any attempt to defend the empirico-statistical approach as a reasonable one. Except the fact that it conveys a better-than-nothing attitude. These brings us to the question of utility.

Engineers build machines that are supposedly useful, more exactly, they are intended to be fulfill a particular purpose. Mostly, however, machines, even any technology in general, is useful only upon processes of subjective appropriation. The most striking example for this is the car. Else, computers have evolved not for reasons of utility, but rather for gaming. Video did not become popular for artistic reasons or for commercial ones, but due to the possibilities the medium offered for the sex industry. The lesson here being that an intended purpose is difficult to achieve as of the actual usage of the technology. On the other hand, every technology may exert some gravitational forces to develop a then unintended symbolic purpose and regarding that even considerable value. So, could we agree that the classification of texts as it is performed by contemporary technology is useful?

Not quite. We can’t regard the classification of texts as it is possible with the empirico-statistical approach as a reasonable technology. For the classification of texts can’t be separated from their understanding. All we can accomplish by this approach is to filter out those texts that do not match our interests with a sufficiently high probability. Yet, for this task we do not need text classification.

Architectures like 3L-SOM could also be expected to play an important role in translation, as translation requires even deeper understanding of texts as it is needed for sorting texts according to a template.

Besides the necessity for this doubly recurrent scheme we haven’t said much so far here about how then actually to treat the text. Texts should not be mistaken as empiric data. That means that we have to take a modified stance regarding measurement itself. In several essays we already mentioned the conceptual advantages of the two-layered (TL) approach based on self-organizing maps (TL-SOM). We already described in detail how the TL-SOM works, including the the basic preparation of the random graph as it has been described by Kohonen.

The important thing about TL-SOM is that it is not a device for modeling the similarity of texts. It is just a representation, even as it is a very powerful one, because it is based on probabilistic contexts (random graphs). More precisely, it is just one of many possible representations, even as it is much more appropriate than n-gram and other jokes. We even should NOT consider the TL-SOM as so-called “unsupervised modeling”, as the distinction between unsupervised vs. supervised is just another myth (=nonsense if it comes to quantitative models). The TL-SOM is nothing else than an instance for associative storage.

The trick of using a random graph (see the link above) is that the surrounds of words are differentially represented as well. The Kohonen model is quite scarce in this respect, since it applies a completely neutral model. In fact, words in a text are represented as if they would be all the same: of the same kind, of the same weight, etc. That’s clearly not reasonable. Instead, we should represent a word in several, different manners into the same SOM.

Yet, the random graph approach should not be considered just as a “trick”. We repeatedly argued (for instance here) that we have to “dissolve” empirical observations into a probabilistic (re)presentation in order to evade and to avoid the pseudo-problem of “symbol grounding”. Note that even by the practice of setting up a table in order to organize “data” we are already crossing the rubicon into the realm of the symbolic!

The real trick of the TL-SOM, however, is something completely different. The first layer represents the random graph of all words, the actual pre-specific sorting of texts, however, is performed by the second layer on the output of the first layer. In other words, the text is “renormalized”, the SOM itself is used as a measurement device. This renormalization allows to organize data in a standardized manner while allowing to avoid the symbolic fallacy. To our knowledge, this possible usage of the renormalization principle has not been recognized so far. It is indeed a very important principle that puts many things in order. We will deal later in a separate contribution with this issue again.

Only based on the associative storage taken as an entirety appropriate modeling is possible for textual data. The tremendous advantage of that is that the structure for any subsequent consideration now remains constant. We may indeed set up a table. The content of this table, the data, however is not derived directly from the text. Instead we first apply renormalization (a technique known from quantum physics, cf. [1])

The input is some description of the text completely in terms of the TL-SOM. More explicit, we have to “observe” the text as it behaves in the TL-SOM. Here, we are indeed legitimized to treat the text as an empirical observation, albeit we can, of course, observe the text in many different ways. Yet, observing means to conceive the text as a moving target, as a series of multitudes.

One of the available tools is Markov modeling, either as Markov chains, or by means of Hidden Markov Models. But there are many others. Most significantly, probabilistic grammars, even probabilistic phrase structure grammars can be mapped onto Markov models. Yet, again we meet the problem of apriori classification. Both models, Markovian as well as grammarian, need an assignment of grammatical type to a phrase, which often first requires understanding.

Given the autonomy of text, their temporal structure and the impossibility to apply apriori schematism, our proposal is that we just have to conceive of the text like we do of (higher) animals. Like an animal in its habitat, we may think of the text as inhabiting the TL-SOM, our associative storage. We can observe paths, their length and form, preferred neighborhoods, velocities, size and form of habitat.

Similar texts will behave in a similar manner. Such similarity is far beyond (better: as if from another planet) the statistical approach. We also can see now that the statistical approach is being trapped by the representationalist fallacy. This similarity is of course a relative one. The important point here is that we can describe texts in a standardized manner strictly WITHOUT reducing their content to statistical measures. It is also quite simple to determine the similarity of texts, whether as a whole, or whether regarding any part of it. We need not determine the range of our source at all apriori to the results of modeling. That modeling introduces a third logical layer. We may apply standard modeling, using a flexible tool for transformation and a further instance of a SOM, as we provide it as SomFluid in the downloads. The important thing is that this last step of modeling has to run automatically.

The proposed structure keeps any kind of reference completely intact. It also draws on its collected experience, that is, all texts it have been digesting before. It is not necessary to determine stopwords and similar gimmicks. Of course, we could, but that’s part of the conversation. Just provide an example of any size, just as it is available. Everything from two words, to a sentence, to a paragraph, to the content of a directory will work.

Such a 3L-SOM is very close to what we reasonably could call “understanding texts”. But does it really “understand”?

As such, not really. First, images should be stored in the same manner (!!), that is, preprocessed as random graphs over local contexts of various size, into the same (networked population of) SOM(s). Second, a language production module would be needed. But once we have those parts working together, then there will be full understanding of texts.

(I take any reasonable offer to implement this within the next 12 months, seriously!)

Conclusion

Understanding is a faculty to move around in a world of symbols. That’s not meant as a trivial issue. First, the world consists of facts, where facts comprise an universe of dynamic relations. Symbols are just not like traffic signs or pictograms as these belong to the more simple kind of symbols. Symbolizing is a complex, social, mediatized diachronic process.

Classifying, understood as “performing modeling and applying models” consists basically of two parts. One of them could be automated completely, while the other one could not treated by a finite or apriori definable set of rules at all: setting the purpose. In the case of texts, classifying can’t be separated from understanding, because the purpose of the text emerges only upon interpretation, which in turn requires a manifold of modeling raids. Modeling a (quasi-)physical system is completely different from that, it is almost trivial. Yet, the structure of a 3L-SOM could well evolve into an arrangement that is capable to understand in a similar way as we humans do. More precisely, and a bit more abstract, we also could say, that a “system” based on a population of 3L-SOM once will be able to navigate in the choreostemic space.

References
  • [1] B. Delamotte (2003). A hint of renormalization. Am.J.Phys. 72 (2004) 170-184, available online: arXiv:hep-th/0212049v3.

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