A Deleuzean Move

June 24, 2012 § Leave a comment

It is probably one of the main surprises in the course of

growing up as a human that in the experience of consciousness we may meet things like unresolvable contradictions, thoughts that are incommensurable, thoughts that lead into contradictions or paradoxes, or thoughts that point to something which is outside of the possibility of empirical, so to speak “direct” experience. All these experiences form a particular class of experience. For one or the other reason, these issues are issues of mental itself. We definitely have to investigate them, if we are going to talk about things like machine-based episteme, or the urban condition, which will be the topic of the next few essays.

There have been only very few philosophers1 who have been embracing paradoxicality without getting caught by antinomies and paradoxes in one or another way.2 Just to be clear: Getting caught by paradoxes is quite easy. For instance, by violating the validity of the language game you have been choosing. Or by neglecting virtuality. The first of these avenues into persistent states of worries can be observed in sciences and mathematics3, while the second one is more abundant in philosophy. Fortunately, playing with paradoxicality without getting trapped by paradoxes is not too difficult either. There is even an incentive to do so.

Without paradoxicality it is not possible to think about beginnings, as opposed to origins. Origins­­—understood as points of {conceptual, historical, factual} departure—are set for theological, religious or mystical reasons, which by definition are always considered as bearer of sufficient reason. To phrase it more accurately, the particular difficulty consists in talking about beginnings as part of an open evolution without universal absoluteness, hence also without the need for justification at any time.

Yet, paradoxicality, the differential of actual paradoxes, could form stable paradoxes only if possibility is mixed up with potentiality, as it is for instance the case for perspectives that could be characterised as reductionist or positivist. Paradoxes exist strictly only within that conflation of possibility and potentiality. Hence, if a paradox or antinomy seems to be stable, one always can find an implied primacy of negativity in lieu of the problematic field spawned and spanned by the differential. We thus can observe the pouring of paradoxes also if the differential is rejected or neglected, as in Derrida’s approach, or the related functionalist-formalist ethics of the Frankfurt School, namely that proposed by Habermas [4]. Paradoxes are like knots that always can be untangled in higher dimensions. Yet, this does NOT mean that everything could be smoothly tiled without frictions, gaps or contradictions.

Embracing the paradoxical thus means to deny the linear, to reject the origin and the absolute, the centre points [6] and the universal. We may perceive remote greetings from Nietzsche here4. Perhaps, you already may have classified the contextual roots of these hints: It is Gilles Deleuze to whom we refer here and who may well be regarded as the first philosopher of open evolution, the first one who rejected idealism without sacrificing the Idea.5

In the hands of Deleuze—or should we say minds?—paradoxicality does neither actualize into paradoxes nor into idealistic dichotomic dialectics. A structural(ist) and genetic dynamism first synthesizes the Idea, and by virtue of the Idea as well as the space and time immanent to the Idea paradoxicality turns productive.7

Philosophy is revealed not by good sense but by paradox. Paradox is the pathos or the passion of philosophy. There are several kinds of paradox, all of which are opposed to the complementary forms of orthodoxy – namely, good sense and common sense. […] paradox displays the element which cannot be totalised within a common element, along with the difference which cannot be equalised or cancelled at the direction of a good sense. (DR227)

As our title already indicates, we not only presuppose and start with some main positions and concepts of Deleuzean philosophy, particularly those he once developed in Difference and Repetition (D&R)8. There will be more details later9. We10 also attempt to contribute some “genuine” aspects to it. In some way, our attempt could be conceived as a development being an alternative to part V in D&R, entitled “Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible”.

This Essay

Throughout the collection of essays about the “Putnam Program” on this site we expressed our conviction that future information technology demands for an assimilation of philosophy by the domain of computer sciences (e.g. see the superb book by David Blair “Wittgenstein, Language and Information” [47]). There are a number of areas—of both technical as well as societal or philosophical relevance—which give rise to questions that already started to become graspable, not just in the computer sciences. How to organize the revision of beliefs?11 What is the structure of the “symbol grounding problem”? How to address it? Or how to avoid the fallacy of symbolism?12 Obviously we can’t tackle such questions without the literacy about concepts like belief or symbol, which of course can’t be reduced to a merely technical notion. Beliefs, for instance, can’t be reduced to uncertainty or its treatment, despite there is already some tradition in analytical philosophy, computer sciences or statistics to do so. Else, with the advent of emergent mental capabilities in machines ethical challenges appear. These challenges are on both sides of the coin. They relate to the engineers who are creating such instances as well as to lawyers who—on the other side of the spectrum—have to deal with the effects and the properties of such entities, and even “users” that have to build some “theory of mind” about them, some kind of folk psychology.

And last but not least, just the externalization of informational habits into machinal contexts triggers often pseudo-problems and “deep” confusion.13 Examples for such confusion are the question about the borders of humanity, i.e. as kind of a defense war fought by anthropology, or the issue of artificiality. Where does the machine end and where does the domain of the human start? How can we speak reasonably about “artificiality”, if our brain/mind remains still dramatically non-understood and thus implicitly is conceived by many as kind of a bewildering nature? And finally, how to deal with technological progress: When will computer scientists need self-imposed guidelines similar to those geneticists ratified for their community in 1974 during the Asimolar Conferences? Or are such guidelines illusionary or misplaced, because we are weaving ourselves so intensively into our new informational carpets—made from multi- or even meta-purpose devices—that are righteous flying carpets?

There is also a clearly recognizable methodological reason  for bringing the inventioneering of advanced informational “machines” and philosophy closer together. The domain of machines with advanced mental capabilities—I deliberately avoid the traditional term of “artificial intelligence”—, let us abbreviate it MMC, acquires ethical weight in itself. MMC establishes a subjective Lebenswelt (life form) that is strikingly different from ours and which we can’t understand analytically any more (if at all)14. The challenge then is how to talk about this domain? We should not repeat the same fallacy as anthropology and anthropological philosophy have been committing since Kant, where human measures have been applied (and still are up today) to “nature”. If we are going to compare two different entities we need a differential position from which both can be instantiated. Note that no resemblance can be expected between the instances, nor between the instances and the differential. That differential is a concept, or an idea, and as such it can’t be addressed by any kind of technical perspective. Hence, questions of mode of speaking can’t be conceived as a technical problem, especially not for the domain of MMC, also due to the implied self-referentiality of the mental itself.

Taken together, we may say that our motivation follows two lines. Firstly, the concern is about the problematic field, the problem space itself, about the possibility that problems could become visible at all. Secondly, there is a methodological position characterisable as a differential that is necessary to talk about the subject of incommensurable that are equipped entities with mental capacities.15

Both directions and all related problems can be addressed in the same single move, so at least is our proposal. The goal of this essay is the introduction and a brief discussion of a still emerging conceptual structure that may be used as an image of thought, or likewise as a tool in the sense of an almost formal mental procedure, helping to avoid worries about the diagnosis—or supporting it—of the challenges opened by the new technologies. Of course, it will turn out that the result is not just applicable to the domain of philosophy of technology.

In the following we will introduce a unique structure that has been inspired not only from heterogeneous philosophical sources. Those stretch from Aristotle to Peirce, from Spinoza to Wittgenstein, and from Nietzsche to Deleuze, to name but a few, just to give you an impression what mindset you could expect. Another important source is mathematics, yet not used as a ready-made system for formal reasoning, but rather as a source for a certain way of thinking. Last, but not least, biology is contributing as the home of the organon, of complexity, of evolution, and, more formally, on self-referentiality. The structure we will propose as a starting point that appears merely technical, thus arbitrary, and at the same time it draws upon the primary amalgamate of the virtual and the immanent. Its paradoxicality consists in its potential to describe the “pure” any, the Idea that comprises any beginning. Its particular quality as opposed to any other paradoxicality is caused by a profound self-referentiality that simultaneously leads to its vanishing, its genesis and its own actualization. In this way, the proposed structure solves a challenge that is considered by many throughout the history of philosophy to be one of the most serious one. The challenge in question is that of sufficient reason, justification and conditionability. To be more precise, that challenge is not solved, it is more correct to say that it is dissolved, made disappear. In the end, the problem of sufficient reason will be marked as a pseudo-problem.

Here, a small remark is necessary to be made to the reader. Finally, after some weeks of putting this down, it turned out as a matter of fact that any (more or less) intelligible way of describing the issues exceeds the classical size of a blog entry. After all, now it comprises approx. 150’000 characters (incl white space), which would amount to 42+ pages on paper. So, it is more like a monograph. Still, I feel that there are many important aspects left out. Nevertheless I hope that you enjoy reading it.

The following provides you a table of content (active links) for the remainder of this essay:

2. Brief Methodological Remark

As we already noted, the proposed structure is self-referential. Self-referentiality also means that all concepts and structures needed for an initial description will be justified by the working of the structure, in other words, by its immanence. Actually, similarly to the concept of the Idea in D&R, virtuality and immanence come very close to each other, they are set to be co-generative. As an Idea, the proposed structure is complete. As any other idea, it needs to be instantiated into performative contexts, thus it is to be conceived as an entirety, yet neither as a completeness nor as a totality. Yet, its self-referentiality allows for and actually also generates a “self-containment” that results in a fractal mirroring of itself, in a self-affine mapping. Metaphorically, it is a concept that develops like the leaf of a fern. Superficially, it could look like a complete and determinate entirety, but it is not, similar to area-covering curves in mathematics. Those fill a 2-dimensional area infinitesimally, yet, with regard to their production system they remain truly 1-dimensional. They are a fractal, an entity to which we can’t apply ordinal dimensionality. Such, our concept also develops into instances of fractal entirety.

For these reasons, it would be also wrong to think that the structure we will describe in a moment is “analytical”, despite it is possible to describe its “frozen” form by means of references to mathematical concepts. Our structure must be understood as an entity that is not only not neutral or invariant against time. It forms its own sheafs of time (as I. Prigogine described it) Analytics is always blind against its generative milieu. Analytics can’t tell anything about the world, contrary to a widely exercised opinion. It is not really a surprise that Putnam recommended to reduce the concept of “analytic” to “an inexplicable noise”. Very basically it is a linear endeavor that necessarily excludes self-referentiality. Its starting point is always based on an explicit reference to kind of apparentness, or even revelation. Analytics not only presupposes a particular logic, but also conflates transcendental logic and practiced quasi-logic. Else, the pragmatics of analysis claims that it is free from constructive elements. All these characteristics do not apply to out proposal, which is as less “analytical” as the philosophy of Deleuze, where it starts to grow itself on the notion of the mathematical differential.

3. The Formal Structure

For the initial description of the structure we first need a space of expressibility. This space then will be equipped with some properties. And right at the beginning I would like to emphasize that the proposed structure does not “explain” by itself anything, just like a (philosophical) grammar. Rather, through its usage, that is, its unfolding in time, it shows itself and provides a stable as well as a generative ground.

The space of the structure is not a Cartesian space, where some concepts are mapped onto the orthogonal dimensions, or where concepts are thought to be represented by such dimensions. In a Cartesian space, the dimensions are independent from each other.16 Objects are represented by the linear and additive combination of values along those dimensions and thus their entirety gets broken up. We loose the object as a coherent object and there would be no way to regain it later, regardless the means and the tools we would apply. Hence the Cartesian space is not useful for our purposes. Unfortunately, all the current mathematics is based on the cartesian, analytic conception. Currently, mathematics is a science of control, or more precisely, a science about the arrangement of signs as far as it concerns linear, trivial machines that can be described analytically. There is not yet a mathematics of the organon. Probably category theory is a first step into its direction.

Instead, we conceive our space as an aspectional space, as we introduced it in a previous chapter. In an aspectional space concepts are represented by “aspections” instead of “dimensions”. In contrast to the values in a dimensional space, values in an aspectional can not be changed independently from each other. More precisely, we always can keep only at most 1 aspection constant, while the values along all the others change simultaneously. (So-called ternary diagrams provide a distantly related example for this in a 2-dimensional space.) In other words, within the N-manifolds of the aspectional space always all values are dependent on each other.

This aspectional space is stuffed with a hyperbolic topological structure. The space of our structure is not flat. You may take M.C. Escher’s plates as a visualization of such a space. Yet, our space is different from such a fixed space; it is a relativistic space that is built from overlapping hyperbolic spaces. At each point in the space you will find a point of reference (“origin”) for a single hyperbolic reference system. Our hyperbolic space is locally centred. A mathematical field about comparable structures would be differential topology.

So far, the space is still quite easy and intuitively to understand. At least there is still a visualization possible for it. This changes probably with the next property. Points in this aspectional space are not “points”, or expressed in a better, less obscure way, our space does not contain points at all. In a Cartesian space, points are defined by one or more scales and their properties. For instance, in a x-y-coordinate system we could have real numbers on both dimensions, i.e. scales, or we could have integers on the first, and reals on the second one. The interaction of the number systems used to create a scale along a dimension determines the expressibility of the space. This way, a point is given as a fixed instance of a set of points as soon as the scale is given. Points themselves are thus said to be 0-dimensional.

Our “points”, i.e. the content of our space is quite different from that. It is not “made up” from inert and passive points but the second differential, i.e. ultimately a procedure that invokes an instantiation. Our aspectional space thus is made from infinitesimal procedural sites, or “situs” as Leibniz probably would have said. If we would represent the physical space by a Cartesian dimensional system, then the second derivative would represent an acceleration. Take this as a metaphor for the behavior of our space. Yet, our space is not a space that is passive. The second-order differential makes it an active space and a space that demands for an activity. Without activity it is “not there”.

We also could describe it as the mapping of the intensity of the dynamics of transformation. If you would try to point to a particular location, or situs, in that space, which is of course excluded by its formal definition, you would instantaneously “transported” or transformed, such that you would find yourself elsewhere instantaneously. Yet, this “elsewhere” can not be determined in Cartesian ways. First, because that other point does not exist, second, because it depends on the interaction of the subject’s contribution to the instantiation of the situs and the local properties of the space. Finally, we can say that our aspectional space thus is not representational, as the Cartesian space is.

So, let us sum the elemental17 properties of our space of expressibility:

  • 1. The space is aspectional.
  • 2. The topology of the space is locally hyperbolic.
  • 3. The substance of the space is a second-order differential.

4. Mapping the Semantics

We now are going to map four concepts onto this space. These concepts are themselves Ideas in the Deleuzean sense, but they are also transcendental. They are indeterminate and real, just as virtual entities. As those, we take the chosen concepts as inexplicable, yet also as instantiationable.

These four concepts have been chosen initially in a hypothetical gesture, such that they satisfy two basic requirements. First, it should not be possible to reduce them to one another. Second, together they should allow to build a space of expressibility that would contain as much philosophical issues of mentality as possible. For instance, it should contain any aspect of epistemology or of languagability, but it does not aim to contribute to the theory of morality, i.e. ethics, despite the fact that there is, of course, significant overlapping. For instance, one of the possible goals could be to provide a space that allows to express the relation between semiotics and any logic, or between concepts and models.

So, here are the four transcendental concepts that form the aspections of our space as described above:

  • – virtuality
  • – mediality
  • – model
  • – concept

Inscribing four concepts into a flat, i.e. Euclidean aspectional space would result in a tetraedic space. In such a space, there would be “corners,” or points of inflections, which would represent the determinateness of the concepts mapped to the aspections. As we have emphasized above, our space is not flat, though. There is no static visualization possible for it, since our space can’t be mapped to the flat Euclidean space of a drawing, or of the space of our physical experience.

So, let us proceed to the next level by resorting to the hyperbolic disc. If we take any two points inside the disc, their distance is determinate. Yet, if we take any two points at the border of the disc, the distance between those points is infinite from the inside perspective, i.e. for any perspective associated to a point within the disc. Also the distance from any point inside the disc to the border is infinite. This provides a good impression how transcendental concepts that by definition can’t be accessed “as such”, or as a thing, can be operationalized by the hyperbolic structure of a space. Our space is more complicated, though, as the space is not structured by a fixed hyperbolic topology that is, so to speak, global for the entire disc. The consequence is that our space does not have a border, but at the same time it remains an aspectional space. Turning the perspective around, we could say that the aspections are implied into this space.

Let us now briefly visit these four concepts.

4.1. Virtuality

Virtuality describes the property of “being virtual”. Saying that something is virtual does not mean that this something does not exist, despite the property “existing” can’t be applied to it either. It is fully real, but not actual. Virtuality is the condition of potentiality, and as such it is a transcendental concept. Deleuze repeatedly emphasises that virtuality does not refer to a possibility. In the context of information technologies it is often said that this or that is “virtual”, e.g. virtualized servers, or virtual worlds. This usage is not the same as in philosophy, since, quite obviously, we use the virtual server as a server, and the world dubbed “virtual“ indeed does exist in an actualized form. Yet, in both examples there is also some resonance to the philosophical concept of virtuality. But this virtuality is not exclusive to the simulated worlds, the informationally defined server instances or the WWW. Virtualization is, as we will see in a moment, implied by any kind of instance of mediality.

As just said, virtuality and thus also potentiality must be strictly distinguished from possibility. Possible things, even if not yet present or existent, can be thought of in a quasi-material way, as if they would exist in their material form. We even can say that possible things and the possibilities of things are completely determined in any given moment. It is not possible to say so about potentiality. Yet, without the concept of potentiality we could not speak about open evolutionary processes. Neglecting virtuality thus is necessarily equivalent to the apriori claim of determinateness, which is methodologically and ethically highly problematic.

The philosophical concept of virtuality is known since Aristotle. Recently, Bühlmann18 brought it to the vicinity of semiotics and the question of reference19 in her work about mediality. There would be much, much more to say about virtuality here, just, the space is missing…

4.2. Mediality

Mediality, that is the medial aspects of things, facts and processes belongs to the most undervalued concepts nowadays, even as we get some exercise by means of so-called “social media”. That term perfectly puts this blind spot to stage through its emphasis: Neither is there any mediality without sociality, nor is there any sociality without mediality. Mediality is the concept that has been “discovered” as the last one of our small group. There is a growing body of publications, but many are—astonishingly—deeply infected by romanticism or positivism20, with only a few exceptions.21 Mediality comprises issues like context, density, or transformation qua transfer. Mediality is a concept that helps to focus the appropriate level of integration in populations or flows when talking about semantics or meaning and their dynamics. Any thing, whether material or immaterial, that occurs in a sufficient density in its manifoldness may develop a mediality within a sociality. Mediality as a “layer of transport” is co-generative to sociality. Media are never neutral with respect to the transported, albeit one can often find counteracting forces here.

Signs and symbols could not exist as such without mediality. (Yet, this proposal is based on the primacy of interpretation, which is rejected by modernist set of beliefs. The costs for this are, however, tremendous, as we are going to argue here) The same is true for words and language as a whole. In real contexts, we usually find several, if not many medial layers. Of course, signs and symbols are not exhaustively described by mediality. They need reference, which is a compound that comprises modeling.

4.3. Model

Models and modeling need not be explicated too much any more, as it is one of the main issues throughout our essays. We just would like to remember to the obvious fact that a “pure” model is not possible. We need symbols and rules, e.g. about their creation or usage, and necessarily both are not subject of the model itself. Most significantly, models need a purpose, a concept to which they refer. In fact, any model presupposes an environment, an embedding that is given by concepts and a particular social embedding. Additionally, models would not be models without virtuality. On the one hand, virtuality is implied by the fact that models are incarnations of specific modes of interpretation, and on the other hand they imply virtuality themselves, since they are, well, just models.

We frequently mentioned that it is only through models that we can build up references to the external world. Of course, models are not sufficient to describe that referencing. There is also the contingency of the manifold of populations and the implied relations as quasi-material arrangements that contribute to the reference of the individual to the common. Yet, only modeling allows for anticipation and purposeful activity. It is only though models that behavior is possible, insofar any behavior is already differentiated behavior. Models are thus the major site where information is created. It is not just by chance that the 20th century experienced the abundance of models and of information as concepts.

In mathematical terms, models can be conceived as second-order categories. More profane, but equivalent to that, we can say that models are arrangement of rules for transformation. This implies the whole issue of rule-following as it has been investigated and formulated by Wittgenstein. Note that rule-following itself is a site of paradoxicality. As there is no private language, there is also no private model. Philosophically, and a bit more abstract, we could describe them as the compound of providing the possibility for reference (they are one of the conditions for such) and the institutionalized site for creating (f)actual differences.

4.4. Concepts

Concept is probably one of the most abused, or at least misunderstood concepts, at least in modern times. So-called Analytical Philosophy is claiming over and over again that concepts could be explicated unambiguously, that concepts could be clarified or defined. This way, the concept and its definition are equaled. Yet, a definition is just a definition, not a concept. The language game of the definition makes sense only in a tree of analytical proofs that started with axioms. Definitions need not to be interpreted. They are fully given by themselves. Such, the idea of clarifying a concept is nothing but an illusion. Deleuze writes (DR228)

It is not surprising that, strictly speaking, difference should be ‘inexplicable’. Difference is explicated, but in systems in which it tends to be cancelled; this means only that difference is essentially implicated, that its being is implication. For difference, to be explicated is to be cancelled or to dispel the inequality which constitutes it. The formula according to which ‘to explicate is to identify’ is a tautology.

Deleuze points to the particular “mechanism” of eradication by explication, which is equal to its transformation into the sayable. There is a difference between 5 and 7, but the arithmetic difference does not cover all aspects of difference. Yet, by explicating the difference using some rules, all the other differences except the arithmetic one vanish. Such, this inexplicability is not limited to the concept of difference. In some important way, these other aspects are much more interesting and important than the arithmetic operation itself or the result of it. Actually, we can understand differencing only as far we are aware of these other aspects.

Elsewhere, we already cited Augustine and his remark about time:22 “What, then, is time? If no one ask of me, I know; if I wish to explain to him who asks, I know not.” Here, we can observe at least two things. Firstly, this observation may well be the interpreted as the earliest rejection of “knowledge as justified belief”, a perspective which became popular in modernism. Meanwhile it has been proofed to be inadequate by the so-called Gettier problem. The consequences for the theory of data bases, or machine-based processing of data, can’t be underestimated. It clearly shows, that knowledge can’t be reduced to confirmed hypotheses qua validated models, and belief can’t be reduced to kind of a pre-knowledge. Belief must be something quite different.

The second thing to observe by those two example concerns the status of interpretation. While Augustine seems to be somewhat desperate, at least for a moment23, analytical philosophy tries to abolish the annoyance of indeterminateness by killing the freedom inherent to interpretation, which always and inevitably happens, if the primacy of interpretation is denied.

Of course, the observed indeterminateness is equally not limited to time either. Whenever you try to explicate a concept, whether you describe it or define it, you find the unsurmountable difficulty to pick one of many interpretations. Again: There is no private language; meaning, references and signs exist only within social situations of interpretation. In other words, we again find the necessity of invoking the other conceptual aspects from which we build our space. Without models and mediality there is no concept. And even more profound than models, concepts imply virtuality.

In the opposite direction we can understand now that these four concepts are not only not reducible to each other. They are dependent on each other and—somewhat paradoxically—they are even competitively counteracting. From this we can expect an abstract dynamics that reminds somewhat to the patterns evolving in Reaction-Diffusion-Systems. These four concepts imply the possibility for a basic creativity in the realm of the Idea, in the indeterminate zone of actualisation that will result in a “concrete” thought, or at least the experience of thinking.

Before we proceed we would like to introduce a notation that should be helpful in avoiding misunderstandings. Whenever we refer to the transcendental aspects between which the aspections of our space stretch out, we use capital letters and mark it additionally by a bar, such as “_Concept”,or “_Model”.The whole set of aspects we denote by “_A”,while its unspecified items are indicated by “_a”.

5. Anti-Ontology: The T-Bar-Theory

The four conceptual aspects _Aplay different roles. They differ in the way they get activated. This becomes visible as soon as we use our space as a tool for comparing various kinds of mental concepts or activities, such as believing, referring, explicating or understanding. These we will inspect later in detail.

Above we described the impossibility to explicate a concept without departing from the “conceptness”. Well, such a description is actually not appropriate according to our aspectional space. The four basic aspections are built by transcendental concepts. There is a subjective, imaginary yet pre-specific scale along those aspections. Hence, in our space “conceptness” is not a quality, but an intensity, or almost a degree, a quantity. The key point then is that a mental concept or activity relates always to all four transcendental aspections in such a way that the relative location of the mental activity can’t be changed along just a single aspect alone.

We also can recognize another significant step that is provided by our space of expressibility. Traditionally, concepts are used as existential signifiers, in philosophy often called qualia. Such existential signifiers are only capable to indicate presence or absence, which thus is also confined to naive ontology of Hamletian style (to be or not to be). It is almost impossible to build a theory or a model from existential signifiers. From the modeling or the measurement theory point of view, concepts are on the binary scale. Despite concepts collect a multitude of such binary usages, appropriate modeling remains impossible due the binary scale, unless we would probabilize all potential dual pairs.

Similarly to the case of logic we also have to distinguish the transcendental aspect _a,that is, the _Model,_Mediality,_Concept,and _Virtualityfrom the respective entity that we find in applications. Those practiced instances of a are just that: instances. That is: instances produced by orthoregulated habits. Yet, the instances of a that could be gained through the former’s actualization do not form singularities, or even qualia. Any a can be instantiated into an infinite diversity of concrete, i.e. definable and sayable abstract entities. That’s the reason for the kinship between probabilistic entities and transcendental perspectives. We could operationalize the latter by the former, even if we have to distinguish sharply between possibility and potentiality. Additionally we have to keep in mind that the concrete instances do not live independently from their transcendental ancestry24.

Deleuze provides us a nice example of this dynamics in the beginning of part V in D&R. For him, “divergence” is an instance of the transcendental entity “Difference”.

Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is given, that by which the given is given as diverse. Difference is not phenomenon but the noumenon closest to the phenomenon.

What he calls “phenomenon” we dubbed “instance”, which is probably more appropriate in order to avoid the reference to phenomenology and the related difficulties. Calling it “phenomenon” pretends—typically for any kind of phenomenology or ontology—sort of a deeply unjustified independence of mentality and its underlying physicality.

This step from existential signifiers to the situs in a space for expressibility, made possible by our aspectional space, can’t be underestimated. Take for instance the infamous question that attracted so many misplaced answers: “How do words or concepts acquire reference?” This question appears to be especially troubling because signs do refer only to signs.25 In existential terms, and all the terms in that question are existential ones, this question can’t be answered, even not addressed at all. As a consequence, deep mystical chasms unnecessarily keep separating the world from the concepts. Any resulting puzzle is based on a misconception. Think of Platons chorismos (greek for “separation”) of explanation and description, which recently has been taken up, refreshed and declared being a “chasm” by Epperson [31] (a theist realist, according to his own positioning; we will meet him later again). The various misunderstandings are well-known, ranging from nominalism to externalist realism to scientific constructivism.

They all vanish in a space that overcomes the existentiality embedded in the terms. Mathematically spoken, we have to represent words, concepts and references as probabilized entities, as quasi-species as Manfred Eigen called it in a different context, in order to avoid naive mysticism regarding our relations to the world.

It seems that our space provides the possibility for measuring and comparing different ways of instantiation for _A,kind of a stable scale. We may use it to access concepts differentially, that is, we now are able to transform concepts in a space of quantitability (a term coined by Vera Bühlmann). The aspectional space as we have constructed it is thus necessary even in order to talk just about modeling. It would provide the possibility for theories about any transition between any mental entities one could think of. For instance, if we conceive “reference” as the virtue of purposeful activity and anticipation, we could explore and describe the conditions for the explication of the path between the _Modelon the one side and the _Concept on the other.On this path—which is open on both sides—we could, for instance, first meet different kinds of symbols near the Model, started by idealization and naming of models, followed by the mathematical attitude concerning the invention and treatment of signs, _Logicand all of its instances, semiosis and signs, words, and finally concepts, not forgetting above all that this path necessarily implies a particular dynamics regarding _Medialityand _Virtuality.

Such an embedding of transformations into co-referential transcendental entities is anything we can expect to “know” reliably. That was the whole point of Kant. Well, here we can be more radical than Kant dared to. The choreostemic space is a rejection of the idea of “pure thought”, or pure reason, since such knowledge needs to undergo a double instantiation, and this brings subjectivity back. It is just a phantasm to believe that propositions could be secured up to “truth”. This is even true for least possible common denominator, existence.

I think that we cannot know whether something exists or not (here, I pretend to understand the term exist), that it is meaningless to ask this. In this case, our analysis of the legitimacy of uses has to rest on something else. (David Blair [49])

Note that Blair is very careful in his wording here. He is not about any universality regarding the justification, or legitimization. His proposal is simply that any reference to “Being” or “Existence” is useless apriori. Claiming seriousness of ontology as an aspect of or even as an external reality immediately instantiates the claim of an external reality as such, which would be such-and-such irrespective to its interpretation. This, in turn, would consequently amount to a stance that would set the proof of irrelevance of interpretation and of interpretive relativism as a goal. Any familiar associations about that? Not to the least do physicists, but only physicists, speak of “laws” in nature. All of this is, of course, unholy nonsense, propaganda and ideology at least.

As a matter of fact, even in a quite strict naturalist perspective, we need concepts and models. Those are obviously not part of the “external” nature. Ontology is an illusion, completely and in any of its references, leading to pseudo-problems that are indeed  “very difficult” to “solve”. Even if we manage to believe in “existence”, it remains a formless existence, or more precisely, it has to remain formless. Any ascription of form immediately would beat back as a denial of the primacy of interpretation, hence in a naturalist determinism.

Before addressing the issue of the topological structure of our space, let us trace some other figures in our space.

6. Figures and Forms

Whenever we explicate a concept we imply or refer to a model. In a more general perspective, this applies to virtuality and mediality as well. To give an example: Describing a belief does not mean to belief, but to apply a model. The question now is, how to revert the accretion of mental activities towards the _Model._Virtuality can’t be created deliberately, since in this case we would refer again to the concept of model. Speaking about something, that is, saying in the Wittgensteinian sense, intensifies the _Model.

It is not too difficult, though, to find some candidate mechanics that turns the vector of mental activity away from the _Concept.It is through performance, mere action without explicable purpose, that we introduce new possibilities for interpretation and thus also enriched potential as the (still abstract) instance of _Virtuality.

In contrast to that, the _Concept is implied.The _Conceptcan only be demonstrated. Even by modeling. Traveling on some path that is heading towards the _Model,the need for interpretation continuously grows, hence, the more we try to approach the “pure” _Model,the stronger is the force that will flip us back towards the _Concept.

_Mediality,finally, the fourth of our aspects, binds its immaterial colleagues to matter, or quasi-matter, in processes that are based on the multiplicity of populations. It is through _Medialityand its instances that chunks of information start to behave as device, as quasi-material arrangement. The whole dynamics between _Conceptsand _Modelsrequires a symbol system, which can evolve only through the reference to _Mediality,which in turn is implied by populations of processes.

Above we said that the motivation for this structure is to provide a space of expressibility for mental phenomena in their entirety. Mental activity does not consist of isolated, rare events. It is an multitude of flows integrated into various organizational levels, even if we would consider only the language part. Mapping these flows into our space rises the question whether we could distinguish different attractors, different forms of recurrence.

Addressing this question establishes an interesting configuration, since we are talking about the form of mental activities. Perhaps it is also appropriate to call these forms “mental style”. In any case, we may take our space as a tool to formalize the question about potential classes of mental styles. In order to render out space more accessible, we take the tetraedic body as a (crude) approximating metaphor for it.

Above we stressed the point that any explication intensifies the _Model aspect. Transposed into a Cartesian geometry we would have said—metaphori- cally—that explication moves us towards the corner of the model. Let us stick to this primitive representation for a moment and in favour of a more intuitive understanding. Now imagine constructing a vector that points away from the model corner, right to the middle of the area spanned by virtuality, mediality and concept. It is pretty clear, that mental activity that leaves the model behind, and quite literally so, in this way will be some form of basic belief, or revelation. Religiosity (as a mental activity) may be well described as the attempt to balance virtuality, mediality and concept without resorting to any kind of explication, i.e. models. Of course, this is not possible in an absolute manner, since it is not possible to move in the aspectional space without any explication. This in turn then yields a residual that again points towards the model corner.

Inversely, it is not possible to move only in the direction of the _Model.Nevertheless, there are still many people proposing such, think for instance about (abundant as well as overdone) scientism. What we can see here are particular forms of mental activity. What about other forms? For instance, the fixed-point attractor?

As we have seen, our aspectional space does not allow for points as singularities. Both the semantics of the aspections as well as the structure of the space as a second-order differential prevents them. Yet, somebody could attempt to realize an orbit around a singularity that is as narrow as possible. Despite such points of absolute stability are completely illusionary, the idea of the absoluteness of ideas—idealism—represents just such an attempt. Yet, the claim of absoluteness brings mental activity to rest. It is not by accident therefore that it was the logician Frege who championed kind of a rather strange hyperplatonism.

At this point we can recognize the possibility to describe different forms of mental activity using our space. Mental activity draws specific trails into our space. Moreover, our suggestion is that people prefer particular figures for whatever reasons, e.g. due to their cultural embedding, their mental capabilities, their knowledge, or even due to their basic physical constraints. Our space allows to compare, and perhaps even to construct or evolve particular figures. Such figures could be conceived as the orthoregulative instance for the conditions to know. Epistemology thus looses its claim of universality.

It seems obvious to call our space a “choreostemic” space, a term which refers to choreography. Choreography means to “draw a dance”, or “drawing by dancing”, derived from Greek choreia (χορεύω) for „dancing, (round) dance”. Vera Bühlmann [19] described that particular quality as “referring to an unfixed point loosely moving within an occurring choreography, but without being orchestrated prior to and independently of such occurrence.”

The notion of the choreosteme also refers to the chorus of the ancient theatre, with all its connotations, particularly the drama. Serving as an announcement for part V of D&R, Deleuze writes:

However, what carries out the third aspect of sufficient reason—namely, the element of potentiality in the Idea? No doubt the pre-quantitative and pre-qualitative dramatisation. It is this, in effect, which determines or unleashes, which differenciates the differenciation of the actual in its correspondence with the differentiation of the Idea. Where, however, does this power of dramatisation come from? (DR221)

It is right here, where the choreostemic space links in. The choreostemic space does not abolish the dramatic in the transition from the conditionability of Ideas into concrete thoughts, but it allows to trace and to draw, to explicate and negotiate the dramatic. In other words, it opens the possibility for a completely new game: dealing with mental attitudes. Without the choreostemic space this game is not even visible, which itself has rather unfortunate consequences.

The choreostemic space is not an epistemic space either. Epistemology is concerned about the conditions that are influencing the possibility to know. Literally, episteme means “to stand near”, or “to stand over”. It draws upon a fixed perspective that is necessary to evaluate something. Yet, in the last 150 years or so, philosophy definitely has experienced the difficulties implied by epistemology as an endeavour that has been expected to contribute finally to the stabilization of knowledge. I think, the choreostemic space could be conceived as a tool that allows to reframe the whole endeavour. In other words, the problematic field of the episteme, and the related research programme “epistemology” are following an architecture (or intention), that has been set up far too narrow. That reframing, though, has become accessible only through the “results” of—or the tools provided by — the work of Wittgenstein and Deleuze. Without the recognition of the role of language and without a renewal of the notion of the virtual, including the invention of the concept of the differential, that reframing would not have been possible at all.

Before we are going to discuss further the scope of the choreostemic space and the purposes it can serve, we have to correct the Cartesian view that slipped in through our metaphorical references. The Cartesian flavour keeps not only a certain arbitrariness alive, as the four conceptual aspects _Aare given just by some subjective empirical observations. It also keeps us stick completely within the analytical space, hence with a closed approach that again would need a mystical external instance for its beginning. This we have to correct now.

7. Reason and Sufficiency

Our choreostemic space is built as an aspectional space that is spanned by transcendental entities. As such, they reflect the implied conditionability of concrete entities like definitions, models or media. The _Conceptcomprises any potential concrete concept, the _Modelcomprises any actual model of whatsoever kind and expressed in whatsoever symbolic system, the _Medialitycontains the potential for any kind of media, whether more material or more immaterial in character. The transcendental status of these aspects also means that we never can “access” them in their “pure” form. Yet, due to these properties our space allows to map any mental activity, not just of the human brain. In a more general perspective, our space is the space where the _Comparison takes place.

The choreostemic space is of course itself a model. Given the transcendentality of the four conceptual aspects _A,we can grasp the self-referentiality. Yet, this neither does result in an infinite regress, nor in circularity. This would be the case only if the space would be Cartesian and the topological structure would be flat (Euclidean) and global.

First, we have to consider that the choreostemic space is not only model, precisely due to its self-referentiality. Second, it is a tool, and as such it is not time-inert as a physical law. Its relevance unfolds only if it is used. This, however, invokes time and activity. Thus the choreostemic space could be conceived also as a means to intensify the virtual aspects of thought. Furthermore, and third, it is of course a concept, that is, it is an instance of the _Concept.As such, it should be constructed in a way that abolishes any possibility for a Cartesio-Euclidean regression. All these aspects are covered by the topological structure of the choreostemic space: It is meant to be a second-order differential.

A space made by the second-order differential does not contain items. It spawns procedures. In such a space it is impossible to stay at a fixed point. Whenever one would try to determine a point, one would be accelerated away. The whole space causes divergence of mental activities. Here we find the philosophical reason for the impossibility to catch a thought as a single entity.

We just mentioned that the choreostemic space does not contain items. Due to the second-order differential it is not made up as a set of coordinates, or, if we’d consider real scaled dimensions, as potential sets of coordinates. Quite to the opposite, there is nothing determinable in it. Yet, in rear-view, or hindsight, respectively, we can reconstruct figures in a probabilistic manner. The subject of this probabilism is again not determinable coordinates, but rather clouds of probabilities, quite similar to the way things are described in quantum physics by the Schrödinger equation. Unlike the completely structureless and formless clouds of probability which are used in the description of electrons, the figures in our space can take various, more or less stable forms. This means that we can try to evolve certain choreostemic figures and even anticipate them, but only to a certain degree. The attractor of a chaotic system provides a good metaphor for that: We clearly can see the traces in parameter space as drawn by the system, yet, the system’s path as described by a sequence of coordinates remains unpredictable. Nevertheless, the attractor is probabilistically confined to a particular, yet cloudy “figure,” that is, an unsharp region in parameter space. Transitions are far from arbitrary.

Hence, we would propose to conceive the choreostemic space as being made up from probabilistic situs (pl.). Transitions between situs are at the same time also transformations. The choreostemic space is embedded in its own mediality without excluding roots in external media.

Above we stuffed the space with a hyperbolic topology in order to align to the transcendentality of the conceptual aspects. It is quite important to understand that the choreostemic space does not implement a single, i.e. global hyperbolic relation. In contrast, each situs serves as point of reference. Without this relativity, the choreostemic space would be centred again, and in consequence it would turn again to the analytic and totalising side. This relativity can be regarded as the completed and subjectivising Cartesian delocalization of the “origin”. It is clear that the distance measures of any two such relative hyperbolic spaces do not coincide any more. There is neither apriori objectivity nor could we expect a general mapping function. Approximate agreement about distance measures may be achievable only for reference systems that are rather close to each other.

The choreostemic space comprises any condition of any mental attitude or thought. We already mentioned it above: The corollary of that is that the choreostemic space is the space of _Comparisonas a transcendental category.

It comprises the conditions for the whole universe of Ideas, it is an entirety. Here, it is again the topological structure of the space that saves us from mental dictatorship. We have to perform a double instantiation in order to arrive at a concrete thought. It is somewhat important to understand that these instantiations are orthoregulated.

It is clear that the choreostemic space destroys the idea of a uniform rationality. Rationality can’t be tied to truth, justice or utility in an objective manner, even if we would soften objectivity as a kind of relaxed intersubjectivity. Rationality depends completely on the preferred or practiced figures in the choreostemic space. Two persons, or more generally, two entities with some mental capacity, could completely agree on the facts, that is on the percepts, the way of their construction, and the relations between them, but nevertheless assign them completely different virtues and values, simply for the fact that the two entities inhabit different choreostemic attractors. Rationality is global within a specific choreostemic figure, but local and relative with regard to that figure. The language game of rationality therefore does not refer to a particular attitude towards argumentation, but quite in contrast, it includes and displays the will to establish, if not to enforce uniformity. Rationality is the label for the will to power under the auspices of logic and reductionism. It serves as the display for certain, quite critical moral values.

Thus, the notion of sufficient reason looses its frightening character as well. As any other principle of practice it gets transformed into a strictly local principle, retaining some significance only with regard to situational instrumentality. Since the choreostemic space is a generative space, locality comprises temporal locality as well. According to the choreostemic space, sufficient reasons can’t even be transported between subsequent situations. In terms of the choreostemic space notions like rationality or sufficient reason are relative to a particular attractor. In different attractors their significance could be very different, they may bear very different meanings. Viewed from the opposite direction, we also can see that a more or less stable attractor in the choreostemic has first to form, or: to be formed, before there is even the possibility for sufficient reasons. This goes straightly parallel to Wittgenstein’s conception of logic as a transcendental apriori that possibly becomes instantiated only within the process of an unfolding Lebensform. As a contribution to political reason, the choreostemic space it enables persons inhabiting different attractors, following different mental styles. Later, we will return to this aspect.

In D&R, Deleuze explicated the concept of the “Image of Thought”, as part III of D&R is titled. There he first discusses what he calls the dogmatic image of thought, comprised according to him from eight elements that together lead to the concept of the idea as an representation (DR167). Following that we insists that the idea is bound to repetition and difference (as differenciation and differentiation), where repetition introduces the possibility of the new, as it is not the repetition of the same. Nevertheless, Deleuze didn’t develop this Image into a multiplicity, as it could have been expected from a more practical perspective, i.e. the perspective of language games. These games are different from his notion emphasizing at several instances that language is a rich play.

For me it seems that Deleuze didn’t (want to) get rid of ontology, hence he did not conceive of his great concept of the “differential” as a language game, and in turn he missed to detect the opportunity for self-referentiality or even to apply it in a self-referential manner. We certainly do therefore not agree with his attempt to ground the idea of sufficient reason as a global principle. Since “sufficient reason” is a practice I think it is not possible or not sufficient to conceive of it as a transcendental guideline.

8. Elective Kinships

It is pretty clear that the choreostemic space is applicable to many problematic fields concerning mental attitudes, and hence concerning cultural issues at large, reaching far beyond the specificity of individual domains.

As we will see, the choreostemic space may serve as a treatment for several kinds of troublesome aberrances, in philosophy itself as well as in its various applications. Predominantly, the choreostemic space provides the evolutionary perspective towards the self-containing theoretical foundation of plurality and manifoldness.26 Comparing that with Hegel’s slogans of “the synthesis of the nation’s reason“ (“Synthese des Volksgeistes“) or „The Whole is the Truth“ („Das Ganze ist das Wahre“) shows the difference regarding its level and scope.

Before we go into the details of the dynamics that unfolds in the choreostemic space, we would like to pick up on two areas, the philosophy of the episteme and the relationship between anthropology and philosophy.

8.1. Philosophy of the Episteme

The choreostemic space is not about a further variety of some epistemological argument. It is thought as a reframing of the concerns that have been addressed traditionally by epistemology. (Here, we already would like to warn of the misunderstanding that the choreostemic space exhausts as epistemology.) Hence, it should be able to serve (as) the theoretical frame for the sociology of science or the philosophy of science as well. Think about the work of Bruno Latour [9], Karin Knorr Cetina [10] or Günther Ropohl [11] for the sociology of science or the work of van Fraassen [12] of Giere [13] for the field of philosophy of science. Sociology and philosophy, and quite likely any of the disciplines in human sciences, should indeed establish references to the mental in some way, but rather not to the neurological level, and—since we have to avoid anthropological references—to cognition as it is currently understood in psychology as well.

Giere, for instance, brings the “cognitive approach” and hence the issue of practical context close to the understanding of science, criticizing the idealising projection of unspecified rationality:

Philosophers’ theories of science are generally theories of scientific rationality. The scientist of philosophical theory is an ideal type, the ideally rational scientist. The actions of real scientists, when they are considered at all, are measured and evaluated by how well they fulfill the ideal. The context of science, whether personal, social or more broadly cultural, is typically regarded as irrelevant to a proper philosophical understanding of science” (p.3).

The “cognitive approach” that Giere proposes as a means to understand science is, however, threatened seriously by the fact that there is no consensus about the mental. This clearly conflicts with the claim of trans-cultural objectivity of contemporary science. Concerning cognition, there are still many simplistic paradigms around, recently seriously renewed by the machine learning community. Aaron Ben Ze’ev [14] writes critically:

In the schema paradigm [of the mind, m.], which I advocate, the mind is not an internal container but a dynamic system of capacities and states. Mental properties are states of a whole system, not internal entities within a particular system. […] Novel information is not stored in a separate warehouse, but is ingrained in the constitution of the cognitive system in the form of certain cognitive structures (or schemas). […] The attraction of the mechanistic paradigm is its simplicity; this, however, is an inadequate paradigm, because it fails to explain various relevant phenomena. Although the complex schema paradigm does not offer clear-cut solutions, it offers more adequate explanations.

How problematic even such critiques are can be traced as soon as we remember Wittgenstein’s mark on “mental states” (Brown Book, p.143):

There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and  finds) what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring as from a reservoir.

In the more general field of epistemology there is still no sign for any agreement about the concept of knowledge. From our position, this is little surprising. First, concepts can’t be defined at all. All we can find are local instances of the transcendental entity. Second, knowledge and even its choreostemic structure is dependent on the embedding culture while at the same time it is forming the culture. The figures in the choreostemic space are attractors: They do not prescribe the next transformation, but they constrain the possibility for it. How ever to “define” knowledge in an explicit, positively representationalist manner? For instance, knowledge can’t be reduced to confirmed hypotheses qua validated models. It is just impossible in principle to say “knowledge is…”, since this implies inevitably the demand for an objective justification. At most, we can take it as a language game. (Thus the choreosteme, that is, the potential of building figures in the choreostemic space, should not be mixed with the episteme! We will return to this issue later again.)

Yet, just to point to the category of the mental as a language game does not feel satisfying at all. Of course, Wittgenstein’s work sheds bright light on many aspects of mentality. Nevertheless, we can’t use Wittgenstein’s work as a structure; it is itself to be conceived as a result of a certain structuredness. On the other hand, it is equally disappointing to rely on the scientific approach to the mental. In some way, we need a balanced view, which additionally should provide the possibility for a differential experimentation with mechanisms of the mental.

Just that is offered by the choreostemic space. We may relate disciplinary reductionist models to concepts as they live in language games without any loss and without getting into troubles as well.

Let us now see what is possible by means of the choreostemic space and the anti-ontological T-Bar-Theory for the terms believing, referring, explicating, understanding and knowing. It might be relevant to keep in mind that by “mental activities” we do not refer to any physical or biochemical process. We distinguish the mental from the low-level affairs in the brain. Beliefs, or believing, are thus considered to be language games. From that perspective our choreostemic space just serves as a tool to externalize language in order to step outside of it, or likewise, to get able to render important aspects of playing the language game visible.

Believing

The category of beliefs, or likewise the activity of believing27, we already met above. We characterised it as a mental activity that leaves the model behind. We sharply refute the quite abundant conceptualisation of beliefs as kind of uncertainty in models. Since there is no certainty at all, not even with regard to transcendental issues, such would make little sense. Actually, the language game of believing shows its richness even on behalf of a short investigation like this one.

Before we go into details here let us see how others conceive of it. PMS Hacker [27] gave the following summary:

Over the last two and a half centuries three main strands of opinion can be discerned in philosophers’ investigations of believing. One is the view that believing that p is a special kind of feeling associated with the idea that p or the proposition that p. The second view is that to believe that p is to be in a certain kind of mental state. The third is that to believe that p is to have a certain sort of disposition.

Right to the beginning of his investigation, Hacker marks the technical, reductionist perspective onto believe as a misconception. This technical reductionism, which took form as so-called AGM-theory in the paper by Alchourron, Gärdenfors and Makinson [28] we will discuss below. Hacker writes about it:

Before commencing analysis, one misconception should be mentioned and put aside. It is commonly suggested that to believe that p is a propositional attitude.That is patently misconceived, if it means that believing is an attitude towards a proposition. […] I shall argue that to believe that p is neither a feeling, nor a mental state, nor yet a disposition to do or feel anything.

Obviously, believing has several aspects. First, it is certainly kind of a mental activity. It seems that I need not to tell anybody that I believe in order to be able to believe. Second, it is a language game, and a rich one, indeed. It seems almost to be omnipresent. As a language game, it links “I believe that” with, “I believe A” and “I believe in A”. We should not overlook, however, that these utterances are spoken towards someone else (even in inner speech), hence the whole wealth of processes and relations of interpersonal affairs have to be regarded, all those mutual ascriptions of roles, assertions, maintained and demonstrated expectations, displays of self-perception, attempts to induce a certain co-perception, and so on. We frequently cited Robert Brandom who analysed that in great detail in his “Making it Explicit”.

Yet, can we really say that believing is just a mental activity? For the one, above we did not mention that believing is something like a “pure” mental activity. We clearly would reject such a claim. First, we clearly can not set the mental as such into a transcendental status, as this would lead straight to a system like Hegel’s philosophy, with all its difficulties, untenable claims and disastrous consequences. Second, it is impossible to explicate “purity”, as this would deny the fact that models are impossible without concepts. So, is it possible that a non-conscious being or entity can believe? Not quite, I would like to propose. Such an entity will of course be able to build models, even quite advanced ones, though probably not about reflective subjects as concepts or ideas. It could experience that it could not get rid of uncertainty and its closely related companion, risk. Such we can say that these models are not propositions “about” the world, they comprise uncertainty and allow to deal with uncertainty through actions in the world. Yet, the ability to deal with uncertainty is certainly not the same as believing. We would not need the language game at all. Saying “I believe that A” does not mean to have a certain model with a particular predictive power available. As models are explications, expressing a belief or experiencing the compound mental category “believing” is just the demonstration that any explication is impossible for the person.

Note that we conceive of “belief “as completely free of values and also without any reference to mysticism. Indeed, the choreostemic space allows to distinguish different aspects of the “compound experience” that we call “belief”, which otherwise are not even visible as separate aspects of it. As a language game we thus may specify it as the indication that the speaker assigns—or the listener is expected to assign—a considerable portion of the subject matter to that part of the choreostemic figure that points away from the _Model.It is immediately clear from the choreostemic space that mental activity without belief is not possible. There is always a significant “rest” that could not be covered by any kind of explication. This is true for engineering and of course for any kind of social interaction, as soon as mutual expectations appear on the stage. By means of the choreostemic space we also can understand the significance of trust in any interaction with the external world. In communicative situations, this quickly may lead to a game of mutual deontic ascriptions, as Robert Brandom [15] has been arguing for in his “Making it Explicit”.

Interestingly enough, belief (in its choreostemically founded version) is implied by any transition away from the _Model,for instance also in case of the transition path that ultimately is heading towards the _Concept.Even more surprising—at first sight—and particularly relevant is the “inflection dynamics” in the choreostemic space. The more one tries to explicate something the larger the necessary imports (e.g. through orthoregulations) from the other _a,and hence the larger is the propensity for an inflecting flip.28

As an example, take for instance the historical development of theories in particle physics. There, people started with rather simple experimental observations, which then have been assimilated by formal mathematical models. Those in turn led to new experiments, and so forth, until physics has been reaching a level of sophistication where “observations” are based on several, if not many layers of derived concepts. On the way, structural constants and heuristic side conditions are implied. Finally, then, the system of the physical model turns into an architectonics, a branched compound of theory-models, that sounds as trivial as it is conceptual. In case of physics, it is the so-called grand unified theory. There are several important things here. First, due to large amounts of heuristic settings and orthoregulations, such concepts can’t be proved or disproved anymore, the least by empirical observations. Second, on the achieved level of abstraction, the whole subject could be formulated in a completely different manner. Note that such a dynamic between experiment, model, theory29 and concept never has been described in a convincing manner before.30

Now that we have a differentiated picture about belief at our disposal we can briefly visit the field of so-called belief revision. Belief revision has been widely adopted in artificial intelligence and machine learning as the theory for updating a data base. Quite unfortunately, the whole theory is, well, simply crap, if we would go to apply it according to its intention. I think that we can raw some significance of the choreostemic space from this mismatch for a more appropriate treatment of beliefs in information technology.

The theory of belief revision was put forward by a branch of analytical philosophy in a paper by Alchourron, Gärdenfors and Makinson (1985) [29], often abbr. as “AGM-theory.” Hansson [30] writes:

A striking feature of the framework employed there [monnoo: AGM] is its simplicity. In the AGM framework, belief states are represented by deductively closed sets of sentences, called belief sets. Operations of change take the form of either adding or removing a specified sentence.

Sets of beliefs are held by an agent, who establishes or maintains purely logical relations between the items of those beliefs. Hansson correctly observes that:

The selection mechanism used for contraction and revision encodes information about the belief state not represented by the belief set.

Obviously, such “belief sets” have nothing to do with beliefs as we know it from language game, besides the fact that is a misdone caricature. As with Pearl [23], the interesting stuff is left out: How to achieve those logical sentences at all, notably by a non-symbolic path of derivation?  (There are no symbols out there in the world.) By means of the choreostemic space we easily derive the answer: By an orthoregulated instantiation of a particular choreostemic performance in an unbounded (open) aspectional space that spans between transcendental entities. Since the AGM framework starts with or presupposes logic, it simply got stuck in symbolistic fallacy or illusion. Accordingly, Pollock & Gillies [30] demonstrate that “postulational approaches” such as the AGM-theory can’t work within a fully developed “standard” epistemology. Both are simply incompatible to each other.

Explicating

Closely related to believing is explicating, the latter being just the inverse of the former, pointing to the “opposite direction”. Explicating is almost identical to describing a model. The language game of “explication” means to transform, to translate and to project choreostemic figures into lists of rules that could be followed, or in other words, into the sayable. Of course, this transformation and projection is neither analytic nor neutral. We must be aware of the fact that even a model can’t be explicated completely. Else, this rule-following itself implies the necessity of believes and trust, and it requires a common understanding about the usage or the influence of orthoregulations. In other words, without an embedding into a choreostemic figure, we can’t accomplish an explication.

Understanding, Explaining, Describing

Outside of the perspective of the language game “understanding” can’t be understood. Understanding emerges as a result of relating the items of a population of interpretive acts. This population and the relations imposed on them are closely akin to Heidegger’s scaffold (“Gestell”). Mostly, understanding something is just extending an existent scaffold. About these relations we can’t speak clearly or in an explicit manner any more, since these relations are constitutive parts of the understanding. As all language games this too unfolds in social situations, which need not be syntemporal. Understanding is a confirming report about beliefs and expectations into certain capabilities of one’s own.

Saying “I understand” may convey different meanings. More precisely, understanding may come along in different shades that are placed between two configurations. Either it signals that one believes to be able to extend just the own scaffold, one’s own future “Gestelltheit”. Alternatively it is used to indicate the belief that the extension of the scaffold is shared between individuals in such a way as to be able to reproduce the same effect as anyone else could have produced understanding the same thing. This effect could be merely instrumental or, more significantly, it could refer to the teaching of further pupils. In this case, two people understand something if they can teach another person to the same ends.

Beside the performative and social aspects of understanding there are of course the mental aspects of the concept of “understanding” something. These can be translated into choreostemic terms. Understanding is less a particular “figure” in the CS than it is a deliberate visiting of the outer regions of the figure and the intentional exploration of those outposts. We understand something only in case we are aware of the conditions of that something and of our personal involvements. These includes cognitive aspects, but also the consequences of the performative parts of acts that contribute to an intensifying of the aspect of virtuality. A scientist who builds a strong model without considering his and its conditionability does not understand anything. He just would practice a serious sort of dogma (see Quine about the dogmas of empiricism here!). Such a scientist’s modeling could be replaced by that of a machine.

A similar account could be given to the application of a grammar, irrespective the abstractness of that grammar. Referring to a grammar without considering its conditionability could be performed by a mindless machine as well. It would indeed remain a machine: mindless, and forever determined. Such is most, if not all of the computer software dealing with language today.

We again would like to emphasize that understanding does not exhaust in the ability to write down a model. Understanding means to relate the model to concepts, that is, to trace a possible path that would point towards the concept. A deep understanding refers to the ability to extend a figure towards the other transcendental aspects in a conscious manner. Hence, within idealism and (any sort of) representationalism understanding is actually excluded. They mistake the transcendental for the empirical and vice versa, ending in a strict determinism and dogmatism.

Explaining, in turn, indicates the intention to make somebody else to understand a certain subject. The infamous existential “Why?” does not make any sense. It is not just questionable why this language game should by performed at all, as the why of absolute existence can’t be answered at all. Actually, it seems to be quite different from that. As a matter of fact, we indeed play this game in a well comprehensible way and in many social situations. Conceiving “explanation” of nature as to account for its existence (as Epperson does it, see [31] p.357) presupposes that everything could turned into the sayable. It would result in the conflation of logic and factual world, something Epperson indeed proposes. Some pages later in his proposal about quantum physics he seems to loosen that strict tie when referring to Whitehead he links “understanding” to coherence and empirical adequacy. ([31] p.361)

I offer this argument in the same speculative philosophical spirit in which Whitehead argued for the fitness of his metaphysical scheme to the task of understanding (though not “explaining”) nature—not by the “provability” of his first principles via deduction or demonstration, but by their evaluation against the metrics of coherence and empirical adequacy.

Yet, this presents us an almost a perfect phenomenological stance, separating objects from objects and subjects. Neither coherence nor empirical adequacy can be separated from concepts, models and the embedding Lebenswelt. It expresses thus the believe of “absolute” understanding and final reason. Such ideas that are at least highly problematic, even and especially if we take into account the role Whitehead gives the “value” as an cosmological apriori. It is quite clear, that this attitude to understanding is sharply different from anything that is related to semiotics, the primacy of interpretation, to the role of language or a relational philosophy, in short, to anything what resembles even remotely to what we proposed about understanding of understanding a few lines above.

The intention to make somebody else to understand a certain subject necessarily implies a theory, where theory here is understood (as we always do) as a milieu for deriving or inventing models. The “explaining game” comprises the practice of providing a general perspective to the recipient such that she or he could become able to invent such a model, precisely because a “direct” implant of an idea into someone else is quite impossible. This milieu involves orthoregulation and a grammar (in the philosophical sense). The theory and the grammar associated or embedded with it does nothing else than providing support to find a possibility for the invention or extension of a model. It is a matter of persistent exchange of models from a properly grown population of models that allow to develop a common understanding about something. In the end we then may say “yes, I can follow you!”

Describing is often not distinguished (properly) from explaining. Yet, in our context of choreostemically embedded language games it is neither mysterious nor difficult to do so. We may conceive of describing just as explicating something into the sayable, the element of cross-individual alignment is not part of it, at least in a much less explicit way. Hence, usually the respective declaration will not be made. The element of social embedding is much less present.

Describing pretends more or less that all the three aspects accompanying the model aspect could be neglected, particularly however the aspects of mediality and virtuality. The mathematical proof can be taken as an extreme example for that. Yet, even there it is not possible, since at least a working system of symbols is needed, which in turn is rooted in a dynamics unfolding as choreostemic figure, the mental aspect of Forms of Life. Basically, this impossibility for fixing a “position” in the choreostemic space is responsible for the so-called foundational crisis in mathematics. This crisis prevails even today in philosophy, where many people naively enough still search for absolute  justification, or truth, or at least regard such as a reasonable concept.

All this should not be understood as an attempt to deny description or describing as a useful category. Yet, we should be aware that the difference to explaining is just one of (choreostemic) form. More explicitly, said difference is an affair of of culturally negotiated portions of the transcendental aspects that make up mental life.

I hope this sheds some light on Wittgenstein’s claim that philosophy should just describe, but not explain anything. Well, the possibly perceived mysteriousness may vanish as well, if we remember is characterisation of grammar

Both, understanding and explaining are quite complicated socially mediated processes, hence they unfold upon layers of milieus of mediality. Both not only relate to models and concepts that need to exist in advance and thus to a particular dynamics between them, they require also a working system of symbols. Models and concepts relate to each other only as instances of _Models and _Concepts,that is in a space as it is provided by the choreostemic space. Talking about understanding as a practice is not possible without it.

Referring

Referring to something means to point to the expectation that the referred entity could point to the issue at hand. Referring is not “pointing to” and hence does not consist of a single move. It is “getting pointed to”. Said expectation is based on at least one model. Hence, if we refer to something, we put our issue as well as ourselves into the context of a chain of signifiers. If we refer to somebody, or to a named entity, then this chain of interpretive relations transforms in one of two ways.

Either the named entity is used, that is, put into a functional context, or more precisely, by assigning it a sayable function. The functionalized entity does not (need to) interpret any more, all activity gets centralized, which could be used as the starting point for totalizing control. This applies to any entity, whether it is just material or living, social.

The second way how referencing is affected by names concerns the reference to another person, or a group of persons. If it is not a functional relationship, e.g. taking the other as a “social tool”, it is less the expected chaining as signifier by the other person. Persons could not be interpreted as we interpret things or build signs from signals. Referring to a person means to accept the social game that comprises (i) mutual deontic assignments that develop into “roles”, including deontic credits and their balancing (as first explicated by Brandom [15]), (ii) the acceptance of the limit of the sayable, which results in a use of language that is more or less non-functional, always metaphorical and sometimes even poetic, as well as (iii) the declared persistence for repeated exchanges. The fact that we interpret the utterances of our partner within the orthoregulative milieu of a theory of mind (which builds up through this interpretations) means that we mediatize our partner at least partially.

The limit of the sayable is a direct consequence of the choreostemic constitution of performing thinking. The social is based on communication, which means “to put something into common”; hence, we can regard “communication” as the driving, extending and public part of using sign systems. As a proposed language game, “functional communication” is nonsense, much like the utterance “soft stone”.

By means of the choreostemic space we also can see that any referencing is equal to a more or less extensive figure, as models, concepts, performance and mediality is involved.

Knowing

At first hand, we could suspect that before any instantiation qua choreostemic performance we can not know something positively for sure in a global manner, i.e. objectively, as it is often meant to be expressed by the substantive “knowledge”. Due to that performance we have to interpret before we could know positively and objectively. The result is that we never can know anything for sure in a global manner. This holds even for transcendental items, that is, what Kant dubbed “pure reason”. Nevertheless, the language game “knowledge” has a well-defined significance.

“Knowledge” is a reasonable category only with respect to performing, interpreting (performance in thought) and acting (organized performance). It is bound to a structured population of interpretive situations, to Peircean signs. We thus find a gradation of privacy vs. publicness with respect to knowledge. We just have to keep in mind that neither of these qualities could be thought of as being “pure”. Pure privacy is not possible, because there is nothing like a private language (meaning qua usage and shared reference). Pure publicness is not possible because there is the necessity of a bodily rooted interpreting mechanism (associative structure). Things like “public space” as a purely exterior or externalized thing do not exist. The relevant issue for our topic of a machine-based episteme is that functionalism always ends in a denial of the private language argument.

We now can see easily why knowledge could not be conceived as a positively definable entity that could be stored or transferred as such. First, it is of course a language game. Second, and more important, “knowing {of, about, that}” always relates to instances of transcendental entities, and necessarily so. Third, even if we could agree on some specific way of instantiating the transcendental entities, it always invokes a particular figure unfolding in an aspectional space. This figure can’t be transferred, since this would mean that we could speak about it outside of itself. Yet, that’s not possible, since it is in turn impossible to just pretend to follow a rule.

Given this impossibility we should stay for a moment at the apparent gap opened by it towards teaching. How to teach somebody something if knowledge can’t be transferred? The answer is furnished by the equipment that is shared among the members of a community of speakers or co-inhabitants of the choreostemic space. We need this equipment for matching the orthoregulation of our rule-following. The parts, tools and devices of this equipment are made from palpable traditions, cultural rhythms, institutions, individual and legal preferences regarding the weighting of individuals versus the various societal clusters, the large story of the respective culture and the “templates” provided by it, the consciously accessible time horizon, both to the past and the future31, and so on. Common sense wrongly labels the resulting “setup” as “body of values”. More appropriately, we could call it grammatical dynamics. Teaching, then, is in some way more about the reconstruction of the equipment than about the agreement of facts, albeit the arrangement of the facts may tell us a lot about the grammar.

Saying ‘I know’ means that one wants to indicate that she or he is able to perform choreostemically with regard to the subject at hand. In other words, it is a label for a pointer (say reference) to a particular image of thought and its use. This includes the capability of teaching and explaining, which probably are the only way to check if somebody really knows. We can, however, not claim that we are aligned to a particular choreostemic dynamics. We only can believe that our choreostemic moves are part of a supposed attractor in the choreostemic space. From that also follows that knowledge is not just about facts, even if we would conceive of facts as a compound of fixed relations and fixed things.

The traditional concerns of epistemology as the discipline that asks about the conditions of knowing and knowledge must be regarded as a misplaced problem. Usually, epistemology does not refer to virtuality or mediality. Else, in epistemology knowledge is often sharply separated from belief, yet for the wrong reasons. The formula of “knowledge as justified belief” puts them both onto the same stage. It then would have to be clarified what “justified” should mean, which is not possible in turn. Explicating “justifying” would need reference to concepts and models, or rather the confinement to a particular one: logic. Yet, knowledge and belief are completely different with regard to their role in choreostemic dynamics. While belief is an indispensable element of any choreostemic figure, knowledge is the capability to behave choreostemically.

8.2. Anthropological Mirrors

Philosophy suffers even more from a surprising strangeness. As Marc Rölli recently mentioned [34] in his large work about the relations between anthropology and philosophy (KAV),

Since more than 200 years philosophy is anthropologically determined. Yet, philosophy didn’t investigate the relevance of this fact to any significant extent. (KAV15)32

Rölli agrees with Nietzsche regarding his critique of idealism.

“Nietzsche’s critique of idealism, which is available in many nuances, always targeting the philosophical self-misunderstanding of the pure reason or pure concepts, is also directed against a certain conception of nature.” (KAV439)33.

…where this rejected certain conception of nature is purposefulness. In nature there is no forward directed purpose, no plan. Such ideas are either due to religious romanticism or due to a serious misunderstanding of the Darwinian theory of natural evolution. In biological nature, there is only blind tendency towards the preference of intensified capability for generalization34. Since Kant, and inclusively him, and in some way already Descartes, philosophy has been influenced by scientific, technological or anthropological conceptions about nature in general, or the nature of the human mind.

Such is (at least) problematic for three reasons. First, it constitutes a misunderstanding of the role of philosophy to rely on scientific insights. Of course, this perspective is becoming (again) visible only today, notably after the Linguistic Turn as far as it regards non-analytical philosophy. Secondly, however, it is clear that the said influence implies, if it remains unreflected, a normative tie to empiric observations. This clearly represents a methodological shortfall. Thirdly, even if one would accept a certain link between anthropology and philosophy, the foundations taken from a “philosophy of nature”35 are so simplistic, that they hardly could be regarded as viable.

This almost primitive image about the purposeful nature finally flowed into the functionalism of our days, whether in philosophy (Habermas) or so-called neuro-philosophy, by which many feel inclined to establish a variety of determinism that is even proto-Hegelian.

In the same passage that invokes Nietzsche’s critique, Rölli cites Friedrich Albert Lange [39]

“The topic that we actually refer to can be denoted explicitly. It is quasi the apple in the logical lapse of German philosophy subsequent to Kant: the relation between subject and object within knowledge.” (KAV443)36

Lange deliberately attests Kant—in contrast to the philosophers of the German idealism— to be clear about that relationship. For Kant subject and object constitute only as an amalgamate, the pure whatsoever has been claimed by Hegel, Schelling and their epigones and inheritors. The intention behind introducing pureness, according to Lange, is to support absolute reason or absolute understanding, in other words, eternally justified reason and undeniability of certain concepts. Note that German Idealism was born before the foundational crisis in mathematics, that started with Russell’s remark on Frege’s “Begriffsschrift” and his “all” quantor, that found its continuation in the Hilbert programme and that finally has been inscribed to the roots of mathematics by Goedel. Philosophies of “pureness” are not items of the past, though. Think about materialism, or about Agamben’s “aesthetics of pure means”, as Benjamin Morgan [39] correctly identified the metaphysical scaffold of Agamben’s recent work.

Marc Rölli dedicates all of the 512 pages to the endeavor to destroy the extra-philosophical foundations of idealism. As the proposed alternative we find pragmatism, that is a conceptual foundation of philosophy that is based on language and Life form (Lebenswelt in the Wittgensteinian sense). He concludes his work accordingly:

After all it may have become more clear that this pragmatism is not about a simple, naive pragmatism, but rather about a pragmatism of difference37 that has been constructed with great subtlety. (KAV512)38

Rölli’s main target is German Idealism. Yet, undeniably Hegelian philosophy is not only abundant on the European continent, where it is the Frankfurt School from Adorno to Habermas and even K.-O. Apel, followed by the ill-fated ideas of Luhmann that are infected by Hegel as well. Significant traces of it can be found in Germany’s society also in contemporary legal positivism and the oligarchy of political parties.

During the last 20 years or so, Hegelian positions spread considerably also in anglo-american philosophy and political theory. Think about Hard and Negri, or even the recent works of Brian Massumi. Hegelian philosophy, however, can’t be taken in portions. It is totalitarian all through, because its main postulates such as “absolute reason” are totalizing by themselves. Hegelian philosophy is a relic, and a quite dangerous one, regardless whether you interpret it in a leftist (Lenin) or in a rightist (Carl Schmitt) manner. With its built-in claim for absoluteness the explicit denial of context-specificity, of the necessary relativity of interpretation, of the openness of future evolution, of the freedom inscribed deeply even into the basic operation of comparison, all of these positions turn into transcendental aprioris. The same holds for the claim that things, facts, or even norms can be justified absolutely. No further comment should be necessary about that.

The choreostemic space itself can not result in a totalising or even totalitarian attitude. We met this point already earlier when we discussed the topological structure of the space and its a-locational “substance” (Reason and Sufficiency). As Deleuze emphasized, there is a significant difference between entirety and completeness, which just mirrors the difference between the virtual and the actual. We’d like to add that the choreostemic space also disproves the possibility for universality of any kind of conception. In some way, yet implicitly, the choreostemic space defends humanity against materiality and any related attitude. Even if we would be determined completely on the material level, which we are surely not39, the choreostemic space proofs the indeterminateness and openness of our mental life.

You already may have got the feeling that we are going to slip into political theory. Indeed, the choreostemic space not only forms a space indeterminateness and applicable pre-specificity, it provides also a kind of a space of “Swiss neutrality”. Its capability to allow for a comparison of collective mental setups, without resorting to physicalist concepts like swarms or mysticistic concepts like “collective intelligence”, provides a fruitful ground for any construction of transitions between choreostemic attractors.

Despite the fact that the choreostemic space concerns any kind of mentality, whether seen as hosted more by identifiable individuals or by collectives, the concept should not be taken as an actual philosophy of reason (“Philosophie des Geistes”). It transcends it as it does regarding any particular philosophical stance. It would be wrong as well to confine it into an anthropology or an anthropological architecture of philosophy, as it is the case not only in Hegel (Rölli, KAV137). In some way, it presents a generative zone for a-human philosophies, without falling prey to the necessity to define what human or a-human should mean. For sure, here we do not refer to transhumanism as it is known today, which just follows the traditional anthropological imperative of growth (“Steigerungslogik”), as Rölli correctly remarks (KAV459).

A-Human simply means that as a conception it is neither dependent nor confined to the human Lebenswelt. (We again would like to stress the point that it does neither represent a positively sayable universalism not even kind of a universal procedural principle, and as well that this “a-” should also not be understood as “anti” or “opposed”, simply as “being free of”). It is this position that is mandatory to draw comparisons40 and, subsequently, conclusions (in the form of introduced irreversibilities) about entities that belong to strikingly different Lebenswelten (forms of life). Any particular philosophical position immediately would be guilty in applying human scales to non-human entities. That was already a central cornerstone of Nietzsche’s critique not only of German philosophy of the 19th century, but also of natural sciences.

8.3. Simplicissimi

Rölli criticizes the uncritical adoption of items taken from the scientific world view by philosophy in the 19th century. Today, philosophy is still not secured against simplistic conceptions, uncritically assimilated from certain scientific styles, despite the fact that nowadays we could know about the (non-analytic) Linguistic Turn, or the dogmatics in empiricism. What I mean here comprises two conceptual ideas, the reduction of living or social system to states and the notion of exception or that of normality respectively.

There are myriads of references in the philosophy of mind invoking so-called mental states. Yet, not only in the philosophy of mind one can find the state as a concept, but also in political theory, namely in Giorgio Agamben’s recent work, which also builds heavily on the notion of the “state of exception”. The concept of a mental state is utter nonsense, though, and mainly so for three very different reasons. The first one can be derived from the theory of complex systems, the second one from language philosophy, and the third one from the choreostemic space.

In complex systems, the notion of a state is empty. What we can observe subsequent to the application of some empiric modeling is that complex systems exhibit meta-stability. It looks as if they are stable and trivial. Yet, what we could have learned mainly from biological sciences, but also from their formal consideration as complex systems, is that they aren’t trivial. There is no simple rule that could describe the flow of things in a particular period of time. The reason is precisely that they are creative. They build patterns, hence the build a further “phenomenal” level, where the various levels of integration can’t be reduced to one another. They exhibit points of bifurcation, which can be determined only in hindsight. Hence, from the empirical perspective we only can estimate the probability for stability. This, however, is clearly to weak as to support the claim of “states”.

In philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari in their “Thousand Plateaus” (p.48) have been among the first who recognized the important abstract contribution of Darwin by means of his theory. He opened the possibility to replace types and species by population, degrees by differential relations. Darwin himself, however, has not been able to complete this move. It took another 100 years until Manfred Eigen coined the term quasi-species as an increased density in a probability distribution. Talking about mental states is noting than a fallback into Linnean times when science was the endeavor to organize lists according to uncritical use of concepts.

Actually, from the perspective of language-oriented philosophy, the notion of a state is even empty for any dynamical system that is subject to open evolution (but probably even for trivial dynamic systems). A real system does not build “states”. There are only flows and memories. “State” is a concept, in particular, an idealistic—or at least an idealizing—concept that are only present in the interpreting entity. The fact that one first has to apply a model before it is possible to assign states is deliberately peculated whenever it is invoked by an argument that relates to philosophy or to any (other) kind of normativity. Therefore, the concept of “state” can’t be applied analytically, or as a condition in a linearly arranged argument. Saying that we do not claim that the concept of state is meaningless at large. In natural science, especially throughout the process of hypothesis building, the notion of state can be helpful (sometimes, at least).

Yet, if one would use it in philosophy in a recurrent manner, one would quickly arrive at the choreostemic space (or something very similar), where states are neither necessary nor even possible. Despite that a “state” is only assigned, i.e. as a concept, philosophers of mind41 and philosophers of political theory alike (as Agamben [37] among other materialists) use it as a phenomenal reference. It is indeed somewhat astonishing to observe this relapse into naive realism within the community of otherwise trained philosophers. One of the reasons for this may well be met in the missing training in mathematics.42

The third argument against the reasonability of the notion of “state” in philosophy can be derived from the choreostemic space. A cultural body comprises individual mentality as well as a collective mentality based on externalized symbolic systems like language, to make a long story short. Both together provide the possibility for meaning. It is absolutely impossible to assign a “state” to a cultural body without loosing the subject of culture itself. It would be much like a grammatical mistake. That “subject” is nothing else than a figurable trace in the choreostemic space. If one would do such an assignment instead, any finding would be relevant only within the reduced view. Hence, it would be completely irrelevant, as it could not support the self-imposed pragmatics. Continuing to argue about such finding then establishes a petitio principii: One would find only what you originally assumed. The whole argument would be empty and irrelevant.

Similar arguments can be put forward regarding the notion of the exceptional, if it is applied in contexts that are governed by concepts and their interpretation, as opposed to trivial causal relationships. Yet, Giorgio Agamben indeed started to built a political theory around the notion of exception [37], which—at first sight strange enough—already triggered an aesthetics of emergency. Elena Bellina [38] cites Agamben:

The state of exception “is neither external nor internal to the juridical order, and the problem of defining it concerns a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with each other.” In this sense, the state of exception is both a structured or rule-governed and an anomic phenomenon: “The state of exception separates the norm from its application in order to make its application possible. It introduces a zone of anomie into the law in order to make the effective regulation of the real possible.”

It results in nothing else than disastrous consequences if the notion of the exception would be applied to areas where normativity is relevant, e.g. in political theory. Throughout history there are many, many terrible examples for that. It is even problematic in engineering. We may even call it fully legitimized “negativity engineering”, as it establishes completely unnecessary the opposite of the normal and the deviant as an apriori. The notion of the exception presumes total control as an apriori. As such, it is opposed to the notion of openness, hence it also denies the primacy of interpretation. Machines that degenerate and that would produce disasters on any malfunctioning can’t be considered as being built smartly. In a setup that embraces indeterminateness, there is even no possibility for disastrous fault. Instead, deviances are defined only with respect to the expectable, not against an apriori set, hence obscure, normality. If the deviance is taken as the usual (not the normal, though!), fault-tolerance and even self-healing could be built in as a core property, not as an “exception handling”.

Exception is the negative category to the normal. It requires models to define normality, models to quantify the deviation and finally also arbitrary thresholds to label it. All of the three steps can be applied in linear domains only, where the whole is dependent on just very few parameters. For social mega-systems as societies it is nothing else than a methodological categorical illusion to apply the concept of the exception.

9. Critique of Paradoxically Conditioned Reason

Nothing could be more different to that than pragmatism, for which the choreostemic space can serve as the ultimate theory. Pragmatism always suffered from—or at least has been violable against—the reproach of relativism, because within pragmatism it is impossible to argue against it. With the choreostemic space we have constructed a self-sufficient, self-containing and a necessary model that not only supports pragmatism, but also destroys any possibility of universal normative position or normativity. Probably even more significant, it also abolishes relativism through the implied concept of the concrete choreostemic figure, which can be taken as the differential of the institution or the of tradition43. Choreostemic figures are quite stable since they relate to mentality qua population, which means that they are formed as a population of mental acts or as mental acts of the members of a population. Even for individuals it is quite hard to change the attractor inhabited in choreostemic space, to change into another attractor or even to build up a new one.

In this section we will check out the structure of the way we can use the choreostemic space. Naively spoken we could ask for instance, how can we derive a guideline to improve actions? How can we use it to analyse a philosophical attitude or a political writing? Where are the limits of the choreostemic space?

The structure behind such questions concerns a choice on a quite fundamental level. The issue is whether to argue strictly in positive terms, to allow negative terms, or even to define anything starting from negative terms only. In fact, there are quite a few of different possibilities to arrange any melange of positivity or negativity. For instance, one could ontologically insist first on contingency as a positivity, upon then constraints would act as a negativity. Such traces we will not follow here. We regard them either as not focused enough or, most of them, as being infected by realist ontology.

In more practical terms this issue of positivity and negativity regards the way of how to deal with justifications and conditions. Deleuze argues for strict positivity; in that he follows Spinoza and Nietzsche. Common sense, in contrast, is given only as far as it is defined against the non-common. In this respect, any of the existential philosophical attitudes, whether Christian religion, phenomenology or existentialism, are quite similar to each other. Even Levinas’ Other is infected by it.

Admittedly, at first hand it seems quite difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at an appropriate valuation of other persons, the stranger, the strange, in short, the Other, but also the alienated. Or likewise, how to derive or develop a stance to the world that does not start from existence. Isn’t existence the only thing we can be sure about? And isn’t the external, the experience the only stable positivity we can think about? Here, we shout a loud No! Nevertheless we definitely do not deny the external either.

We just mentioned that the issue of justification is invoked by our interests here. This gives rise to ask about the relation of the choreostemic space to epistemology. We will return to this in the second half of this section.

Positivity. Negativity.

Obviously, the problem of the positive is not the positive, but how we are going to approach it. If we set it primary, we first run into problems of justification, then into ethical problems. Setting the external, the existence, or the factual positive as primary we neglect the primacy of interpretation. Hence, we can’t think about the positive as an instance. We have to think of it as a Differential.

The Differential is defined as an entirety, yet not instantiated. Its factuality is potential, hence its formal being is neither exhaustive nor limiting its factuality, or positivity. Its givenness demands for action, that is for a decision (which is sayable regarding its immediacy) bundled with a performance (which is open and just demonstrable as a matter of fact).

The concept of choreosteme follows closely Deleuze’s idea of the Differential: It is built into the possibility of expressibility that spans as the space between the _Directionsas they are indicated by the transcendental aspects _A.The choreostemic space does not constitute a positively definable stance, since the space for it, the choreostemic space is not made from elements that could be defined apriori to any moment in time. Nevertheless it is well-defined. In order to provide an example which requires a similar approach we may refer to the space of patterns as they are potentially generated by Turing-systems. The mechanics of Turing-patterns, its mechanism, is well-defined as well, it is given in its entirety, but the space of the patterns can’t be defined positively. Without deep interpretation there is nothing like a Turing-pattern. Maybe, that’s one of the reasons that hard sciences still have difficulties to deal adequately with complexity.

Besides the formal description of structure and mechanism of our space there is nothing left about one could speak or think any further. We just could proceed by practicing it. This mechanism establishes a paradoxicality insofar as it does not contain determinable locations. This indeterminateness is even much stronger than the principle of uncertainty as it is known from quantum physics, which so far is not constructed in a self-referential manner (at least if we follow the received views). Without any determinate location, there seems to be no determinable figure either, at least none of which we could say that we could grasp them “directly”, or intuitively. Yet, figures may indeed appear in the choreostemic space, though only by applying orthoregulative scaffolds, such as traditions, institutions, or communities that form cultural fields of proposals/propositions (“Aussagefeld”), as Foucault named it [40].

The choreostemic space is not a negativity, though. It does not impose apriori determinable factual limits to a real situation, whether internal or external. It even doesn’t provide the possibility for an opposite. Due to its self-referentiality it can be instantiated into positivity OR negativity, dependent on the “vector”—actually, it is more a moving cloud of probabilities—one currently belongs to or that one is currently establishing by one’s own  performances.

It is the necessity of choice itself, appearing in the course of instantiation of the twofold Differential, that introduces the positive and the negative. In turn, whenever we meet an opposite we can conclude that there has been a preceding choice within an instantiation. Think about de Saussure structuralist theory of language, which is full of opposites. Deleuze argues (DR205) that the starting point of opposites betrays language:

In other words, are we not on the lesser side of language rather than the side of the one who speaks and assigns meaning? Have we not already betrayed the nature of the play of language – in other words, the sense of that combinatory, of those imperatives or linguistic throws of the dice which, like Artaud’s cries, can be understood only by the one who speaks in the transcendent exercise of language? In short, the translation of difference into opposition seems to us to concern not a simple question of terminology or convention, but rather the essence of language and the linguistic Idea.

In more traditional terms one could say it is dependent on the “perspective”. Yet, the concept of “perspective” is fallacious here, at least so, since it assumes a determinable stand point. By means of the choreostemic space, we may replace the notion of perspectives by the choreostemic figure, which reflects both the underlying dynamics and the problematic field much more adequately. In contrast to the “perspective”, or even of such, a choreostemic figure spans across time. Another difference is that a perspective needs to be taken, which does not allow for continuity, while a choreostemic figure evolves continually. The possibility for negativity is determined along the instantiation from choreosteme to thought, while the positivity is built into the choreostemic space as a potential. (Negative potentials are not possible.)

Such, the choreostemic space is immune to any attempt—should we say poison pill?—to apply a dialectic of the negative, whether we consider single, double, or absurdly enough multiply repeated ones. Think about Hegel’s negativity, Marx’s rejection and proposal for a double negativity, or the dropback by Marcuse, all of which must be counted simply as stupidity. Negativity as the main structural element of thinking did not vanish, though, as we can see in the global movement of anti-capitalism or the global movement of anti-globalization. They all got—or still get—victimized by the failure to leave behind the duality of concepts and to turn them into a frame of quantitability. A recent example for that ominous fault is given by the work of Giorgio Agamben; Morgan writes:

Given that suspending law only increases its violent activity, Agamben proposes that ‘deactivating’ law, rather erasing it, is the only way to undermine its unleashed force. (p.60)

The first question, of course, is, why the heck does Agamben think that law, that is: any lawfulness, must be abolished. Such a claim includes the denial of any organization and any institution, above all, as practical structures, as immaterial infrastructures and grounding for any kind of negotiation. As Rölli noted in accordance to Nietzsche, there is quite an unholy alliance between romanticism and modernism. Agamben, completely incapable of getting aware of the virtual and of the differential alike, thus completely stuck in a luxurating system of “anti” attitudes, finds himself faced with quite a difficulty. In his mono-(zero) dimensional modernist conception of world he claims:

“What is found after the law is not a more proper and original use value that precedes law, but a new use that is born only after it. And use, which has been contaminated by law, must also be freed from its value. This liberation is the task of study, or of play.”

Is it really reasonable to demand for a world where uses, i.e. actions, are not “contaminated” by law? Morgan continues:

In proposing this playful relation Agamben makes the move that Benjamin avoids: explicitly describing what would remain after the violent destruction of normativity itself. ‘Play’ names the unknowable end of ‘divine violence’.

Obviously, Agamben never realized any paradox concerning rule-following. Instead, he runs amok against his own prejudices. “Divine violence” is the violence of ignorance. Yet, abolishing knowledge does not help either, nor is it an admirable goal in itself. As Derrida (another master of negativity) before him, in the end he demands for stopping interpretation, any and completely. Agamben provides us nothing else than just another modernist flavour of a philosophy of negativity that results in nihilistic in-humanism (quite contrary to Nietzsche, by the way). It is somewhat terrifying that Agamben receives not jut little attention currently.

In the last statement we are going to cite from Morgan, we can see in which eminent way Agamben is a thinker of the early 19th century, incapable to contribute any reasonable suggestion to current political theory:

But it is not only the negative structure of the argument but also the kind of negativity that is continuous between Agamben’s analyses of aesthetic and legal judgement. In other words, ‘normality without a norm’, which paradoxically articulates the subtraction of normativity from the normal, is simply another way of saying ‘law without force or application’.

This Kantian formulation is not only fully packed with uncritical aprioris, such like normality or the normal, which marks Agamben as an epigonic utterer of common sense. As this ancient form of idealism demonstrates, Agamben obviously never heard anything of the linguistic turn as well. The unfortunate issue with Agamben’s writing is that it is considered both as influential and pace-making.

So, should we reject negativity and turn to positivity? Rejecting negativity turns problematic only if it is taken as an attitude that stretches out from the principle down to the activity. Notably, the same is true for positivity. We need not to get rid of it, which only would send us into the abyss of totalised mysticism. Instead, we have to transcend them into the Differential that “precedes” both. While the former could be reframed into the conditionability of processes (but not into constraints!), the latter finds its non-representational roots in the potential and the virtual. If the positive is taken as a totalizing metaphysics, we soon end in overdone specialization, uncritical neo-liberalism or even dictatorship, or in idealism as an ideology. The turn to a metaphysics of (representational) positivity is incurably caught in the necessity of justification, which—unfortunately enough for positivists—can’t be grounded within a positive metaphysics. To justify, that is to give “good reasons”, is a contradictio in adiecto, if it is understood in its logic or idealistic form.

Both, negativity and positivity (in their representational instances) could work only if there is a preceding and more or less concrete subject, which of course could not presupposed when we are talking about “first reasons” or “justification”. This does not only apply to political theory or practice, it even holds for logic as a positively given structure. Abstractly, we can rewrite the concreteness into countability. Turning the whole thing around we see that as long as something is countable we will be confined by negativity and positivity on the representational level. Herein lies the limitation of the Universal Turing Machine. Herein lies also the inherent limitation of any materialism, whether in its profane or it theistic form. By means of the choreostemic space we can see various ways out of this confined space. We may, for instance, remove the countability from numbers by mediatizing it into probabilities. Alternatively, we may introduce a concept like infinity to indicate the conceptualness of numbers and countability. It is somewhat interesting that it is the concept of the infinite that challenges the empiric character of numbers. Else, we could deny representationalism in numbers while trying to keep countability. This creates the strange category of infinitesimals. Or we create multi-dimensional number spaces like the imaginary numbers. There are, of course, many, many ways to transcend the countability of numbers, which we can’t even list here. Yet, it is of utmost importance to understand that the infinite, as any other instance of departure from countability, is not a number any more. It is not countable either in the way Cantor proposed, that is, thinking of a smooth space of countability that stretches between empiric numbers and the infinite. We may count just the symbols, but the reference has inevitably changed. The empirics is targeting the number of the symbols, not the their content, which has been defined as “incountability”. Only by this misunderstanding one could get struck by the illusion that there is something like the countability of the infinite. In some ways, even real numbers do not refer to the language game of countability, and all the more irrational numbers don’t either. It is much more appropriate to conceive of them as potential numbers; it may well be that precisely this is the major reason for the success of mathematics.

The choreostemic space is the condition for separating the positive and the negative. It is structure and tool, principle and measure. Its topology implies the necessity for instantiation and renders the representationalist fallacy impossible; nevertheless, it allows to map mental attitudes and cultural habits for comparative purposes. Yet, this mapping can’t be used for modeling or anticipation. In some way it is the basis for subjectivity as pre-specific property, that is for a _Subjectivity,of course without objectivity. Therefore, the choreostemic space also allows to overcome the naïve and unholy separation of subjects and objects, without denying the practical dimension of this separation. Of course, it does so by rejecting even the tiniest trace of idealism, or apriorisms respectively.

The choreostemic space does not separate apriori the individual or the collective forms of mentality. In describing mentality it is not limited to the sayable, hence it can’t be attacked or even swallowed by positivism. Since it provides the means to map those habitual _Mentalfigures, people could talk about transitions between different attractors, which we could call “choreostemic galaxies”. The critical issue of values, those typical representatives of uncritical aprioris, is completely turned into a practical concern. Obviously, we can talk about “form” regarding politics without the need to invoke aesthetics. As Benjamin Morgan recently demonstrated (in the already cited [41]), aesthetics in politics necessarily refers to idealism.

Rejecting representational positivity, that is, any positivity that we could speak of in a formal manner, is equivalent to the rejection of first reason as an aprioric instance. As we already proposed for representational positivity, the claim of a first reason as a point of departure that is never revisited again results as well in a motionless endpoint, somewhere in the triangle built from materialism, idealism or realism. Attempts to soften this outcome by proposing a playful, or hypothetical, if not pragmatic, “fixation of first principles” are not convincing, mainly because this does not allow for any coherence between games, which results in a strong relativity of principles. We just could not talk about the relationships between those “firstness games”. In other words, we would not gain anything. An example for such a move is provided by Epperson [42].  Though he refers to the Aristotelian potential, he sticks with representational first principles, in his case logic in the form of the principle of the excluded middle and the principle of non-contradiction. Epperson does not get aware of the problems regarding the use of symbols in doing this. Once Wittgenstein critized the very same point in the Principia by Russell and Whitehead. Additionally, representational first principles are always transporters for ontological claims. As long as we recognize that the world is NOT made from objects, but of relations organized, selected and projected by each individual through interpretation, we would face severe difficulties. Only naive realism allows for a frictionless use of first principles. Yet, for a price that is definitely too high.

We think that the way we dissolved the problem of first reason has several advantages as compared to Deleuze’s proposal of the absolute plane of immanence. First, we do not need the notion of absoluteness, which appears at several instances in Deleuze’s main works “What is Philosophy?” [35] (WIP), “Empiricism and Subjectivity [43], and his “Pure Immanence” [44]. The second problem with the plane of immanence concerns the relation between immanence and transcendence. Deleuze refers to two different kinds of transcendence. While in WIP he denounces transcendence as inappropriate due to its heading towards identity, the whole concept of transcendental empiricism is built on the Kantian invention. This two-fold measure can’t be resolved. Transcendence should not be described by its target. Third, Deleuze’s distinction between the absolute plane of immanence and the “personal” one, instantiated by each new philosophical work, leaves a major problem: Deleuze leaves completely opaque how to relate the two kinds of immanence to each other. Additionally, there is a potentially infinite number of “immanences,” implying a classification, a differential and an abstract kind of immanence, all of which is highly corrosive for the idea of immanence itself. At least, as long one conceives immanence not as an entity that could be naturalized. This way, Deleuze splits the problem of grounding into two parts: (1) a pure, hence “transcendent” immanence, and (2) the gap between absolute and personal immanence. While the first part could be accepted, the second one is left completely untouched by Deleuze. The problem of grounding has just been moved into a layer cake. Presumably, these problems are caused by the fact that Deleuze just considers concepts, or _Concepts, if we’d like to consider the transcendental version as well. Several of those imply the plane of immanence, which can’t be described, which has no structure, and which just is implied by the factuality of concepts. Our choreostemic space moves this indeterminacy and openness into a “form” aspect in a non-representational, non-expressive space with the topology of a double-differential. But more important is that we not only have a topology at our disposal which allows to speak about it without imposing any limitation, we else use three other foundational and irreducibly elements to think that space, the choreostemic space. The CS thus also brings immanence and transcendence into the same single structure.

In this section we have discussed a change of perspective towards negativity and positivity. This change did become accessible by the differential structure of the choreostemic space. The problematic field represented by them and all the respective pseudo-solutions has been dissolved. This abandonment we achieved through the “Lagrangean principle”, that is, we replaced the constants—positivity and negativity respectively—by a procedure—instantiation of the Differential—plus a different constant. Yet, this constant is itself not a not a finite replacement, i.e. a “constant” as an invariance. The “constant” is only a relative one: the orthoregulation, comprising habits, traditions and institutions.

Reason—or as we would like to propose for its less anthropological character and better scalability­, mentality—has been reconstructed as a kind of omnipresent reflection on the conditionability of proceedings in the choreostemic space. The conditionability can’t be determined in advance to the performed mental proceedings (acts), which for many could appear as somewhat paradoxical. Yet, it is not. The situation is quite similar to Wittgenstein’s transcendental logic that also gets instantiated just by doing something, while the possibility for performance precedes that of logic.

Finally, there is of course the question, whether there is any condition that we impose onto the choreostemic itself, a condition that would not be resolved by its self-referentiality. Well, there is indeed one: The only unjustified apriori of the choreostemic space seems to be the primacy of interpretation (POI). This apriori, however, is only a weak one, and above all, a practicable one, or one that derives from the openness of the world. Ultimately, the POI in turn is a direct consequence of the time-being. Any other aspect of interpretation is indeed absorbed by the choreostemic space and its self-referentiality, hence requiring no further external axioms or the like. In other words, the starting point of the choreostemic space, or the philosophical attitude of the choreosteme, is openness, the insight that the world is far to generative as to comprehend all of it.

The fact that it is almost without any apriori renders the choreostemic space suitable for those practical purposes where the openness and its sibling, ignorance, calls for dedicated activity, e.g. in all questions of cross-disciplinarity or trans-culturality. As far as different persons establish different forms of life, the choreostemic space even is highly relevant for any aspect of cross-personality. This in turn gives rise to a completely new approach to ethics, which we can’t follow here, though.

<h5>Mentality without Knowledge</h5>

Two of the transcendental aspects of the choreostemic space are _Model,and _Concept. The concepts of model and concept, that is, instantiations of our aspects, are key terms in philosophy of science and epistemology. Else, we proposed that our approach brings with it a new image of thought. We also said that mental activities inscribe figures or attractors into that space. Since we are additionally interested in the issue of justification—we are trying to get rid of them—the question of the relation between the choreostemic space and epistemology is being triggered.

The traditional primary topic of epistemology is knowledge, how we acquire it, particularly however the questions of first how to separate it from beliefs (in the common sense) on the one hand, and second how to secure it in a way that we possibly could speak about truth. In a general account, epistemology is also about the conditions of knowledge.

Our position is pretty clear: the choreostemic space is something that is categorically different from episteme or epistemology. Which are the reasons?

We reject the view that truth in its usual version is a reasonable category for talking about reasoning. Truth as a property of a proposition can’t be a part of the world. We can’t know anything for sure, neither regarding the local context, nor globally. Truth is an element of logic, and the only truth we can know of is empty: a=a. Yet, knowledge is supposed to be about empirical facts (arrangements of relations). Wittgenstein thus set logic as transcendental. Only the transcendental logic can be free of semantics and thus only within transcendental logic we can speak of truth conditions. The consequence is that we can observe either of two effects. First, any actual logic contains some semantic references, because of which it could be regarded as “logic” only approximately. Second, insisting on the application of logical truth values to actual contexts instead results in a categorical fault. The conclusion is that knowledge can’t be secured neither locally from a small given set of sentences about empirical facts, nor globally. We even can’t measure the reliability of knowledge, since this would mean to have more knowledge about the fact than it is given by the local observations provide. As a result, paradoxes and antinomies occur. The only thing we can do is try to build networks of stable models for a negotiable anticipation with negotiable purposes. In other words, facts are not given by relation between objects, but rather as a system of relations between models, which as a whole is both accepted by a community of co-modelers and which provides satisfying anticipatory power. Compared to that the notion of partial truth (Newton da Costa & Steven French) is still misconceived. It keeps sticking to the wrong basic idea and as such it is inferior to our concept of the abstract model. After all, any account of truth violates the fact that it is itself a language game.

Dropping the idea of truth we could already conclude that the choreostemic space is not about epistemology.

Well, one might say, ok, then it is an improved epistemology. Yet, this we would reject as well. The reason for that is a grammatical one. Knowledge in the meaning of epistemology is either about sayable or demonstrable facts. If someone says “I know”, or if someone ascribes to another person “he knows”, or if a person performs well and in hindsight her performance is qualified as “based on intricate knowledge” or the like, we postulate an object or entity called knowledge, almost in an ontological fashion. This perspective has been rejected by Isabelle Peschard [45]. According to her, knowledge can’t be separated from activity, or “enaction”, and knowledge must be conceived as a social embedded practice, not as a stateful outcome. For her, knowledge is not about representation at all. This includes the rejection of the truth conditions as a reasonable part of a concept of knowledge. Else, it will be impossible to give a complete or analytical description of this enaction, because it is impossible to describe (=to explicate) the Form of Life in a self containing manner.

In any case, however, knowledge is always, at least partially, about how to do something, even if it is about highly abstract issues. That means that a partial description of knowledge is possible. Yet, as a second grammatical reason, the choreostemic space does not allow for any representations at all, due to its structure, which is strictly local and made up from the second-order differential.

There are further differences. The CS is a tool for the expression of mental attractors, to which we can assign distinct yet open forms. To do so we need the concepts of mediality and virtuality, which are not mentioned anywhere in epistemology. Mental attractors, or figures, will always “comprise” beliefs, models, ideas, concepts as instances of transcendental entities, and these instances are local instances, which are even individually constrained. It is not possible to explicate these attractors other than by “living” it.

In some way, the choreostemic space is intimately related to the philosophy of C.S. Peirce, which is called “semiotics”. As he did, we propose a primacy of interpretation. We fully embrace his emphasis that signs only refer to signs. We agree with his attempt for discerning different kinds of signs. And we think that his firstness, secondness and thirdness could be related to the mechanisms of the choreostemic space. In some way, the CS could be conceived as a generalization of semiotics. Saying this, we also may point to the fact that Peirce’s philosophy is not  regarded as epistemology either.

Rejecting the characterization of the choreostemic space as an epistemological subject we can now even better understand the contours of the notion of mentality. The “mental” can’t be considered as a set of things like beliefs, wishes, experiences, expectations, thought experiments, etc. These are just practices, or likewise practices of speaking about the relation between private and public aspects of thinking. Any of these items belong to the same mentality, to the same choreostemic figures.

In contrast to Wittgenstein, however, we propose to discard completely the distinction between internal and external aspects of the mental.

And nothing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning a mental activity! Unless, that is, one is setting out to produce confusion.” [PI §693]

One of the transcendental aspects in the CS is concept, another is model. Both together are providing the aspects of use, idea and reference, that is, there is nothing internal and external any more. It simply depends on the purpose of the description, or the kind of report we want to create about the mental, whether we talk about the mental in an internalist or in externalist way, whether we talk about acts, concepts, signs, or models. Regardless, what we do as humans, it will always be predominantly a mental act, irrespective the change of material reconfigurations.

10. Conclusion

It is probably not an exaggeration to say that in the last two decades the diversity of mentality has been discovered. A whole range of developments and shifts in public life may have been contributing to that, concerning several domains, namely from politics, technology, social life, behavioural science and, last but not least, brain research. We saw the end of the Cold War, which has been signalling an unrooting of functionalism far beyond the domain of politics, and simultaneously the growth and discovery of the WWW and its accompanied “scopic44 media” [46, 47]. The “scopics” spurred the so-called globalization that worked much more in favour of the recognition of diversity than it levelled that diversity, at least so far. While we are still in the midst of the popularization and increasingly abundant usage of so-called machine learning, we already witness an intensified mutual penetration and amalgamation of technological and social issues. In the behavioural sciences, probably also supported by the deepening of mediatization, an unforeseen interest in the mental and social capabilities of animals manifested, pushing back the merely positivist and dissecting description of behavior. As one of the most salient examples may serve the confirmation of cultural traditions in dolphins and orcas, concerning communication as well as highly complex collaborative hunting.  The unfolding of collaboration requires the mutual and temporal assignment of functional roles for a given task. This not only prerequisites a true understanding of causality, but even its reflected use as a game in probabilistic spaces.

Let us distil three modes or forms here, (i) the animal culture, (ii) the machine-becoming and of course (iii) the human life forms in the age of intensified mediatization. All three modes must be considered as “novel” ones, for one reason or another. We won’t go in any further detail here, yet it is pretty clear that the triad of these three modes render any monolithic or anthropologically imprinted form of philosophy of mind impossible. In turn, any philosophy of mind that is limited to just the human brains relation to the world, or even worse, which imposes analytical, logical or functional perspectives onto it, must be considered as seriously defect. This applies still to large parts of the mainstream in philosophy of mind (and even ethics).

In this essay we argued for a new Image of Thought that is independent from the experience of or by a particular form of life, form of informational45 organization or cultural setting, respectively. This new Image of Thought is represented through the choreostemic space. This space is dynamic and active and can be described formally only if it is “frozen” into an analytical reduction. Yet, its self-referentiality and self-directed generativity is a major ingredient. This self-referentiality is takes a salient role in the space’s capability to  leave its conditions behind.

One of the main points of the choreostemic space (CS) probably is that we can not talk about “thought”—regardless its quasi-material and informational foundations—without referring to the choreostemic space. It is a (very) strong argument against Rylean concepts about the mind that claim the irrelevance of the concept of the mental by proposing that looking at the behavior is sufficient to talk about the “mind”. Of course, the CS does not support “the dogma of the ghost in the machine“ either. The choreostemic space defies (and helps to defy) any empirical and so also anthropological myopias through its triple-feature of transcendental framing, differential operation and immanent rooting. Such it is immune against naturalist fallacies such as Cartesian dualism as well as against arbitrariness or relativism. Neither it could be infected by any kind of preoccupation such like idealism or universalism. Despite one could regard it in some way as “pure Thought”, or consider it as the expressive situs of it, its purity is not an idealistic one. It dissolves either into the metaphysical transcendentality of the four conceptual aspects _a,that is, the _Model, _Mediality,_Concept,and _Virtuality.Or it takes the form of the Differential that could be considered as being kind of a practical transcendentality46 [48].  There, as one of her starting points Bühlmann writes:

Deleuze’s fundamental critique in Difference and Repetition is that throughout the history of philosophy, these conditions have always been considered as »already confined« in one way or another: Either within »a formless, entirely undifferentiated underground« or »abyss« even, or within the »highly personalized form« of an »autocratically individuated Being«

Our choreostemic space provides also the answer to the problematics of conditions.47  As Deleuze, we suggest to regard conditions only as secondary, that is as relevant entities only after any actualization. This avoids negativity as a metaphysical principle. Yet, in order to get completely rid of any condition while at the same time retain conditionability as a transcendental entity we have to resort to self-referentiality as a generic principle. Hence, our proposal goes beyond Deleuze’s framework as he developed it from “Difference and Repetition” until “What is Philosophy?”, since he never made this move.

Basically, the CS supports Wittgenstein’s rejection of materialism, which experienced a completely unjustified revival in the various shades of neuro-isms. Malcolm cites him [49]:

It makes as little sense to ascribe experiences, wishes, thoughts, beliefs, to  a brain as to a mushroom. (p.186)

This support should not surprise, since the CS was deliberately constructed to be compatible with the concept of language game. Despite the CS also supports his famous remark about meaning:

And nothing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning a mental activity! Unless, that is, one is setting out to produce confusion.” [PI §693]

it is also clear that the CS may be taken as a means to overcome the debate about external or internal primacies or foundations of meaning. The duality of internal vs. external is neutralized in the CS. While modeling and such the abstract model always requires some kind of material body, hence representing the route into some interiority, the CS is also spanned by the Concept and by Mediality. Both concepts are explicit ties between any kind of interiority and and any kind of exteriority, without preferring a direction at all. The proposal that any mental activity inscribes attractors into that space just means that interiority and exteriority can’t be separated at all, regardless the actual conceptualisation of mind or mentality. Yet, in accordance with PI 693 we also admit that the choreostemic space is not equal to the mental. Any particular mentality unfolds as an actual performance in the CS. Of course, the CS does not describe material reconfigurations, environmental contingency etc. and the performance taking place “there”. In other words, it does not cover any aspect of use. On the other hand, material reconfiguration are simply not “there” as long as they do not get interpreted by applying some kind of model.

The CS clearly shows that we should regard questions like “Where is the mind?” as kind of a grammatical mistake, as Blair lucidly demonstrates [50]. Such a usage of the word “mind” not only implies irrevocably that it is a localizable entity. It also claims its conceptual separatedness. Such a conceptualization of the mind is illusionary. The consequences for any attempt to render “machines” “more intelligent” are obviously quite dramatic. As for the brain, it is likewise impossible to “localize” mental capacities in the case of epistemic machines. This fundamental de-territorialization is not a consequence of scale, as in quantum physics. It is a consequence of the verticality of the differential, the related necessity of forms of construction and the fact, that a non-formal, open language, implying randolations to the community, is mandatory to deal with concepts.

One important question about a story like the “choreostemic space” with its divergent, but nevertheless intimately tied four-fold transcendentality is about the status of that space. What “is” it? How could it affect actual thought? Since we have been starting even with  mathematical concepts like space, mappings, topology, or differential, and since our arguments frequently invokes the concept of mechanism,one could suspect that it is a piece of analytical philosophy. This ascription we can clearly reject.

Peter Hacker convincingly argues that “analytical philosophy” can’t be specified by a set of properties of such assumed philosophy. He proposes to consider it as a historical phase of philosophy, with several episodes, beginning around 1890 [53]. Nevertheless, during the 1970ies a a set of believes formed kind of a basic setup. Hacker writes:

But there was broad consensus on three points. First, no advance in philosophical understanding can be expected without the propaedeutic of investigating the use of the words relevant to the problem at hand. Second, metaphysics, understood as the philosophical investigation into the objective, language-independent, nature of the world, is an illusion. Third, philosophy, contrary to what Russell had thought, is not continuous with, but altogether distinct from science. Its task, contrary to what the Vienna Circle averred, is not the clarification or ‘improvement’ of the language of science.

Where we definitely disagree is at the point about metaphysics. Not only do we refute the view that metaphysics is about the objective, language-independent, nature of the world. As such we indeed would reject metaphysics. An example for this kind of thinking is provided by the writing of Whitehead. It should have become clear throughout our writing that we stick to the primacy of interpretation, and accordingly we do regard the believe in an objective reality as deeply misconceived. Thereby we do neither claim that our mental life is independent from the environment—as radical constructivism (Varela & Co) does—nor do we claim that there is no external world around us that is independent from our perception and constructions. Such is just belief in metaphysical independence, which plays an important tole in modernism. The idea of objective reality is also infected by this belief, resulting in a self-contradiction. For “objective” makes sense only as an index to some kind of sociality, and hence to a group sharing a language, and further to the use of language. The claim of “objective reality is thus childish.

More important, however, we have seen that the self-referentiality of terms like concept (we called those “strongly singular terms“) enforces us to acknowledge that Concept, much like logic, is a transcendental category. Obviously we refer strongly to transcendental, that is metaphysical categories. At the same time we also propose, however, that there are manifolds of instances of those transcendental categories.

The choreostemic space describes a mechanism. In that it resembles to the science of biology, where the concept of mechanism is an important epistemological tool. As such, we try to defend against mysticism, against the threat that is proposed by any all too quick reference to the “Lebenswelt”, the form of life and the ways of living. But is it really an “analysis”?

Putnam called “analysis” an “inexplicable noise”[54]. His critique was precisely that semantics can’t be found by any kind of formalization, that is outside of the use of language. In this sense we certainly are not doing analytic philosophy. As a final point we again want to emphasize that it is not possible to describe the choreostemic space completely, that is, all the conditions and effects, etc., due to its self-referentiality. It is a generative space that confirms its structure by itself. Nevertheless it is neither useless nor does it support solipsism. In a fully conscious act it can be used to describe the entirety of mental activity, and only as a fully conscious act, while this description is a fully non-representational description. In this way it overcomes not only the Cartesian dualism about consciousness. In fact, it is another way to criticise the distinction between interiority and exteriority.

For one part we agree with Wittgenstein’s critique (see also the work of PMS Hacker about that), which identifies the “mystery” of consciousness as an illusion. The concept of the language game, which is for one part certainly an empiric concept, is substantial for the choreostemic space. Yet, the CS provides several routes between the private and the communal, without actually representing one or the other. The CS does no distinguish between the interior and the exterior at all, just recall that mediality is one of the transcendental aspects. Along with Wittgenstein’s “solipsistic realism” we consequently reject also the idea that ontology can be about the external world, as this again would introduce such a separation. Quite to the contrast, the CS vanishes the need for the naive conception of ontology. Ontology makes sense only within the choreostemic space.

Yet, we certainly embrace the idea that mental processes are ultimately “based” on physical matter, but unfolded into and by their immaterial external surrounds, yielding an inextricable compound. Referring to any “neuro” stuff regarding the mental does neither “explain” anything nor is it helpful to any regard, whether one considers it as neuro-science or as neuro-phenomenology.

Summarizing the issue we may say that the choreostemic space opens a completely new level for any philosophy of the mental, not just what is being called the human “mind”. It also allows to address scientific questions about the mental in a different way, as well as it clarifies the route to machines that could draw their own traces and figures into that space. It makes irrepealable clear that any kind of functionalism or materialism is once and for all falsified.

Let us now finally inspect our initial question that we put forward in the editorial essay. Is there a limit for the mental capacity of machines? If yes, which kind of limit and where could we draw it? The question about the limit of machines directly triggers the question about the image of humanity („Bild des Menschen“), which is fuelled from the opposite direction. So, does this imply kind of a demarcation line between the domain of the machines and the realm of the human? Definitely not, of course. To opt for such a separation would not only follow idealist-romanticist line of critizising technology, but also instantiate a primary negativity.

Based on the choreostemic space, our proposal is a fundamentally different one. It can be argue that this space can contains any condition of any thought as an population of unfolding thoughts. These unfoldings inscribe different successions into the space, appearing as attractors and figures. The key point of this is that different figures, representing different Lebensformen (Forms of Life) that are probably even incommensurable to each other, can be related to each other without reducing any of them. The choreostemic space is a space of mental co-habitation.

Let us for instance start with the functionalist perspective that is so abundant in modernism since the times of Descartes. A purely functionalist stance is just a particular figure in that space, as it applies to any other style of thinking. Using the dictum of the choreosteme as a guideline, it is relatively easy to widen the perspective into a more appropriate one. Several developmental paths into a different choreostemic attractor are possible. For instance, mediatization through social embedding [52], opening through autonomous associative mechanisms as we have described it, or the adhoc recombination of conceptual principles as it has been demonstrated by Douglas Hofstadter. Letting a robot range freely around also provokes the first tiny steps away from functionalism, albeit the behavioral Bauplan of the insects (arthropoda) demonstrates that this does not install a necessity for the evolutionary path to advanced mental capabilities.

The choreostemic space can serve as such a guideline because it is not infected by anthropology in any regard. Nevertheless it allows to speak clearly about concepts like belief and knowledge, of course, without reducing these concepts to positive definite or functionalist definitions. It also remains completely compatible with Wittgenstein’s concept of the language game. For instance, we reconstructed the language game “knowing” as a label for a pointer (say reference) to a particular image of thought and its use. Of course, this figure should not be conceived as a fixed point attractor, as the various shades of materialism, idealism and functionalism actually would do (if they would argue along the choreosteme). It is somewhat interesting that here, by means of the choreostemic space, Wittgenstein and Deleuze approach each other quite closely, something they themselves would not have been supported, probably.

Where is the limit of machines, then?

I guess, any answer must refer to the capability to leave a well-formed trace in the choreostemic space. As such, the limits of machines are to be found in the same way as they are found for us humans: To feel and to act as an entity that is able to contribute to culture and to assimilate it in its mental activity.

We started the choreostemic space as a framework to talk about thinking, or more general: about mentality, in a non-anthropological and non.-reductionist manner. In the course of our investigation, we found a tool that actualizes itself into real social and cognitive situations. We also found the infinite space of choreostemic galaxies as attractors for eternal returns without repetition of the identical. Choreosteme keeps the any alive, without subjugating individuality, it provides a new and extended level of sayability without falling into representationalism. Taken together, as a new Image of Thought it allows to develop thinking deliberately and as part of a multitudinous variety.

Notes

1. This piece is thought of as a close relative to Deleuze’s Difference & Repetition (D&R)[1]. Think of it as a satellite of it, whose point of nearest approach is at the end of part IV of D&R, and thus also as a kind of extension of D&R.

2. Deleuze of course, belongs to them, but of course also Ludwig Wittgenstein (see §201 of PI [2], “paradox” of rule following), and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl [3], who presented three mutually paradoxical maxims as a new kind of a theory of morality (ethics), that resists the reference to monolithically set first principles, such as for instance in John Rawls’ “Theory of Justice”. The work of those philosophers also provides examples of how to turn paradoxicality productive, without creating paradoxes at all, the main trick being to overcome their fixation by a process. Many others, including Derrida, just recognize paradoxes, but are neither able to conceive of paradoxicality nor to distinguish them from paradoxes, hence they take paradoxes just as unfortunate ontological knots. In such works, one can usually find one or the other way to prohibit interpretation (think about the trail, grm. “Spur” in Derrida)

3. Paradoxes and antinomies like those described by Taylor, Banach-Tarski, Russell or of course Zenon are all defect, i.e. pseudo-paradoxes, because they violate their own “gaming pragmatics”. They are not paradoxical at all, but rather either simply false or arbitrarily fixed within the state of such violation. The same fault is committed by the Sorites paradox and its relatives. They are all mixing up—or colliding—the language game of countability or counting with the language game of denoting non-countability, as represented by the infinite or the infinitesimal. Instead of saying that they violate the apriori self-declared “gaming pragmatics” we also could say that they change the most basic reference system on the fly, without any indication of doing so. This may happen through an inadequate use of the concept of infiniteness.

4. DR 242 eternal return: it is not the same and the identical that returns, but the virtual structuredness (not even a “principle”), without which metamorphosis can’t be conceived.

5. In „Difference and Repetition“, Deleuze chose to spell “Idea” with a capital letter, in order to distinguish his concept from the ordinary word.

7. Here we find interesting possibilities for a transition to Alan Turing‘s formal foundation of creativity [5].

8. This includes the usage of concepts like virtuality, differential, problematic field, the rejection of the primacy of identity and closely related to that, the rejection of negativity, the rejection of the notion of representation, etc. Rejecting the negative opens an interesting parallel to Wittgenstein’s insisting on the transcendentality of logics and the subordination of any practical logic to performance. Since the negative is a purely symbolic entity, it is also purely aposteriori to any genesis, that is self-referential performance.

9. I would like to recommend to take a look to the second part of part IV in D&R, and maybe, also to the concluding chapter therein (download it here).

10. Saying „we“ here is not just due to some hyperbolic politeness. The targeted concept of this essay, the choreosteme, has been developed by Vera Bühlmann and the author of this essay (Klaus Wassermann) in close collaboration over a number of years. Finally the idea proofed to be so strong that now there is some dissent about the role and the usage of the concept.

11. For belief revision as described by others, overview @ Stanford, a critique by Pollock, who clarified that belief revision as comprised and founded by the AGM theory (see below) is incompatible to  standard epistemology.

12. By symbolism we mean the belief that symbols are the primary and apriori existent entities for any description of any problematic field. In machine-based epistemology for instance, we can not start with data organized in tables because this pre-supposes a completed process of “ensymbolization”. Yet, in the external world there are no symbols, because symbols only exist subsequent to interpretation. We can see that symbolism creates the egg-chick-problem.

13. Miriam Meckel, communication researcher at the university of Zürich, is quite active in drawing dark-grey pictures. Recently, she coined “Googlem” as a resemblance to Google and Golem. Meckel commits several faults in that: She does not understand the technology(accusing Google to use averages), and she forgets about the people (programmers) behind “the computer”, and the people using the software as well. She follows exactly the pseudo-romantic separation between nature and the artificial.

Miriam Meckel, Next. Erinnerungen an eine Zukunft ohne uns,  Rowohlt 2011.

14. Here we find a resemblance to Wittgenstein’s denial to attribute philosophy the role of an enabler of understanding. According to Wittgenstein, philosophy even does not and can not describe. It just can show.

15. This also concerns the issue of cross-culturality.

16. Due to some kind of cultural imprinting, a frequently and solitary exercised habit, people almost exclusively think of Cartesian spaces as soon as a “space” is needed. Yet, there is no necessary implication between the need for a space and the Cartesian type of space. Even Deleuze did not recognize the difficulties implied by the reference to the Cartesian space, not only in D&R, but throughout his work. Nevertheless, there are indeed passages (in What is philosophy? with “planes of immanence”, or in the “Fold”) where it seems that he could have smelled into a different conception of space.

17. For the role of „elements“ please see the article about „Elementarization“.

18. Vera Bühlmann [8]: „Insbesondere wird eine Neu-Bestimmung des aristotelischen Verhältnisses von Virtualität und Aktualität entwickelt, unter dem Gesichtspunkt, dass im Konzept des Virtuellen – in aller Kürze formuliert – das Problem struktureller Unendlichkeit auf das Problem der zeichentheoretischen Referenz trifft.“

19. which is also a leading topic of our collection of essays here.

20. e.g. Gerhard Gamm, Sybille Krämer, Friedrich Kittler

21. cf. G.C. Tholen [7], V.Bühlmann [8].

22. see the chapter about machinic platonism.

23. Actually, Augustine instrumentalises the discovered difficulty to propose the impossibility to understand God’s creation.

24. It is an „ancestry“ only with respect to the course in time, as the result of a process, not however in terms of structure, morphology etc.

25. cf. C.S. Peirce [16], Umberto Eco [17], Helmut Pape [18];

26. Note that in terms of abstract evolutionary theory rugged fitness landscapes enforce specialisation, but also bring along an increased risk for vanishing of the whole species. Flat fitness landscapes, on the other hand, allow for great diversity. Of course the fitness landscape is not a stable parameter space, neither locally not globally. IN some sense, it is even not a determinable space. Much like the choreostemic space, it would be adequate to conceive of the fitness landscape as a space built from 2-set of transformatory power and the power to remain stability. Both can be determined only in hindsight. This paradoxality is not by chance, yet it has not been discovered as an issue in evolutionary theory.

27. Of course I know that there are important differences between verbs and substantives, which we may level out in our context without loosing too much.

28. In many societies, believing has been thought to be tied to religion, the rituals around the belief in God(s). Since the renaissance, with upcoming scientism and profanisation of societies religion and science established sort of a replacement competition. Michel Serres described how scientists took over the positions and the funds previously held by the cleric. The impression of a competition is well-understandable, of course, if we consider the “opposite direction” of the respective vectors in the choreostemic space. Yet, it is also quite mistaken, maybe itself provoked by overly idealisation, since neither the clerk can make his day without models nor the scientist his one without beliefs.

29. The concept of “theory” referred to here is oriented towards a conceptualisation based on language game and orthoregulation. Theories need to be conceived as orthoregulative milieus of models in order to be able to distinguish between models and theories, something which can’t be accomplished by analytic concepts. See the essay about theory of theory.

30. Of course, we do not claim to cover completely the relation between experiments, experience, observation on the one side and their theoretical account on the other by that. We just would like to emphasize the inextricable dynamic relation between modeling and concepts in scientific activities, whether in professional or “everyday-type” of science. For instance, much could be said in this regard about the path of decoherence from information and causality. Both aspects, the decoherence and the flip from intensifying modeling over to a conceptual form has not been conceptualized before. The reason is simple enough: There was no appropriate theory about concepts.

When, for instance, Radder [28] contends that the essential step from experiment to theory is to disconnect theoretical concepts from the particular experimental processes in which they have been realized [p.157], then he not only misconceives the status and role of theories, he also does not realize that experiments are essentially material actualisations of models. Abstracting regularities from observations into models and shaping the milieu for such a model in order to find similar ones, thereby achieving generalization is anything but to disconnect them. It seems that he overshoot a bit in his critique of scientific constructivism. Additionally, his perspective does not provide any possibility to speak about the relation between concepts and models. Though Radder obviously had the feeling of a strong change in the way from putting observations into scene towards concepts, he fails to provide a fruitful picture about it. He can’t surpass that feeling towards insight, as he muses about “… ‘unintended consequences’ that might arise from the potential use of theoretical concepts in novel situations.” Such descriptions are close to scientific mysticism.

Radder’s account is a quite recent one, but others are not really helpful about the relation between experiment, model and concept either. Kuhn’s praised concept of paradigmatic changes [24] can be rated at most as a phenomenological or historizing description. Sure, his approach brought a fresh perspective in times of overdone reductionism, but he never provided any kind of abstract mechanism. Other philosophers of science stuck to concepts like prediction (cf. Reichenbach [20], Salmon [21]) and causality (cf. Bunge [22], Pearl [23]), which of course can’t say anything about the relation to the category of concepts. Finally, Nancy Cartwright [25], Isabelle Stengers [26], Bruno Latour [9] or Karin Knorr Cetina [10] are representatives for the various shades of constructivism, whether individually shaped or as a phenomenon embedded into a community, which also can’t say anything about concepts as categories. A screen through the Journal of Applied Measurement did not reveal any significantly different items.

Thus, so far philosophy of science, sociology and history of science have been unable to understand the particular dynamics between models and concepts as abstract categories, i.e. as _Modelsor _Concepts.

31. If the members of a community, or even the participants in random interactions within it, agree on the persistence of their relations, then they will tend to exhibit a stronger propensity towards collaboration. Robert Axelrod demonstrated that on the formal level by means of a computer experiment [33]. He has been the first one, who proposed game theory as a means to explain the choice of strategies between interactees.

32. Orig.: „Seit über 200 Jahren ist die Philosophie anthropologisch bestimmt. Was das genauer bedeutet, hat sie dagegen kaum erforscht.“

33. Orig.: „Nietzsches Idealismuskritik, die in vielen Schattierungen vorliegt und immer auf das philosophische Selbstmissverständnis eines reinen Geistes und reiner Begriffe zielt, richtet sich auch gegen ein bestimmtes Naturverständnis.“ (KAV439)

34. More precisely, in evolutionary processes the capability for generalization is selected under conditions of scarcity. Scarcity, however, is inevitably induced under the condition of growth or consumption. It is important to understand that newly emerging levels of generalization do not replace former levels of integration. Those undergo a transformation with regard to their relations and their functional embedding, i.e. with regard to their factuality. In morphology of biological specimens this is well-known as “Überformung”. For more details about evolution and generalization please see this.

35. The notions of “philosophy of nature” or even “natural philosophy” are strictly inappropriate. Both “kinds” of philosophy are not possible at all. They have to be regarded as a strange mixture of contemporarily available concepts from science (physics, chemistry, biology), mysticism or theism and the mistaken attempt to transfer topics as such from there to philosophy. Usually, the result is simply a naturalist fallacy with serious gaps regarding the technique of reflection. Think about Kant’s physicalistic tendencies throughout his philosophy, the unholy adaptation of Darwinian theory, analytic philosophy, which is deeply influenced by cybernetics, or the comeback of determinism and functionalism due to almost ridiculous misunderstandings of the brain.

Nowadays it must be clear that philosophy before the reflection of the role of language, or more general, before the role of languagability—which includes processes of symbolization and naming—can’t be regarded as serious philosophy. Results from sciences can be imported into philosophy only as formalized structural constraints. Evolutionary theory, for instance, first have to be formalized appropriately (as we did here), before it could be of any relevance to philosophy. Yet, what is philosophy? Besides Deleuze’s answer [35], we may conceive philosophy as a technique of asking about the conditionability of the possibility to reflect. Hence, Wittgenstein said that philosophy should be regarded as a cure. Thus philosophy includes fields like ethics as a theory of morality or epistemology, which we developed here into a “choreostemology”.

36. Orig.: „Der Punkt, um den es sich namentlich handelt, lässt sich ganz bestimmt angeben. Es ist gleichsam der Apfel in dem logischen Sündenfall der deutschen Philosophie nach Kant: das Verhältnis zwischen Subjekt und Objekt in der Erkenntnis.“

37. Despite Rölli usually esteems Deleuze’s philosophy of the differential, here he refers to the difference though. I think it should be read as “divergence and differential”.

38. Orig.: „Nach allem wird klarer geworden sein, dass es sich bei diesem Pragmatismus nicht um einen einfachen Pragmatismus handelt, sondern um einen mit aller philosophischen Raffinesse konstruierten Pragmatismus der Differenz.“

39. As scientific facts, Quantum physics, the probabilistic structure of the brain and the non-representationalist working of the brain falsify determinism as well as finiteness of natural processes, even if there should be something like “natural laws”.

40. See the article about the structure of comparison.

41. Even Putnam does so, not only in his early functionalist phase, but still in Representation and Reality [36].

42. Usually, philosophers are trained only in logics, which does not help much, since logic is not a process. Of course, being trained in mathematical structures does not imply that the resulting philosophy is reasonable at all. Take Alain Badiou as an example, who just blows up materialism.

43. A complete new theory of governmentality and sovereignty would be possible here.

44. The notion of “scopic” media as coined by Knorr Cetina means that modern media substantially change the point of view (“scopein”, looking, viewing). Today, we are not just immersed into them, but we deliberately choose them and search for them. The change of perspective is thought to be a multitude and contracting space and time. This however, is not quite typical for the new media.

45. Here we refer to our extended view onto “information” that goes far beyond the technical reduced perspective that is forming the main stream today. Information is a category that can’t be limited to the immaterial. See the chapter about “Information and Causality”.

46. Vera Bühlmann described certain aspects of Deleuze’s philosophy as an attempt to naturalize transcendentality in the context of emergence, as it occurs in complex systems. Deleuze described the respective setting in “Logic of Sense” [49] as the 14th series of paradoxes.

47. …which is not quite surprising, since we developed the choreostemic space together.

References
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۞

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